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Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Scope of This Dissertation
“Good savers, bad investors” (originally: “Gute Sparer, schlechte Anleger”) is how
the German magazine Capital described Germans and their financial decision
making in 2014.1 This statement captures what both practitioners and aca-
demics have been repeating for years: Individuals do not invest sufficiently
into the stock market. According to Deutsche Aktieninstitut, only 15.7% of the
German population invested, directly or indirectly, into stocks in 2017.2
In 2008, the financial crisis led to an erosion of trust, a component key to
encouraging investors to take financial risks (Guiso et al., 2008; Sapienza and
Zingales, 2012). Now that trust has slowly been restored, and of course aided
by years of (nominal) interest rates close to zero, the proportion of equity in-
vestors has recovered to the level prior to the financial crisis. However, there
are various other reasons why investors shy away from the stock market in
the first place. Aside from rational reasons such as severe capital and liquid-
ity constraints, investors tend to focus on short-horizon risk when in fact they
have long-horizon investment goals, or they do not adequately understand
investment risks conveyed through descriptions and illustrations (Benartzi
1 Editorial in September 2014, see https://www.capital.de/wirtschaft-politik/gute-
sparer-schlechte-anleger.
2 https://www.dai.de/files/dai_usercontent/dokumente/studien/2018-02-
19%20Aktieninstitut%20Aktionaerszahlen%202017%20Web.pdf.
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and Thaler, 1995, 1999; Weber et al., 2005; Beshears et al., 2011; Kaufmann
et al., 2013).
Unfortunately, convincing oneself to invest into the stock market is only
the very first step. Once invested, new “dangers” await. Shall I pick stocks?
Shall I try to time the market? Shall I invest into stocks of firms in my re-
gion, stocks of firms whose business I know well? In general, the answer to
all of these questions is a resounding No!. Many investors, however, make
such simple investment mistakes (Calvet et al., 2007). Discussing these in-
vestor mistakes, their potential psychological roots, and their monetary con-
sequences is far beyond the scope of this dissertation.3
Instead, this dissertation focuses on one aspect that can help investors
overcome investment mistakes: Delegation of investment decisions. In the
last decade, extensive research on two potential solutions to reduce investor
mistakes has been produced. The first potential solution is to increase indi-
viduals’ financial sophistication or literacy. Pioneered by Annamaria Lusardi
(see e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014), financial literacy has been linked to in-
creased stock market participation (van Rooij et al., 2011), greater awareness
for retirement planning (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi, 2011), and stronger
portfolio diversification (Calvet et al., 2007; Gaudecker, 2015; Guiso and Vi-
viano, 2015). There is, however, also skepticism about the benefits of finan-
cial literacy. In a meta study of the economics of financial literacy, Fernandes
et al. (2014) conclude that the importance of financial literacy may have been
vastly overstated due to omitted psychological traits (and other variables).
The second potential solution – and the common theme in this disserta-
tion – is delegation of investment decisions. Instead of investing on their
own, investors can easily delegate investment decisions to another party,
hereafter summarized by the term money manager. In practice, this party
3 For an easy-to-read, non-academic handbook on investment mistakes and how they can be
avoided, the interested reader is therefore referred to Weber et al. (2007).
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is often either an intermediary in the form of a human investment advisor or
a robo-advisor, or a fund manager.4
Today, the delegation industry is of substantial size. In 2017, the market
for financial planning and advice in the U.S. was estimated at US$ 56bn, pro-
viding jobs for more than 215.000 employees.5 U.S. robo-advisors, such as
Betterment or Wealthfront, already report several billion US$ worth of assets
under management.6 In Germany, the largest robo-advisor, Scalable Capital,
recently surpassed 1bn e of assets under management.7
The delegation industry also has major impact on investors’ investment
decisions. According to the Investment Company Institute, U.S. mutual fund
investors purchased 50% of their mutual funds through investment sales
force and investment professionals in 2017. For mutual funds held outside
employer-sponsored retirement plans, investment sales force and investment
professionals were the primary purchasing channel.8 In Canada, 58.5% of all
households owning investment funds in 2017 stated to have used financial
advice. Wealthy households (> CAD$ 500.000) were especially dependent
on financial advice (72.4%).9
Reasons for delegating investments can be manifold. Investors, for ex-
ample, may lack time to manage their investments on their own. Investors
may also feel relieved to shift responsibility for investments to someone else
(see e.g., Chang et al., 2016). Most notably, investors may simply lack finan-
cial knowledge. If aware of this lack of knowledge, investors want to avoid
4 There are, of course, more types of financial agents, such as brokers, financial planners, etc.
In the context of this dissertation, all these agents can be thought of as money managers (see
Gennaioli et al., 2015).
5 http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/default.aspx?indid=1316.
6 US$ 13.5bn for Betterment and US$ 10bn for Wealthfront as of March 2018. Data from Google
Finance, 22 May 2018.
7 https://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/banken-versicherungen/scalable-
capital-erster-robo-advisor-sammelt-mehr-als-eine-milliarde\-euro-
kundengelder-ein/22611308.html.
8 https://www.ici.org/pdf/per23-08.pdf.
9 Consultation paper 81-408 of the Canadian Security Administrators from 2017, https://
www.securities-administrators.ca/uploadedFiles/General/RulesPolicyPaper/81-
408_Consultation_Paper_09-01-17_EN.pdf.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
making costly investment mistakes by delegating their investments. That is,
delegation can be regarded as substitute for financial literacy. In any case,
investors must have faith in both the trustworthiness of the other party and
the ability of the other party to make better investment decisions than the
investor herself.
To the disadvantage of investors, overwhelming evidence suggests that
investment decisions made by the other party are far from optimal.10 In
case investors rely on financial advisors,11 there are two obvious explana-
tions: First, delegation usually creates an agency problem, as the financial
advisor (agent) may have monetary incentives to not act in the best inter-
est of the client (principal). This explanation is backed by findings in em-
pirical (Bergstresser et al., 2009; Hackethal et al., 2012; Hoechle et al., 2017,
2018), theoretical (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009, 2012), and experimental stud-
ies (Mullainathan et al., 2012). Second, the financial advisor herself may lack
financial skill and knowledge. Thus, the financial advisor does not invest ef-
ficiently (or makes efficient recommendations), even if interests are aligned.
This explanation is backed by Foerster et al. (2017), who find that financial
advisors in Canada recommend portfolios akin to their own to any client,
regardless of their clients’ needs.
Up to date, the literature on delegation of investments focuses primarily
on the parties involved. On the one hand, behavior of the party that the in-
vestment is delegated to is analyzed. On the other hand, welfare of investors
delegating the investment is investigated. This dissertation is concerned with
how investors make delegated investment decisions. Drawing from various
streams of the finance, psychology, and economics literature, each chapter of
10 To the best of the author’s knowledge, only Gaudecker (2015) finds that investors who make
use of advice from family, friends, or professionals, are overall better off.
11 In order to be concise, literature on fund managers is not discussed here. This strand of lit-
erature, however, leads to a similar conclusion for individual investors: Delegating invest-
ments to fund managers does not benefit investors, either because there is no investment
skill (Fama and French, 2010), or because there is fierce competition and decreasing returns
to scale (Berk and Green, 2004; Pastor et al., 2015).
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this dissertation identifies a particular factor that influences the delegation of
investment decisions.
In chapter 2, the key question is whether investors appreciate the ex ante
quality of the delegated investment decision, or the ex post outcome of the
delegated investment decision. The underlying motive for this question is
the Outcome Bias (Baron and Hershey, 1988), which describes the human ten-
dency to judge decisions by their outcome. Because investing in the stock
market is risky, quality and outcome of investment decisions can diverge.12
If investors reward investment outcomes instead of investment quality, their
behavior can distort the behavior of the money manager they delegate the in-
vestment to. The Outcome Bias can hence lead to suboptimal (i.e., too risky)
investment decisions of money managers. Unlike causes studied in the del-
egation literature, under the Outcome Bias it is flawed judgment of investors
that leads to suboptimal delegated investment decisions.
In chapter 3, the key question is whether trustworthiness of money man-
agers influences investors’ delegation decisions. Specifically, this chapter ex-
amines the Money Doctors theory by Gennaioli et al. (2015). The intuition of
this well-cited13 theory is that trust lowers the perceived riskiness of invest-
ments. That is, trustworthy money managers make investors comfortable to
take financial risk by essentially holding their hand. At least two practical
implications follow from the Money Doctors theory: First, it provides an ex-
planation why money managers can charge fees for generic services. Second,
and more important in the context of this dissertation, it shows that trust en-
ables both money managers and investors to benefit from delegation.
12 As a simple example, consider an investment into a single stock. According to normative
theory, investing into a single stock is not a “good” investment decision ex ante. However,
if the stock performs well it is a “good” investment decision ex post.
13 225 citations on Google Scholar, as of June 2018.
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Lastly, in chapter 4 the key question is whether investors are equally will-
ing to delegate their investments to another human or an investment algo-
rithm. The motivation for the last chapter is twofold. On the one hand, liter-
ature on humans’ interaction with algorithms is indecisive. In some domains
humans are found to be averse to the use of algorithms, while in others they
are found to rely on algorithms. On the other hand, few industries have been
affected by growing digitalization as much as the finance industry. Hence,
the fourth chapter sheds light on the presumed importance of a human touch
in financial delegation.
1.2 Contribution and Results of This Dissertation
1.2.1 Outcome Bias in Financial Decision Making
Chapter 2, coauthored with Martin Weber, presents an experimental study
of the Outcome Bias. The Outcome Bias refers to the human tendency to
base judgments about decisions’ quality on irrelevant outcome information
(Baron and Hershey, 1988). It is well-documented in both experimental and
empirical studies in different fields. It also seems to be present in various
financial contexts. CEOs, for example, are found to be rewarded for good
luck (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) and punished for bad luck (Jenter
and Kanaan, 2015). In the mutual fund industry, investors are found to chase
returns (Sirri and Tufano, 1998), even though chasing returns does not pay
off going forward (Frazzini and Lamont, 2008; Fama and French, 2010).
To study whether investors focus on investment outcomes (i.e., chase re-
turns) or investment quality, we conducted an incentivized online experi-
ment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Investigating the Outcome Bias
experimentally is warranted, because in real-world data it is virtually im-
possible to isolate the Outcome Bias from investor beliefs. If, for example,
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investors believe in fund manager skill, it would be rational to judge fund
managers based on past performance. If investors do not believe in fund
manager skill, judging fund managers based on past performance would be
driven by the Outcome Bias. In an experiment, we can control the informa-
tion necessary to judge investment quality.
In our experiment, participants have to choose among several investment
managers. These investment managers invest either into a stochastically
dominant (“good”) asset, or a stochastically dominated (“bad”) asset. Par-
ticipants are monetarily incentivized to select an investment manager who
invests into the good asset. However, returns are randomly drawn from
the respective asset’s payoff distribution. Hence, good investments may –
ex post – yield worse outcomes than bad investments. In three randomly
ordered treatments, we vary the simplicity with which the quality (i.e., the
type) of the investment can be inferred. Common to all treatments, quality
and outcome can be separated. In the first treatment, participants are shown
the asset each investment manager invests into. In the second treatment, par-
ticipants are not shown the assets of each investment manager. However, the
good asset always pays a fixed amount over the bad asset, such that assets
have all unique payoffs. Hence, participants can easily infer the quality of the
investment from the uniqueness of outcomes. In the third treatment, assets
have common payoffs with different probabilities. Again, participants are
not shown the assets of each investment manager. Participants are only in-
formed that it is randomly determined (50%) into which asset an investment
manager invests, such that participants can choose an investment manager to
maximize the chance of investing into the good asset. Our design therefore
allows us to pin down the cognitive challenge that is most relevant for the
Outcome Bias in financial decision making: Either it is the challenge of using
outcomes only to infer investment quality alone, or the additional challenge
of dealing with uncertainty about investment quality.
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We find that 44% of all investment manager choices are outcome biased
even in the first treatment. In the second and third treatment, this fraction in-
creases to approximately 60%. In all treatments, investment manager choices
that resulted in investments into the bad asset are almost exclusively driven
by the Outcome Bias. Our findings suggest that individuals find it difficult
to separate investment quality from investment outcomes. Specifically, indi-
viduals mistake high outcomes for good decisions, when all information that
proves otherwise is readily available. Using simulations of random choices,
we also rule out that results are a product of chance.
Findings from this study may also have implications for policymakers.
Today, investment funds, financial advisors, and other financial service
providers must inform investors that “past performance is no reliable indicator
for future performance”. All too often, this crucial disclaimer is hidden in
footnotes. In the light of chapter 2, educating investors that investment
quality and investment outcomes are often not identical remains a key
challenge. Therefore, it may be helpful to stress factors that affect investment
quality, such as fees, more prominently.
1.2.2 Trust and Delegated Investing: A Money Doctors Ex-
periment
Chapter 3, coauthored with Benjamin Loos and Martin Weber, presents an
experimental study of trust and its role for delegated investing. Trust and
its key role as “lubricant” (Arrow, 1972) of economic transactions has been
documented in many studies. In particular, overall trust has been linked to
stock market participation and greater risk taking (Guiso et al., 2004, 2008).
More recently, Gennaioli et al. (2015) propose a theory of delegation that
includes trust as its core component. Their Money Doctors model explains
management fees as a trust premium voluntarily paid by investors. Trusting
1.2. Contribution and Results of This Dissertation 9
in money managers reduces investors’ anxiety to make risky investments.
Ceteris paribus, more trustworthy money managers can set higher fees for
generic services, because investors still profit from increased participation in
risky investments.
We are the first to test this theory in a laboratory experiment. Investigat-
ing this theory experimentally is warranted, because it a) permits a a clean
quantification of trust, and b) allows us to measure the trust-cost relationship.
Due to the interactive nature of the experiment, we conducted a laboratory
experiment at the Mannheim MLab.
In the experiment, participants first play a trust game (Berg et al., 1995).
We exploit variation in the amounts participants return in this game as mea-
sure of trustworthiness. In two treatments, participants assuming the role of
an investor are then matched to two other participants. These two matched
participants represent money managers. By providing the amount these
matched participants returned in the trust game, we induce different lev-
els of trustworthiness. In the first treatment, investors are then asked to
make two separated, delegated investment decisions. In the second treat-
ment, investors are first asked to make a delegated investment decision with
one money manager, and are subsequently asked to indicate costs they are
willing to pay to make the same investment decision with a second money
manager. Crucially, in both treatments both money managers offer identical
before-costs investment opportunities.
In summary, we find that investors take substantially more risk with
more trustworthy money managers, even though these are exogenously
assigned twice the costs of less trustworthy money managers. Similarly,
results from the second treatment show that investors are willing to accept
considerably higher costs from a more trustworthy money manager than
from a less trustworthy money manager. Both, the willingness to invest
more risky and the willingness to pay higher costs, are increasing in the
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difference in money manager trustworthiness. Furthermore, we show that
our results survive if we control for alternative explanations such as biased
investor beliefs. Most importantly, our study provides evidence that money
managers and investors benefit from increased trust: Investors’ profits from
increased risk taking exceed the additional costs they are charged.
Most of the literature on delegated investing paints a dire picture of the
usefulness of money managers. This dissertation’s third chapter, on the con-
trary, highlights a positive aspect of delegated investing. Although investors
would be best off with higher risk taking at lower costs, they are still better
off with higher risk taking at higher costs, if they trust their money manager.
Trust may thus well be the “substantial intangible benefit” Bergstresser et al.
(2009, p.4129) suspect but cannot observe.
1.2.3 Algorithm Aversion in Financial Investing
Chapter 4, coauthored with Christoph Merkle, presents an experimental
study of Algorithm Aversion and its role for delegated investing. The term
algorithm aversion was recently coined by Dietvorst et al. (2015). It refers to
the tendency to rely on human predictions or recommendations more than
on those of an algorithm, even if the latter (observably) performs better. The
concept of algorithm aversion, however, is not new. In several contexts, such
as medical recommendations, studies have documented aversion towards
algorithms (e.g., Promberger and Baron, 2006; Shaffer et al., 2013; Yeomans
et al., 2017).
Little attention has been paid to algorithm aversion and its potential role
in financial markets. Financial markets in particular, however, have been
reshaped by increasing digitalization in recent years. Due to abundant com-
puting power and potent exchange infrastructure, algorithmic traders now
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try to profit from mispricings within milliseconds. The delegation indus-
try has also been subject to radical change. Robo-advisors, such as Better-
ment or Wealthfront in the U.S. or Scalable Capital and Vaamo in Germany, now
compete successfully with human investment advisors. Human investment
advisors, to keep their lead, can use computerized financial tools (e.g., Fina-
metrica) in the advisory process. These ongoing developments warrant an
investigation of algorithm aversion in a financial context.
In our experiment, participants have to delegate an investment decision
to an intermediary. This intermediary is either a human fund manager or
an investment algorithm. Since we must necessarily pin a human against an
algorithm, we conducted a laboratory experiment at the Mannheim MLab.
Using a simple market consisting of one risky stock and one riskless bond,
we program the investment algorithm to maximize expected return. Human
fund managers are appointed from the group of participants after having
succeeded in a quiz measuring financial literacy and numeracy skills. Par-
ticipants assuming the role of investors then have to indicate to whom they
want to delegate their investment. To investigate investors’ initial algorithm
aversion, we measure the strength of investors’ preference for either interme-
diary, and we make use of survey responses collected several weeks before
the laboratory experiment.
We find no evidence for algorithm aversion. When both intermediaries
charge equal fees, 56% of participants decide to invest with the algorithm in
the initial choice. If fees differ, participants mostly (> 80%) choose the in-
termediary with lower fees. There is also no strong trend in the proportions
choosing either intermediary. Once investors learn about investment choices
and outcomes of both intermediaries, they focus on performance. In line
with Bayesian behavior, choices are strongly influenced by cumulative past
performance. Critically, in their reaction to performance, participants do not
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discriminate between intermediaries. Specifically, they do not respond dif-
ferently to mistakes by the intermediaries, rejecting the idea of trust in an al-
gorithm eroding more quickly. Hence, we find no support for the two major
predictions of algorithm aversion – general preference for human judgment
and adverse response to errors by an algorithm – in the domain of financial
decision making.
The fourth chapter helps clarify the literature’s inconclusive stance on al-
gorithm aversion. When the investment setting is easy to understand, in-
vestors do not discriminate between a human fund manager and an invest-
ment algorithm. Unlike in previous studies, in our experiment investors
can choose a real human. Hence, finding no sign of algorithm aversion is
a strong indicator that a human touch is not a necessity for delegated in-
vesting. Strong performance of the intermediary, however, is a necessity for
delegated investing. Human advisors should therefore consider forming a
symbiotic relationship with algorithms in finance: Investors could profit not
only from powerful algorithms, but also from the trust relationship human
advisors can establish.
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Chapter 2
Outcome Bias in Financial
Decision Making ∗
2.1 Introduction
Consider the following scenario: An individual investor with a basic under-
standing of finance, but no time at hand, wants to invest a portion of her
wealth. She therefore asks her trusted financial advisor for help. Knowing
about diversification, she asks her financial advisor to set up a broadly diver-
sified portfolio. Instead, the advisor invests her client’s wealth exclusively
in the oil industry. In the following months, the oil price increases unexpect-
edly, and the oil industry significantly outperforms the broadly diversified
benchmark.
In theory, the random outcome of the investment decision should be ir-
relevant to the quality of the investment decision (e.g., Vlek, 1984). Thus,
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the financial advisor in this scenario should be held responsible for mak-
ing a wrong investment decision, as she opted for unnecessary risks ex ante.
However, most people would take the (positive) outcome into account when
evaluating the advisor’s investment decision. As a result, the investment
decision would be considered good ex post by the decision evaluator. This
tendency to base judgments about decisions’ quality on irrelevant outcome
information was dubbed Outcome Bias by Baron and Hershey (1988). In this
paper, we investigate whether individuals exhibit the Outcome Bias in fi-
nancial decision making. In particular, we examine whether individuals are
more prone to the Outcome Bias the more difficult it becomes to separate de-
cision quality from decision outcome. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to investigate whether and under which circumstances the Outcome
Bias exists in financial decision making. For a deeper analysis of the psycho-
logical foundations of this bias, the interested reader is referred to Baron and
Hershey (1988), Agrawal and Maheswaran (2005), or Savani and King (2015).
The Outcome Bias is well-documented in both experimental and empiri-
cal studies in various fields. In an experiment with officers in the Israel De-
fense Forces, Lipshitz (1989) shows that military decisions are rated better
when their outcomes turn out favorable. Participants associate good out-
comes with superior decision making processes, even though in Lipshitz’
experiment they are independent of another. In a more recent study, Ratner
and Herbst (2005) demonstrate that individuals switch from more profitable
lotteries to less profitable lotteries after observing unfavorable outcomes, de-
spite being able to correctly recall the probabilities of outcomes. In the study
by Ratner and Herbst (2005), however, individuals are not incentivized and
do not have to bear the consequences of their choices.
Several empirical studies also provide support for the Outcome Bias. Lef-
gren et al. (2014), for example, find that the probability of changes made to
the starting lineup of NBA teams spikes after games that are lost by a small
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margin. Losses by a small margin, however, are least informative in a rational
Bayesian framework, as they are most likely to occur by pure chance. In pol-
itics, electorates appear to punish U.S. presidents and governors for severe
natural disasters (Gasper and Reeves, 2011) which are beyond the politicians’
control.
In finance, there is evidence that CEOs are rewarded for good luck
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), and punished for bad luck (Jenter and
Kanaan, 2015). Linking CEO pay or punishment to a component of luck,
however, implies that the decision maker – the CEO – is not only judged
for her decision quality. More important and motivating our experiment,
the Outcome Bias is closely related to the puzzling finding that investors
chase fund returns. The majority of evidence indicates that chasing fund
performance and paying fees to active managers does not pay off for in-
vestors (Frazzini and Lamont, 2008; Fama and French, 2010). There are two
prominent lines of reasoning: First, there may simply be no fund manager
skill that justifies higher costs – this is the argument brought forward by
Fama and French (2010). Alternatively, there are decreasing returns to scale
for capital provided to skilled mutual fund managers. Rationally, capital
flows to well-performing funds. In equilibrium, when capital is provided
competitively, returns are unpredictable (Berk and Green, 2004; Chen et al.,
2004; Pastor et al., 2015). In the first line of reasoning, investors’ judgments
of the fund’s investment decision should not be based on past performance
and returns should not be chased. In the second line of reasoning, chasing
returns may be rational, but will not pay off going forward.
Several studies suggest that investors indeed chase returns. As docu-
mented by Sirri and Tufano (1998), mutual funds with strong recent perfor-
mance receive disproportionally high fund inflows. A similar performance-
flow relationship is observed for private equity partnerships (Kaplan and
Schoar, 2005). Heuer et al. (2017) also provide experimental evidence that
16 Chapter 2. Outcome Bias in Financial Decision Making
even sophisticated private investors misperceive luck for skill and hence
chase returns. Nonetheless, chasing fund returns is not necessarily equiv-
alent to the Outcome Bias. Investors could believe that fund managers pos-
sessed investing skills. Under this premise it would be rational to equate
good past performance with investment skill. However, if investors did not
believe in investing skills, chasing fund returns would be outcome biased.
Since investor beliefs are notoriously difficult to measure, it is virtually im-
possible to isolate the Outcome Bias in real-world data. Thus we can only
observe the result that investors chase returns, but not its precise cause. We
therefore investigate the Outcome Bias experimentally, allowing us to set up
a clean testing environment.
In our experiment, participants have to choose among investment man-
agers. These investment managers invest into either a good or a bad asset,
where good and bad are defined by stochastic dominance. Past performances
of all investment managers are provided. Since asset payoffs are randomly
distributed and drawn independently, past performances can (and should
only) be used to infer the quality of the investment.1 Because investment
managers are fixed to a particular asset, the inference problem becomes one
of selecting the appropriate investment manager.2 While in reality the task of
evaluating fund managers’ skill and its translation into an investment strat-
egy is complex, this task is simple in our experiment: Either an investment
manager follows a good strategy of investing into the good asset, or she does
not.
1 Decision quality and investment quality are essentially the same in our experiment, hence
both terms can be used interchangeably.
2 We believe that fixing investment managers to a particular strategy is reasonably close to
reality. First, there are well known examples of fund managers who represent a certain strat-
egy or style. Warren Buffett (value) in the U.S. or Klaus Kaldemorgen (mixed fund with
active risk management) in Germany may serve as examples here. There is also a literature
in finance that acknowledges this “style investing”, see as examples Barberis and Shleifer
(2003); Kumar (2009); Cronqvist et al. (2015). Second, fund managers’ investment strategies
are essentially a translation of their (alleged) investment skill into action. Hence, an invest-
ment strategy is necessarily linked to a fund manager, as it reflects the fund manager’s best
application of her investment skill.
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In three randomly ordered treatments, we vary the simplicity with which
the quality of the investment can be inferred. Crucially, investment qual-
ity and investment outcome – or in finance terms, skill and luck – can be
separated in all treatments. Moreover, by the choice of assets and by link-
ing assets to investment managers, we ensure that chasing high outcomes is
inconsistent with rational Bayesian behavior. In the first treatment, we ex-
plicitly show the assets every investment manager invests into. Thus, it is
trivial to identify a good investment. In the second treatment, both assets
are constructed such that payoffs uniquely identify the underlying asset. Be-
cause the good asset always pays a fixed additional amount over the bad
asset, it is state-wise dominant. Hence, a good investment can again be iden-
tified – this time from outcomes. In the third treatment we use assets that
can yield identical payoffs with different probabilities, such that the good as-
set first-order stochastically dominates the bad asset. Instead of showing the
investment managers’ assets, however, we inform participants that invest-
ment managers are allocated to either asset with a probability of 0.5. Thus,
a good investment can no longer be inferred with certainty, but participants
can maximize the probability of making a good investment manager choice.
Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 hence share the feature that investment qual-
ity can be inferred with certainty, but outcome information is only needed in
Treatment 2. Similarly, Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 share the feature that in-
vestment quality can be inferred from investment outcomes, but investment
quality can be inferred with certainty only in Treatment 2. We can therefore
pin down which cognitive challenge is (more) relevant for the Outcome Bias
in financial decision making.
We find a substantial Outcome Bias in all treatments. Even in the first
treatment, in which the difference between skill and luck is made obvious,
approximately 44% of all investment manager choices are outcome biased.
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The proportion of outcome biased choices increases by a third in both the sec-
ond and the third treatment. This equal increase is puzzling, since state-wise
dominance used in the second treatment allows for a certain identification of
investment quality, while first-order stochastic dominance used in the third
treatment makes it more complicated to identify investment quality. Our
findings suggest that individuals find it difficult to distinguish skill from
luck. In particular, participants mistake high outcomes for good decisions,
when in fact moderate outcomes are more representative of good decisions.
Importantly, this observation holds regardless of the concept of stochastic
dominance used. Furthermore, our findings seem to be independent of socio-
demographic characteristics. To address sample selection concerns and to es-
tablish a benchmark against which our results can be measured, we simulate
the experiment with random choices. Comparing observed data to randomly
simulated data lends further support to our findings. Observed proportions
of outcome biased choices are consistently and significantly larger than pre-
dicted by chance.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one comparable study by
König-Kersting et al. (2017). They show that investors reward agents more
the better the outcomes of the delegated investment decision. In their set-
ting, however, a good investment cannot be defined ex ante. Our experiment
allows us to make such definitions. An important feature of our setting is
that we ask participants for their preferred asset in any treatment. Hence, we
can account for individual preferences and adjust what constitutes a good in-
vestment ex ante accordingly. Contrasting choices of individuals preferring
the dominant asset with choices of individuals preferring the dominated as-
set does not reveal substantial differences in susceptibility to the Outcome
Bias. Taken together with evidence from the analysis of simulated data, our
main results thus appear to be robust to the objection that participants did
not understand the experimental tasks.
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Lastly, our study contributes to the list of factors found to mitigate the
Outcome Bias (see e.g., Savani and King, 2015; Martin and Cushman, 2016;
Sezer et al., 2016). Although the Outcome Bias is prevalent in the first treat-
ment, it is significantly weaker than in the two treatments in which good
investments need to be inferred from outcomes. Policymakers and financial
institutions should therefore emphasize characteristics that are certain to in-
fluence the quality of investment decisions ex ante. Without much doubt,
educating investors about the detrimental effects of fund fees and steering
them towards low fee funds could be a first step towards improving invest-
ment decision quality – that is, before returns materialize (see also Beshears
et al., 2011). The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2
gives a detailed overview of the experimental setup, how we analyze par-
ticipants’ choices, and the hypotheses we test. A sample description follows
in section 2.3. In section 2.4, general results are presented. In section 2.5,
observed and simulated data are compared and alternative explanations are
considered. Section 2.6 concludes with potential implications for policymak-
ers and financial institutions.
2.2 Experimental Design and Hypothesis
Experimental Design
Under the Outcome Bias, the focus of decision evaluators is on decision out-
comes rather than decision quality. The goal of our experimental design is to
present participants with the choice to either appreciate investment quality
(i.e., skill) or investment outcomes (i.e., luck), while allowing for the two to
be distinguished.
In our experiment, participants’ task (hereafter called manager choice) is to
choose one out of five computerized investment managers. This captures the
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situation investors experience in the real world, in which they have to choose
from a pool of financial money managers. Investment managers invest into
either a good or a bad asset. Thus all complexity from the otherwise com-
plex task of evaluating fund manager skill is eliminated. In the context of
the experiment, skill is equivalent to the strategy of investing into the good
asset. Importantly, while the payoff distribution of the good asset dominates
that of the bad asset, it is possible that the good asset yields lower payoffs by
mere chance. By separating skill from luck, rational investors should choose
an investment manager who invests into the good asset. In three randomly
ordered within-subject treatments, we vary the simplicity with which skill
and luck can be separated. Specifically, these three treatments allow us to
pin down whether the challenge of inferring quality from outcomes alone,
or only in combination with uncertainty drives the Outcome Bias. In all
treatments, the task is as described above. However, characteristics of good
and bad assets and the amount of information provided to participants differ
across treatments. These differences are described in the following.
In Treatment 1, investment managers are first randomly allocated to ei-
ther the good asset or the bad asset. These assets are called Investment B
and Investment A, respectively, and are constructed such that Investment B
first-order stochastically dominates Investment A. Figure 2.1 shows the dis-
tribution of the assets’ discrete payoffs. A random payoff is then drawn from
the allocated asset’s distribution. The payoffs of all investment managers’
assets are subsequently shown to participants as “Last payoffs realized” (see
also Figure A.1). Crucially, in Treatment 1 we also prominently display in
which asset each investment manager invests. Inferring the quality of the
investment manager’s investment is therefore trivial: An investment man-
ager who was allocated to the good asset makes a good investment, while an
investment manager who was allocated to the bad asset makes a bad invest-
ment.
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Figure 2.1: Payoff Distributions of Investments
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In Treatment 2, investment managers are again first randomly allocated
to either the good or the bad asset. However, in this treatment the good as-
set is state-wise dominant to the bad asset. The good asset is constructed
such that its payoffs in any state are $0.05 higher than payoffs of the bad
asset. To make the distinction from the assets used in the first treatment
clear, the assets in this treatment are labeled Investment D and Investment
C, respectively. Again, a random payoff is then drawn from each investment
manager’s allocated asset. Payoffs of all investment managers’ assets are
subsequently shown to participants as “Last payoffs realized”. Contrary to
the first treatment, we do not provide information about the allocated assets
explicitly. However, both assets have all unique payoffs. Hence, participants
can easily infer the asset’s quality – this time from outcomes. Treatment 2
and Treatment 1 therefore share the feature that investment quality can be
inferred with certainty, but outcome information is only needed in Treatment
2. The task in the second treatment thus resembles a situation in which in-
vestors have to choose between two investment funds that follow identical
strategies, but charge different costs.
Treatment 3 is identical to Treatment 1, except that the investment man-
agers’ allocated assets are not shown to participants. However, participants
are informed that investment managers are allocated to either asset with a
probability of 0.5. Fixing the prior belief about the allocation of assets allows
participants to infer the probabilities that last realized payoffs were obtained
from either the good or the bad asset. Because assets have simple, discrete
distributions, the inference problem can either be solved a) graphically by
comparing the ratio of bars from the payoff distributions or b) analytically
by calculating probability ratios.3 Since both assets are skewed into oppo-
site directions, the fixed allocation probability implies that outcomes in the
upper tail of the distribution become relatively more likely to stem from the
3 To assist participants we provide a calculator built into the application.
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bad asset than from the good asset.4 Rational investors should therefore opt
for an investment manager whose investment yielded a moderate outcome.
In other words, chasing extreme outcomes in Treatment 3 does not maxi-
mize the probability of investing in the good asset. Treatment 3 and Treat-
ment 2 therefore share the feature that investment quality can be inferred
from investment outcomes, but investment quality can be inferred with cer-
tainty only in Treatment 2. That is, Treatment 3 adds uncertainty to the task
of Bayesian updating, a condition that has proven difficult for individuals
(Grether, 1992; Ouwersloot et al., 1998; Charness and Levin, 2005). The task
in the third treatment thus resembles a situation in which investors have to
choose between investing into a single stock and a diversified fund. The first
should not be considered a good investment ex ante and is rather likely to
yield extreme outcomes, while latter should be considered a good invest-
ment ex ante and is rather unlikely to yield extreme outcomes. The task in
the third treatment is also loosely related to Charness and Levin (2005), in
whose study high outcomes are a sign of a bad decision.
After participants choose their favored investment manager, a payoff
from the investment manager’s respective asset is drawn. In each treatment
the experimental task is then repeated four additional times with new
independent allocations and new random draws of “Last payoffs realized”.
Thus, we observe a total of 15 manager choices per participant. Participants’
earnings are determined by a random draw of the payoff of one of the 15
tasks. Figure 2.2 illustrates the sequence of the tasks. In addition, partici-
pants play a practice round in the beginning of each treatment, which does
not contribute to their total earnings. The experimental setup, and in partic-
ular the assets’ distributions, is fully known to participants. Instructions and
4 Note that the mode of Investment B is at $1.75, while the highest outcome possible is $2.50.
Assuming that participants are correctly preferring dominant Investment B, the highest
chance of ending up with Investment B is obtained for an outcome of $1.75 (Pr($1.75|B)÷
Pr($1.75|A) = 1.82), whereas this chance is strictly decreasing for higher outcomes down to
Pr($2.50|B)÷ Pr($2.50|A) = 0.5.
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Figure 2.2: Diagram of Experimental Setup
asset distributions are shown at the bottom of the screen during the whole
experiment, such that participants do not need to memorize any informa-
tion. Figure A.1 in the appendix shows an example of the screen participants
see in Treatment 1. Because the component of luck is fundamental to our
analysis, we require participants to answer two binary questions aimed at
testing their understanding of luck at the start of the experiment. The first
question asks for predictability of certain payoffs, i.e., whether investment
managers can promise a particular payoff. The second question asks for
predictability of payoffs based on past payoffs, i.e., whether past payoffs
influence the probability distribution of future payoffs. After submitting
an answer, an explanation of the correct answer is shown immediately.
Furthermore, we ask participants about their experience in understanding
the distributions of assets shown. The experiment concludes with a short
survey of socio-demographics and the extended 7-points cognitive reflection
test (CRT).
Although assets are constructed such that one asset is stochastically dom-
inant to the other, we also ask participants for their preferred asset at the
beginning of each treatment. Asking for the preferred asset permits us to al-
ways identify a good investment decision ex ante: If a participant indicated
a preference for Investment A in Treatment 1, choosing a manager who in-
vests into Investment A is a good manager choice (albeit the asset itself is not
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the good asset). If, as expected, a participant preferred the dominant asset
Investment B, choosing a manager who invests into Investment B is a good
manager choice. Using participants’ indicated asset preferences, we impose
a few restrictions on the experimental task that allow us to better analyze the
data. First, participants must be able to appreciate a good investment deci-
sion. Hence, for every task there must be at least one investment manager
who invests into the preferred asset. Second, participants must be able to
chase luck instead of skill. Thus, for every task there must be at least one in-
vestment manager who invests into the non-preferred asset. Third and last,
we rule out cases in which the investment manager with the highest last re-
alized payoff is also an investment manager who invests into the preferred
asset. These cases would not allow us to distinguish whether a manager
choice was rational or outcome biased and would therefore require us to col-
lect a substantially larger sample. All restrictions are implemented by repeat-
ing the allocation of investment managers to assets and the drawing of asset
payoffs until all restrictions are met. Participants are then only confronted
with tasks that do not violate any of the restrictions above.
Due to the imposed restrictions, one may object that participants are not
presented truly random manager choices. While technically true, we believe
that this is not critical to our experiment for two reasons. First, any series
of manager choices that complies with our restrictions could also occur if
manager choices were truly random. Thus, a rational Bayesian agent would
merely conclude that the series he was presented had a low(er) chance of
occuring. In fact, imposing the first and second restriction does not change
the Bayesian agent’s posterior belief about the 50% - 50% allocation of invest-
ment managers to assets: Both restrictions eliminate equally likely manager
choices and the a-priori probability of investment manager allocations to as-
sets is 50%. Moreover, since participants act in isolation, they cannot learn
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from series that others are presented. Second, the imposed restrictions ap-
ply to all treatments equally. Since there is no reason to believe that they
would affect treatments differently, the restrictions may only affect levels of
the Outcome Bias. Our conclusion that individuals struggle to separate skill
from luck when skill must be inferred from outcomes, regardless of the sim-
plicity of this task, would remain unchanged. Nonetheless, we show basic
results of an additional experiment if no restrictions are imposed in the ap-
pendix. Results are in line with the hypothesis described in the following
section.
Hypothesis
There are two kinds of irrational manager choices that are of interest to us.
First, participants can choose the investment manager with the highest last
realized payoff. As outlined above, this choice is by construction not a ratio-
nal choice. Since the Outcome Bias refers to the tendency to focus on deci-
sion outcomes instead of decision quality, we classify such manager choices
as outcome biased. Second, participants can choose an investment manager
who invests into the bad ( i.e., non-preferred) asset. However, this invest-
ment manager does not necessarily have to be the investment manager with
the highest last realized payoff. All such manager choices are classified as
suboptimal. Consequently, outcome biased manager choices are included in
the set of suboptimal manager choices. If participants choose an investment
manager who invests into the good asset, their choice is rational and thus
classified as neither of the above. Figure 2.3 depicts the types of manager
choices and how they are classified.
Our treatments vary in the degree of simplicity with which skill and luck
can be distinguished. Arguably, making a good manager choice is easiest in
the first treatment – investment managers’ investments are made obvious. In
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Figure 2.3: Diagram of Manager Choices and Their Classification
the second treatment, investment managers’ investments can also be inferred
easily and with certainty. Nonetheless, making a good manager choice re-
quires participants to use outcomes only as indicator of investment quality.
Treatment 3 is designed to be most difficult. In this treatment, participants
need to discount high outcomes in favor of moderate outcomes and need to
compare probabilities of both the good and the bad asset distribution. There-
fore, we seek to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The more difficult the distinction between investment
quality (i.e., skill) and investment outcome (i.e., luck), the
more prone participants are to making outcome biased
manager choices. The proportion of outcome biased man-
ager choices should therefore increase from Treatment 1
to Treatment 2 to Treatment 3.
2.3 Sample Description
The experiment was computerized using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). It was
then posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). We opted for AMT as it
is easy to attract participants, and there is ample evidence suggesting that
AMT is a valid recruiting source (e.g., Paolacci et al., 2010; Buhrmester et al.,
2011; Amir et al., 2012; Goodman et al., 2013; Casler et al., 2013). We recruited
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100 participants in total in January 2017. To guarantee a high quality of re-
sponses, non-U.S.-AMT workers and those with less than 5,000 completed
tasks or an approval rating below 97% were excluded from the experiment.5
The base payment for participation was US$ 0.50. The variable payment con-
sisted of a randomly drawn realization of one of the 15 manager choices. It
could range from US$ 0.25 to US$ 3.00, with an expected value between US$
1.27 and US$ 1.65, depending on the asset chosen. With a duration of about
15 minutes, the total expected payment for participation thus lay approxi-
mately at the level of the current U.S. federal minimum wage of US$ 7.25 per
hour.6
Study participants were predominantly male (70%). The mean age was
≈ 32 years, with the lowest (highest) age being 18 (70) years. Participants’
educational background was higher than the national standard,7 with 46%
of participants holding at least a Bachelor degree. The majority of recruited
AMT-workers had little investment experience. For example, only 25 partici-
pants indicated having ever invested in active funds. Results of the extended
cognitive reflection test showed an average number of correct answers of
3.90 out of 7 with considerable variation (SD=2.30). The large majority of
participants documented they had understood that asset payoffs were inde-
pendent of one another. The two control questions on payoff independence
were answered correctly by 86% and 87%, respectively, and both questions
were answered correctly by 78%. Table A.1 in the appendix provides more
detailed sample statistics.
5 We address the concern that high quality workers may work too efficiently later in the paper.
6 As of October 2016, see https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm.
7 The fraction of U.S. citizens aged 18 or older with a Bachelor degree or higher was ≈ 28.4%
in 2015 according to the United States Census Bureau, see https://www.census.gov/hhes/
socdemo/education/data/cps/2015/tables.html.
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2.4 Results
In the following, we first present results from univariate analyses. We then
resort to multivariate analyses to shed light on the drivers of the Outcome
Bias. Our central question is whether participants seek high investment out-
comes instead of good investment decisions. If they did, they would presum-
ably choose the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff. In
this the case, we classify their manager choices as outcome biased. Thus, a
dummy variable is coded, taking the value of 1 (=Outcome Bias) if partici-
pants choose an investment manager with the highest last realized payoff.
Figure 2.4 depicts the proportions of outcome biased choices by treatments.
In Treatment 1, 43.2% of all manager choices are outcome biased. This frac-
tion increases to 58.2% in Treatment 2, and 60.0% in Treatment 3.8 To assess
differences between treatments we need to account for the fact that obser-
vations are not necessarily independent, since each individual is observed
multiple times per treatment. Therefore, we run simple regressions of Out-
come Bias in a given treatment on a constant only and cluster standard errors
at the individual level. We then test the constant against the proportion of
outcome biased choices observed in the other treatments.9 This approach ef-
fectively performs a test of means with adjusted test statistics. The increase
from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2 and 3, respectively, is highly significant (p-
values=0.000). The difference between Treatment 2 and 3, however, is small
and insignificant (p-value=0.604).
8 Due to technical difficulties, we lose three (0.6%) observations in Treatment 3.
9 Example: When regressing the dummy variable Outcome Bias in Treatment 1 on a constant
only, this constant equals 0.432. We can then test this constant against the proportion of
outcome biased choices observed in Treatment 2, 58.2%, which translates to a constant of
0.582.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Outcome Bias
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Nonetheless, manager choices need not be outcome biased to be subop-
timal. Participants can, in principle, choose an investment manager who in-
vests into the non-preferred asset, but has not obtained the highest last real-
ized payoff (see again Figure 2.3). In this case, we classify manager choices
as suboptimal. Thus, a dummy variable is again coded, taking the value of
1 (=Suboptimal Choice) if participants make a manager choice which does not
maximize the probability of obtaining the preferred asset. Figure 2.5 shows
the distribution of suboptimal choices by treatments. In Treatment 1, par-
ticipants choose suboptimally more than half of the time (54.4%), resulting
in not obtaining the preferred asset. The fraction is even larger for Treat-
ment 2, in which 74.2% of manager choices are suboptimal, again resulting
in not obtaining the preferred asset. The increase from Treatment 1 to Treat-
ment 2 is also highly significant (p-value=0.000). However, the largest frac-
tion of suboptimal choices can be observed in Treatment 3. In this treatment,
in which suboptimal choices correspond to not maximizing the probability
of obtaining the preferred asset, 83.8% of manager choices are suboptimal.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Suboptimal Choices
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Again, differences to both Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are highly significant
(p-values=0.000 and 0.000, respectively).
Suboptimal choices are not necessarily outcome biased choices as well.
For this reason, we analyze whether the Outcome Bias is the primary driver
of suboptimal choices. We code a dummy variable equal to 1 (=Outcome
Bias|Suboptimal) if the manager choice is classified as outcome biased, con-
ditional on the manager choice being classified as suboptimal. By construc-
tion, the total number of observations thus equals the number of suboptimal
choices in each treatment. Shown in Figure 2.6, more than 7 in 10 subop-
timal manager choices are suboptimal due to the Outcome Bias in all three
treatments. Relative to Treatment 1 (79.4%) and Treatment 2 (78.4%, differ-
ence to Treatment 1 insignificant), participants in Treatment 3 base subopti-
mal choices slightly less on outcomes (71.1%). This marginal decrease could
be rooted in the fact that the first two treatments differ from Treatment 3 in
the way optimal manager choices are made. In Treatment 1 and 2, the assets
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Outcome Bias|Suboptimal
56 (20.6%)
216 (79.4%)
80 (21.6%)
291 (78.4%)
121 (28.9%)
298 (71.1%)
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
0 1 0 1 0 1
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Ab
so
lu
te
 (R
ela
tiv
e) 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
1 = outcome biased; 0 = not outcome biased
Abs. Freq. of Outcome Bias if Choice Suboptimal
investment managers invest in can be inferred with certainty, hence an op-
timal manager choice is defined by the asset type itself. On the contrary, in
Treatment 3 the assets investment managers invest in cannot be inferred with
certainty, hence an optimal manager choice is defined by the probability that
each investment manager invests into the good (i.e., preferred) asset. This
probability has to be inferred from the outcomes of all investment managers
and hence provides more opportunities for suboptimal manager choices.
Results of univariate analyses clearly indicate that individuals have dif-
ficulties in separating investment outcomes from investment quality. A con-
siderable fraction of manager choices is outcome biased in the baseline treat-
ment. This is surprising, given that the quality of the decision is known and
given that participants are incentivized to appreciate good decisions. As
such, our results can be interpreted as evidence of the Outcome Bias even
when decision evaluators bear the consequences of their evaluations. In line
with our hypothesis, the tendency to fall prey to the Outcome Bias is even
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of Outcome Bias by Treatment and Round
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stronger in Treatment 3. Because in this treatment Bayesian updating is re-
quired to make optimal manager choices, the result is as expected. More
puzzling, however, participants are equally prone to the Outcome Bias in
Treatment 2. Since, in this treatment, outcomes provide clear information
about the investment’s quality, we expected the Outcome Bias to be sub-
stantially weaker than in Treatment 3. Furthermore, the Outcome Bias ap-
pears to be consistent through rounds within each treatments. As depicted
in Figure 2.7, there is no apparent trend along rounds in any treatment.10
That is, participants do not avoid outcome biased choices the more familiar
they become with the manager choice task. Summed up, the Outcome Bias
is more pronounced once (moderate) outcomes are indicative of the invest-
ment’s quality, regardless of how simple the concept of stochastic dominance
is. Moreover, participants seem to make erroneous manager choices primar-
ily because they focus on high outcomes.
To provide more details on the Outcome Bias, we now resort to multi-
variate analyses. To investigate whether the simplicity (i.e., the concept of
stochastic dominance) with which skill and luck can be separated is the major
driver of the Outcome Bias, the Outcome Bias dummy is used as a dependent
10 In regressions we nonetheless control for potential learning effects over time.
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variable in regressions shown in Table 2.1. Although it is a binary variable,
linear regression results are reported for ease of interpretation; unreported
probit models provide qualitatively similar results. All specifications include
dummies for treatments (Treatment 1 as baseline), our main variables of in-
terest. In addition, we control for participants’ self-reported difficulty of in-
terpreting the assets’ distributions. We also control for the dispersion of last
realized payoffs shown to participants. This is motivated by findings of Seta
et al. (2015), who document that decisions are rated better the higher their
outcomes and the lower the outcomes of alternative decisions. In our exper-
iment, this would mean that the investment manager with the highest last
realized payoff is more likely to be chosen the worse the other investment
managers’ outcomes turned out. Furthermore, specification (3) includes con-
trols for age and gender, and a set of controls for education and investment
experience. We also control for cognitive ability through the CRT. Given the
evidence in the literature (e.g., Ratner and Herbst, 2005), higher performance
on the CRT (Cognitive Score) is expected to reduce the Outcome Bias. All
specifications also account for potential learning effects through round fixed
effects. Although we make use of the panel structure of our data, coefficients
for treatments do not change substantially if we control for unobserved in-
dividual characteristics through either individual fixed effects or individual
random effects. We thus only report the more efficient random effects esti-
mates.
Our regression results confirm the pattern from Figure 2.4. Across all
specifications, coefficients for Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 are highly sta-
tistically significant. Looking at the full specification in column 3, we see
that the baseline probability of observing outcome biased choices is approxi-
mately 47% (Constant=0.471). The coefficients for Treatment 2 and Treatment
3 are similar at 0.160 and 0.171, respectively (F(1,99)=0.08, indicates no sig-
nificant difference). Hence, participants are more than one-third more likely
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Table 2.1: Outcome Bias Regressions – Full Sample
This table reports regression results with Outcome Bias as dependent variable. Outcome Bias is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if participants chose the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff. By construction,
choosing the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff is not a rational (“good”) choice, as it does
not maximize the probability of investing into the preferred asset. Specifications (1) and (3) are pooled OLS regres-
sions. (2) is a multi-level panel regression with individual- and treatment-individual random effects. Treatment 2,
Treatment 3, and Male are dummy variables. Age measures participant’s age in years. Var. of manager payoffs is calcu-
lated as the variance of all five investment managers’ last realized payoffs shown to participant in the current choice
task. Cognitive Score is the number of correct answers on a 7 question cognitive reflection test taken from Toplak et
al. (2014). Understanding Distributions measures how difficult participants found interpreting the distributions of
assets in the experiment. It is calculated from a 5-point Likert scale where 1 refers to “Very easy” and 5 refers to
“Very difficult”.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
POLS Multi-Level Panel POLS
Treatment 3 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.171***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Treatment 2 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.160***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Var. of manager payoffs -0.056 -0.044 -0.061
(0.082) (0.057) (0.068)
Age 0.001
(0.003)
Male -0.068
(0.064)
Cognitive Score -0.020
(0.018)
Understanding Distributions 0.016
(0.032)
Constant 0.473*** 0.470*** 0.471**
(0.059) (0.058) (0.237)
Observations 1,497 1,497 1,497
Round FE YES YES YES
Education/Investment Controls YES
Individual RE YES
Treatment-Individual RE YES
R2adjusted 0.014 0.093
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to make outcome biased choices in these treatments than in Treatment 1. Per-
sonal characteristics do not seem to explain the Outcome Bias, as all addi-
tional control variables are insignificant at conventional levels. In turn, this
suggests that mainly having to infer investment quality from (moderate) out-
comes contributes to the Outcome Bias.
For the sake of completeness, we also estimate regressions with both the
Suboptimal Choice dummy and the Outcome Bias|Suboptimal dummy as de-
pendent variables. Regressions are specified exactly as before. Table 2.2
shows the results for Suboptimal Choice.11 Again, coefficients for Treatment
2 and Treatment 3 are highly statistically significant across all specifications.
Focusing on column 3, the coefficient for Treatment 3 (0.297) implies that
suboptimal choices are almost 30% more likely to be observed in Treatment
3 than they are in Treatment 1. For Treatment 2, this increase is still approx-
imately 21% (coefficient=0.207). Consistent with Figure 2.5, the difference
between both coefficients is statistically significant (F(1,99)=11.48). Male par-
ticipants appear to be slightly less prone to making suboptimal choices, as
indicated by a weakly significant coefficient of -0.078. In addition, cognitive
ability is negatively related to suboptimal choices, although the coefficient
becomes marginally insignificant after controlling for round fixed effects.
In Table 2.3, regression results with Outcome Bias|Suboptimal as de-
pendent variable are summarized. The lower proportion of Outcome
Bias|Suboptimal in Treatment 3 documented in Figure 2.6 also shows
in the regressions. The coefficient for Treatment 3 is negative (-0.083 in
column 3) and significant across all specifications, whereas the coefficient
for Treatment 2 is not significant. Additionally, all other control variables are
11 The coefficients of the constants in column 3 is larger than in other specifications since par-
ticipants whose occupation is “retired” and whose highest educational level is “university
entrance qualification” are captured in the constants. Since only one participant reported
her occupation as “retired” and since she made more suboptimal choices than the average
participant, the effect captured in the constant is large. If other occupations are defined as
baseline, the constant drops without qualitatively changing the results of the regressions.
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Table 2.2: Suboptimal Choice Regressions
This table reports regression results with Suboptimal Choice as dependent variable. Suboptimal Choice is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if participants chose an investment manager who should not have been chosen rationally, i.e., for
whom the probability of investing into the preferred asset is not maximized. Specifications (1) and (3) are pooled
OLS regressions. (2) is a multi-level panel regression with individual- and treatment-individual random effects.
Treatment 2, Treatment 3, and Male are dummy variables. Age measures participant’s age in years. Var. of manager
payoffs is calculated as the variance of all five investment managers’ last realized payoffs shown to participant in the
current choice task. Cognitive Score is the number of correct answers on a 7 question cognitive reflection test taken
from Toplak et al. (2014). Understanding Distributions measures how difficult participants found interpreting the
distributions of assets in the experiment. It is calculated from a 5-point Likert scale where 1 refers to “Very easy”
and 5 refers to “Very difficult”.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
POLS Multi-Level Panel POLS
Treatment 3 0.297*** 0.295*** 0.297***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Treatment 2 0.208*** 0.201*** 0.207***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Var. of manager payoffs -0.071 -0.019 -0.060
(0.079) (0.063) (0.066)
Age -0.001
(0.003)
Male -0.078*
(0.045)
Cognitive Score -0.019
(0.012)
Understanding Distributions 0.019
(0.025)
Constant 0.590*** 0.576*** 0.974***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.213)
Observations 1,500 1,500 1,500
Round FE YES YES YES
Education/Investment Controls YES
Individual RE YES
Treatment-Individual RE YES
R2adjusted 0.064 0.104
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again insignificant. Taken together, results from the regressions indicate that
suboptimal choices are made more frequently the more difficult it becomes
to make optimal choices. However, the proportion of outcome biased choices
out of suboptimal choices remains relatively similar across treatments.12 Our
regression results therefore point to the Outcome Bias as the primary driver
of suboptimal choices. Lastly, multivariate analyses of Suboptimal Choice
and Outcome Bias|Suboptimal suggest that personal characteristics do not
substantially impact manager choices in our experiment.
2.5 Robustness of Results
Observed vs. Simulated Results
To corroborate our findings, we compare them to randomly simulated
results. An advantage of oTree is that it enables testing of experiments
through automated bots. This feature can also be modified to simulate
experiments. The experiment is simulated 1,000 times (i.e., 1,000 simu-
lated participants) with random manager choices. Thus, any investment
manager will be chosen with a probability of one fifth. Such simulation
allows us to establish a benchmark for Outcome Bias, Suboptimal Choice,
and Outcome Bias|Suboptimal. In other words, it allows us to provide
values for the outcome biased and suboptimal choices one would expect
from naïve participants. We also touched on issues that potentially come
with recruiting “high-quality” AMT-workers. One could argue that, for
these workers, the opportunity costs of going through the experiment may
outweigh the expected monetary reward. As a consequence, these workers
may be inclined to select investment managers arbitrarily in order to rush
through the experiment. Simulating the experiment addresses this concern
12 We already discussed earlier why the slight drop of Outcome Bias|Suboptimal in Treatment
3 is not necessarily surprising.
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Table 2.3: Outcome Bias|Suboptimal Regressions
This table reports regression results with Outcome Bias|Suboptimal as dependent variable. Outcome Bias|Suboptimal
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if participants chose the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff,
and equal to 0 if participants did not choose the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff but chose
an investment manager who should not have been chosen rationally, i.e., for whom the probability of investing into
the preferred asset is not maximized. Specifications (1) and (3) are pooled OLS regressions. (2) is a multi-level panel
regression with individual- and treatment-individual random effects. Treatment 2, Treatment 3, and Male are dummy
variables. Age measures participant’s age in years. Var. of manager payoffs is calculated as the variance of all five
investment managers’ last realized payoffs shown to participant in the current choice task. Cognitive Score is the
number of correct answers on a 7 question cognitive reflection test taken from Toplak et al. (2014). Understanding
Distributions measures how difficult participants found interpreting the distributions of assets in the experiment. It
is calculated from a 5-point Likert scale where 1 refers to “Very easy” and 5 refers to “Very difficult”.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
POLS Multi-Level Panel POLS
Treatment 3 -0.084** -0.079** -0.083**
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038)
Treatment 2 -0.011 -0.017 -0.011
(0.037) (0.033) (0.034)
Var. of manager payoffs 0.003 -0.030 -0.037
(0.072) (0.060) (0.068)
Age 0.002
(0.003)
Male -0.007
(0.049)
Cognitive Score -0.008
(0.015)
Understanding Distributions 0.002
(0.026)
Constant 0.802*** 0.785*** 0.484**
(0.060) (0.059) (0.211)
Observations 1,062 1,062 1,062
Round FE YES YES YES
Education/Investment Controls YES
Individual RE YES
Treatment-Individual RE YES
R2adjusted -0.001 0.063
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as well. Note that we do not simulate the heuristic of always choosing the
investment manager with the highest last realized payoff as, by construction,
this would imply simulating only outcome biased (and also suboptimal)
choices.
Table 2.4 contrasts simulated with observed results. Across all treatments,
random manager choices should only be classified as outcome biased in less
than a one out of four cases. Evidently, the Outcome Bias is much more pro-
nounced in the observed data. For Treatment 1, approximately twice as many
manager choices are outcome biased in observed data than in simulated data
(44.2% to 22.7%). For Treatment 2 and Treatment 3, manager choices are al-
most three times as likely to be classified as outcome biased (58.2% to 22.9%
and 60.0% to 24.0%, respectively). To assess differences, we again use the
regression-based approach. The differences between observed and simulated
data are highly significant in all treatments (all p-values=0.000).
There are also significant differences between observed and simulated
data when investigating suboptimal choices. In Treatment 1, however, par-
ticipants make insignificantly fewer suboptimal manager choices in the ex-
periment than would be predicted by chance (54.4% to 58.8%, p-value=0.261).
On the contrary, participants perform substantially worse in Treatment 2 and
Treatment 3. In Treatment 2, the difference between observed (74.2%) and
simulated (57.6%) proportions of suboptimal choices is highly significant.
Similar holds for Treatment 3, in which the number of suboptimal choices is
even larger (83.8%). Although still highly significant, the difference between
observed and simulated proportions (74.0%) is smaller. Note that the con-
siderably higher proportion of simulated suboptimal choices in Treatment 3
is not surprising: While in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 an optimal choice
is determined by the initial asset allocation – the asset type can be identified
with certainty – an optimal choice in Treatment 3 is determined by the last
realized payoffs of all investment managers. Hence, there are fewer cases
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Table 2.4: Observed vs. Simulated Data
Outcome Bias
∆
Outcome Bias = 0 Outcome Bias = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Observed 284 (55.8%) 216 (44.2%) 0.000***
Simulated 3867 (77.3%) 1133 (22.7%)
Treatment 2
Observed 209 (41.8%) 291 (58.2%) 0.000***
Simulated 3857 (77.1%) 1143 (22.9%)
Treatment 3
Observed 199 (40.0%) 298 (60.0%) 0.000***
Simulated 3798 (76.0%) 1180 (24.0%)
Suboptimal Choice
∆
Suboptimal Choice = 0 Suboptimal Choice = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Observed 228 (45.6%) 272 (54.4%) 0.261
Simulated 2062 (41.2%) 2938 (58.8%)
Treatment 2
Observed 129 (25.8%) 371 (74.2%) 0.000***
Simulated 2118 (42.4%) 2882 (57.6%)
Treatment 3
Observed 81 (16.2%) 419 (83.8%) 0.000***
Simulated 1299 (26.0%) 3701 (74.0%)
Outcome Bias|Suboptimal
∆
Outcome Bias|Suboptimal = 0 Outcome Bias|Suboptimal = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Observed 56 (20.6%) 216 (79.4%) 0.000***
Simulated 1805 (61.4%) 1133 (38.6%)
Treatment 2
Observed 80 (21.6%) 291 (78.4%) 0.000***
Simulated 1739 (60.3%) 1143 (39.7%)
Treatment 3
Observed 121 (28.9%) 298 (71.1%) 0.000***
Simulated 2521 (68.1%) 1180 (31.9%)
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in which more than one investment manager maximizes the probability of
obtaining the preferred asset.
Lastly, we can compare how often suboptimal choices are driven by the
Outcome Bias. In every treatment, observed suboptimal choices are about 40
percentage points more likely to be outcome biased than simulated subopti-
mal choices. Due to the definition of suboptimal choices in Treatment 3, the
simulated proportion (31.9%) of Outcome Bias|Suboptimal is lower than in
the other treatments (38.6% and 39.7%). Nonetheless, all differences between
observed and simulated data are again highly significant. Simulated data
therefore support our findings. We present clear evidence that participants
are considerably more prone to the Outcome Bias than would be expected by
chance. Even in our baseline treatment, in which manager choices are least
biased, levels of the Outcome Bias (and hence Outcome Bias|Suboptimal)
are above what can be accounted for by randomness.
Are Different Manager Choices Comparable?
Two key features of our experiment are the random allocation of investment
managers to assets and the random draws of last realized payoffs. Due to this
randomness, circumstances under which manager choices are made need not
be identical. Taking Treatment 1 as an example, it might be that only one
investment manager is allocated to the preferred asset, while all four others
are allocated to the non-preferred asset. In this case, there is only one optimal
choice to make. It might, however, also be the case that four investment man-
agers are allocated to the preferred asset, while only one investment manager
is allocated to the non-preferred asset. In this case, there are four optimal
choices, but only one suboptimal choice. Furthermore, investment managers
may obtain identical last realized payoffs. Hence, two or more investment
managers may tie for the highest last realized payoff.
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Table 2.5: Outcome Bias Regression – Number of Wrong Managers and Ties
of Highest Last Realized Payoff
This table reports regression results with Outcome Bias as dependent variable. Outcome Bias is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if participants chose the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff. By construction,
choosing the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff is not a rational (“good”) choice, as it does
not maximize the probability of investing into the preferred asset. Num. of wrong managers = X are dummy variables
indicating the number of investment managers who, for a given manager choice, would have been classified as
suboptimal choice. By construction, this number is random randomly distributed between 1 and 4 for any manager
choice. Ties of highest last realized payoff = X are dummy variables indicating the number of investment managers
whose last realized payoff tied for the highest last realized payoff of all five investment managers. By construction,
this number is randomly distributed between 1 and 4 for any manager choice. Treatment 2, Treatment 3, and Male are
dummy variables. Age measures participant’s age in years. Var. of manager payoffs is calculated as the variance of all
five investment managers’ last realized payoffs shown to participant in the current choice task. Cognitive Score is the
number of correct answers on a 7 question cognitive reflection test taken from Toplak et al. (2014). Understanding
Distributions measures how difficult participants found interpreting the distributions of assets in the experiment. It
is calculated from a 5-point Likert scale where 1 refers to “Very easy” and 5 refers to “Very difficult”.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLS POLS POLS POLS Panel Panel Panel Panel
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 All Treatments All Treatments All Treatments All Treatments All Treatments
Treatment 3 0.164*** 0.163***
(0.045) (0.045)
Treatment 2 0.151*** 0.152***
(0.038) (0.08)
Num. of wrong managers = 2 0.055 -0.089 -0.030 -0.030 0.019 -0.036 0.021 -0.036
(0.105) (0.102) (0.376) (0.068) (0.057) (0.065) (0.057) (0.065)
Num. of wrong managers = 3 -0.0160 -0.083 -0.033 -0.045 0.031 -0.056 0.032 -0.056
(0.108) (0.095) (0.349) (0.068) (0.060) (0.065) (0.060) (0.065)
Num. of wrong managers = 4 -0.015 -0.065 0.070 0.0130 0.077 -0.030 0.078 -0.030
(0.109) (0.100) (0.344) (0.068) (0.061) (0.067) (0.061) (0.067)
Ties of highest last realized payoff = 2 0.083 0.139** 0.169*** 0.131*** 0.084** 0.106*** 0.085** 0.105***
(0.079) (0.059) (0.061) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038)
Ties of highest last realized payoff = 3 0.201 0.303** 0.002 0.195* 0.237*** 0.238** 0.239*** 0.238**
(0.227) (0.122) (0.222) (0.105) (0.086) (0.102) (0.086) (0.102)
Ties of highest last realized payoff = 4 -0.153 -0.104
(0.313) (0.245)
Var. of manager payoffs -0.042 -0.042
(0.067) (0.067)
Age 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.068 -0.067
(0.064) (0.064)
Cognitive Score -0.020 -0.020
(0.018) (0.018)
Understanding Distributions 0.016 0.016
(0.032) (0.032)
Constant 0.441*** 0.670*** 0.519 0.556*** 0.498*** 0.502** 0.495*** 0.502**
(0.115) (0.097) (0.347) (0.072) (0.068) (0.241) (0.068) (0.241)
Observations 500 499 496 1,495 1,495 1,495 1,497 1,497
Treatment-Round FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES
Education/Investment Controls YES YES
Individual RE YES YES
R2adjusted -0.010 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.096 0.096
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We address these potential issues in Table 2.5. In particular, we estimate
regressions with Outcome Bias as a dependent variable but control for both
the number of investment managers who are a suboptimal choice and the
number of investment managers who tied for the highest last realized pay-
off.13 The constant captures the case in which only one investment manager
obtained the highest last realized payoff. In all specifications except (7) and
(8), we leave out the two observations for which four investment managers
tied for highest last realized payoff.14 We first split the sample by treatments
in columns 1 to 3. The number of potentially suboptimal investment man-
agers does not impact the Outcome Bias. None of the coefficients is sig-
nificant in any of the treatments. However, the number of ties for highest
last realized payoff is positively correlated with the dependent variable. In
Treatment 2, it increases by 13.9% if two managers tie and by 30.3% if three
managers tie. In Treatment 3, if two managers tie for highest historical pay-
off, the probability of the Outcome Bias increases by 16.9%. Once treatments
are pooled, the dummy for two ties for highest last realized payoff still pre-
dicts a highly significant 13.1% increase in the probability of observing an
outcome biased manager choice. The coefficient for three ties is reduced to
0.195 (19.5%) but remains weakly significant. Column 8 presents a fully spec-
ified regression. Specifically, it includes dummies for treatments and socio-
demographic controls. Importantly, treatment dummies remain highly sig-
nificant even after the inclusion of additional controls. Coefficients of 0.152
and 0.163 for Treatment 2 and Treatment 3, respectively, indicate that the
Outcome Bias is approximately one third more likely to be observed in these
treatments than in the baseline treatment. Socio-demographic controls are
13 Since there is always one optimal manager choice, the case of five suboptimal manager
choices or five ties for highest last realized payoff cannot occur.
14 The surprisingly negative coefficient for Ties of highest last realized payoff = 4 is hence only
estimated from two observations.
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not significant. Nonetheless, dummies for two and three investment man-
agers tying for highest last realized payoff are significant at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively. While the coefficient of former dummy is smaller (0.105)
than those for Treatment 2 and Treatment 3, the coefficient of latter is larger
(0.238).
At a first glance, the sizable effect of the number of ties of highest last
realized payoff appears difficult to reconcile with the idea of the Outcome
Bias. Individuals should be rather insensitive to the number of ties of highest
last realized payoff. At a second glance this effect can be reconciled with the
Outcome Bias: The more investment managers tie for highest last realized
payoff, the more tempting it may become to believe that high outcomes must
stem from good investments. Thus, the more investment managers tie, the
more likely participants become to choose one of these managers.
However, the regression coefficients for number of ties for highest last
realized payoff may just reflect the mechanical increase in outcome biased
choices that would be consistent with random choices. In other words, the
more options there are for randomly choosing participants to make outcome
biased choices, the more likely it would be to also observe the Outcome Bias.
This objection is not backed by the data. To provide more details on this is-
sue, we disaggregate our data further. Tables 2.6 to 2.8 show distributions of
the Outcome Bias by treatments. All observations are split by the number of
ties for highest last realized payoff (top to bottom) and the number of poten-
tially irrational manager choices (left to right). Values expected from random
manager choices (as in the simulations) are shown in italics. Focusing on the
cases with one (most likely case) and two (second-most likely case) ties for
highest last realized payoff, we observe that the Outcome Bias is more pro-
nounced than expected by random choices. This observation holds true for
any treatment. In Treatment 1 the Outcome Bias is observed in 42.3% of the
cases in which there is only one investment manager with the highest last
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realized payoff. Randomly simulated choice making, however, would only
account for 20.0% of outcome biased choices in this scenario. The fraction
of outcome biased choices also increases to 50.0% when two managers tie,
thereby remaining above the 40.0%-fraction predicted by random choices.
Expectedly, in Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 outcome biased choices are also
more frequent in the observed data than in the simulated data. If there is only
one highest last realized payoff, 56.0% are outcome biased choices in Treat-
ment 2 and 58.1% are outcome biased choices in Treatment 3. When there
are two highest last realized payoffs, these proportions increase to 68.7% and
75.9%, respectively. Due to small numbers of observations for most specific
cases,15 we refrain from reporting p-values for all differences. However, for
all treatments the difference between observed and simulated data is highly
significant (p-values=0.000) in the case with only a single highest historical
payoff. Hence, regression results are put into perspective: The tendency to
make outcome biased choices is positively affected by the number of poten-
tially outcome biased choices and remains above what can be expected from
random choices.
Subsample: Understanding Questions
Understanding that past payoffs do not predict future payoffs is crucial in
our experiment. If it was not clear to participants that past outcomes do not
predict future outcomes, choosing an investment manager with the highest
last realized payoff could be perfectly rational. To check this objection, we
restrict our sample to those participants who answered both understanding
questions correctly. The sample then shrinks moderately to 1,167 observa-
tions (or 78 participants). Table 2.9 summarizes regression results with Out-
come Bias as dependent variable. For ease of comparison of treatment effects,
15 There is, for example, only one observation with Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff
= 3 and Wrong Manager = 4 in Treatment 1.
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Table 2.6: Outcome Bias by Number of Wrong Managers and Ties of Highest
Last Realized Payoff – Treatment 1
This table reports the distribution of outcome-biased choices by the number of investment managers who, for a
given manager choice, would have been classified as suboptimal choice (Wrong Managers = X) and by the number
of investment managers who tied for the highest last realized payoff (Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized
Payoff = X). If only one investment manager obtained the highest last realized payoff, the number of ties for highest
last realized payoff is counted as 1. Since in any choice task there is at least one investment manager who should be
chosen rationally and because the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff should not be chosen
rationally, the maximum (minimum) number of wrong managers is 4 (1).
Treatment 1 Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 1
Wrong Managers = 1 Wrong Managers = 2 Wrong Managers = 3 Wrong Managers = 4
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 20% 20% 20% 20%
Outcome Bias = 0 14 (58.3%) 64 (51.6%) 110 (59.5%) 71 (61.2%) 259 (57.7%)
Outcome Bias = 1 10 (41.7%) 60 (48.4%) 75 (40.5%) 45 (38.8%) 190 (42.3%)
Total 24 124 185 116 449
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 2
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 40% 40% 40% 40%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. 4 (57.1%) 8 (53.3%) 11 (45.8%) 23 (50.0%)
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. 3 (42.9%) 7 (46.7%) 13 (54.2%) 23 (50.0%)
Total n.a. 7 15 24 46
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 3
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 60% 60% 60% 60%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. n.a. 2 (50.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (40.0%)
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. n.a. 2 (50.0%) 1 (100.0%) 3 (60.0%)
Total n.a. n.a. 4 1 5
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 4
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 80% 80% 80% 80%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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Table 2.7: Outcome Bias by Number of Wrong Managers and Ties of Highest
Last Realized Payoff – Treatment 2
This table reports the distribution of outcome-biased choices by the number of investment managers who, for a
given manager choice, would have been classified as suboptimal choice (Wrong Managers = X) and by the number
of investment managers who tied for the highest last realized payoff (Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized
Payoff = X). If only one investment manager obtained the highest last realized payoff, the number of ties for highest
last realized payoff is counted as 1. Since in any choice task there is at least one investment manager who should be
chosen rationally and because the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff should not be chosen
rationally, the maximum (minimum) number of wrong managers is 4 (1).
Treatment 2 Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 1
Wrong Managers = 1 Wrong Managers = 2 Wrong Managers = 3 Wrong Managers = 4
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 20% 20% 20% 20%
Outcome Bias = 0 11 (36.7%) 49 (45.4%) 81 (45.5%) 47 (42.3%) 188 (44.0%)
Outcome Bias = 1 19 (63.3%) 59 (54.6%) 97 (54.5%) 64 (57.7%) 239 (56.0%)
Total 30 108 178 111 427
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 2
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 40% 40% 40% 40%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. 3 (30.0%) 8 (29.6%) 9 (33.3%) 20 (31.3%)
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. 7 (70.0%) 19 (70.4%) 18 (66.7%) 44 (68.7%)
Total n.a. 10 27 27 64
6
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 3
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 60% 60% 60% 60%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. n.a. 0 (0.0%) 1 (16.7%) 1 (12.5%)
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. n.a. 2 (100.0%) 5 (83.3%) 7 (87.5%)
Total n.a. n.a. 2 6 8
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 4
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 80% 80% 80% 80%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 (100.0%) 1 (100.0%)
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 1
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Table 2.8: Outcome Bias by Number of Wrong Managers and Ties of Highest
Last Realized Payoff – Treatment 3
This table reports the distribution of outcome-biased choices by the number of investment managers who, for a
given manager choice, would have been classified as suboptimal choice (Wrong Managers = X) and by the number
of investment managers who tied for the highest last realized payoff (Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized
Payoff = X). If only one investment manager obtained the highest last realized payoff, the number of ties for highest
last realized payoff is counted as 1. Since in any choice task there is at least one investment manager who should be
chosen rationally and because the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff should not be chosen
rationally, the maximum (minimum) number of wrong managers is 4 (1).
Treatment 3 Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 1
Wrong Managers = 1 Wrong Managers = 2 Wrong Managers = 3 Wrong Managers = 4
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 20% 20% 20% 20%
Outcome Bias = 0 1 (50.0%) 10 (52.6%) 43 (43.9%) 129 (40.6%) 183 (41.9%)
Outcome Bias = 1 1 (50.0%) 9 (47.4%) 55 (56.1%) 189 (59.4%) 254 (58.1%)
Total 2 19 98 318 437
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 2
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 40% 40% 40% 40%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. 0 (0.0%) 3 (50.0%) 10 (21.3%) 13 (24.1%)
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. 1 (100.0%) 3 (50.0%) 37 (78.7%) 41 (75.9%)
Total n.a. 1 6 47 54
6
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 3
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 60% 60% 60% 60%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. n.a. 0 (0.0%) 2 (50.0%) 2 (40.0%)
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. n.a. 1 (100.0%) 2 (50.0%) 3 (60.0%)
Total n.a. n.a. 1 4 5
Number of Ties for Highest Last Realized Payoff = 4
Chance of random choice to be outcome-biased: 80% 80% 80% 80%
Outcome Bias = 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 (100.0%) 1 (100.0%)
Outcome Bias = 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Total n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 1
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Table 2.9: Outcome Bias Regression – Subsamples
This table reports regression results with Outcome Bias as dependent variable. Outcome Bias is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if participants chose the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff. By construction,
choosing the investment manager with the highest last realized payoff is not a rational (“good”) choice, as it does
not maximize the probability of investing into the preferred asset. All specifications are identical to specification
(2) of Table 2.1. (1) restricts the sample to those participants who answered both understanding questions correctly.
(2) restricts the sample to those participants who chose the dominant asset in all treatments. (3) restricts the sample
to those participants who answered both understanding questions correctly and chose the dominant asset in all
treatments. Treatment 2 and Treatment 3. Var. of manager payoffs is calculated as the variance of all five investment
managers’ last realized payoffs shown to participant in the current choice task.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Multi-Level Panel Multi-Level Panel Multi-Level Panel
only correct answers only dominant asset only correct answers and dominant asset
Treatment 3 0.230*** 0.320*** 0.346***
(0.049) (0.063) (0.067)
Treatment 2 0.194*** 0.236*** 0.245***
(0.043) (0.055) (0.060)
Var. of manager payoffs -0.063 -0.053 -0.044
(0.056) (0.090) (0.096)
Constant 0.401*** 0.361*** 0.326***
(0.067) (0.087) (0.092)
Observations 1,167 674 614
Round FE YES YES YES
Individual RE YES YES YES
Treatment-Individual RE YES YES YES
only random effects regressions are reported. Shown in column 1, findings
do not change substantially. If anything, coefficients for Treatment 2 and
Treatment 3 increase slightly to 0.194 and 0.230. Results therefore indicate
that the impact of requiring good investments to be inferred from moder-
ate outcomes is marginally stronger in the restricted sample than in the full
sample.
Subsample: Preferred Asset
We constructed assets such that in any treatment one asset is dominant. In
Treatment 1 and 3 assets were characterized by first-order stochastic dom-
inance, in Treatment 2 they were characterized by state-wise dominance.
Nonetheless we ask participants for their preferred asset at the beginning
of each treatment. In theory, participants should prefer the dominant asset
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Table 2.10: Asset Choices by Treatment (in %)
Asset Choice in Treatment 1
Investment A (dominated) 29
Investment B (dominant) 71
Asset Choice in Treatment 2
Investment C (dominated) 30
Investment D (dominant) 70
Asset Choice in Treatment 3
Investment A (dominated) 23
Investment B (dominant) 77
in any treatment. Indeed, shown in Table 2.10, a large majority of partic-
ipants prefers the dominant asset in a given treatment. 71 and 77 partici-
pants prefer Investment B in Treatment 1 and Treatment 3, respectively, and
70 participants prefer Investment D in Treatment 2. Pre-tests with various
formats of displaying payoff distributions conducted on Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk showed that at least 30% of participants always preferred the domi-
nated asset.16 That is, a certain level of “noisy”, unexpected asset preferences
also remains for the experimental design used here. However, in an unre-
ported regression using participants’ characteristics, only cognitive score is
positively and significantly correlated with a choice for the dominant asset.
Furthermore, the overall stronger preference for Investment B (D) suggests
that ordering or alphabetic biases are not tampering with our observations.
In short, participants seem to prefer Investment B (D) due to its dominance
property.
Nonetheless, only 45 participants prefer the dominant asset in all three
treatments. To check if our previous results on the Outcome Bias are robust,
we condition on those participants who indicated preferences expected from
a rational individual. The subsample thus shrinks to 674 observations. The
16 Data available upon request.
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random effects regression is presented in column 2 of Table 2.9. Contrary
to our expectations, the coefficients for Treatment 3 (0.320) and Treatment 2
(0.236) are larger than in the full sample. Both coefficients remain significant
at the 1%-level. Lastly, column 3 shows regression result for a subsample re-
stricted to both only correct answers to independence questions and rational
preferences for assets. Coefficients remain virtually similar to column 2. That
is, we find that even those participants best equipped to make good choices
because they a) understand independence and b) prefer the dominant asset
are prone to the Outcome Bias. The lower constant in column 3 (compare to
column 2 in Table 2.1) suggests that the tendency to make outcome biased
choices in our baseline treatment is slightly lower for the subgroup than for
the full sample. However, the subgroup is just as likely as the full sample to
make outcome biased choices once moderate outcomes correspond to good
investment quality.17
To comply with the approach from the previous subsection, we again dis-
aggregate manager choices and test differences using the regression-based
approach. Manager choices split by preferred asset and treatment are shown
in Table 2.11. Regarding the Outcome Bias in Treatment 1, participants pre-
ferring Investment B make significantly fewer (39.7% to 51.7%) outcome bi-
ased choices than their counterparts. For Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 pro-
portions of outcome biased choices are not significantly different between
participants preferring either the dominant or the dominated asset. For sub-
optimal choices, differences between both groups of participants are gener-
ally larger. In Treatment 1, 67.6% of choices are suboptimal for participants
preferring Investment A, whereas only 49.0% are suboptimal for those pre-
ferring Investment B (p-value=0.000). In Treatment 2, the difference is not
17 Compare for example the predicted probability of observing outcome biased choices by
adding the constant and a treatment dummy in column 2 of Table 2.1 to the predicted prob-
ability of observing outcome biased choices by adding the constant and a treatment dummy
in column 3 of Table 2.9.
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Table 2.11: Manager Choices by Treatment and Preferred Asset
Suboptimal Choice by Preferred Asset
∆
Suboptimal Choice = 0 Suboptimal Choice = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Preferred Asset = A 47 (32.4%) 98 (67.6%) 0.005***
Preferred Asset = B 181 (51.0%) 174 (49.0%)
Treatment 2
Preferred Asset = C 35 (23.3%) 115 (76.7%) 0.455
Preferred Asset = D 94 (26.9%) 256 (73.1%)
Treatment 3
Preferred Asset = A 11 (9.6%) 104 (90.4%) 0.010**
Preferred Asset = B 70 (18.2%) 315 (81.8%)
Outcome Bias by Preferred Asset
∆
Outcome Bias = 0 Outcome Bias = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Preferred Asset = A 70 (48.3%) 75 (51.7%) 0.080*
Preferred Asset = B 214 (60.3%) 141 (39.7%)
Treatment 2
Preferred Asset = C 60 (40.0%) 90 (60.0%) 0.689
Preferred Asset = D 149 (42.6%) 201 (57.4%)
Treatment 3
Preferred Asset = A 39 (34.5%) 74 (65.5%) 0.265
Preferred Asset = B 160 (41.7%) 224 (58.3%)
Outcome Bias |Suboptimal by Preferred Asset
∆
Outcome Bias |Suboptimal = 0 Outcome Bias |Suboptimal = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Preferred Asset = A 23 (23.5%) 75 (76.5%) 0.421
Preferred Asset = B 33 (19.0%) 141 (81.0%)
Treatment 2
Preferred Asset = C 25 (21.7%) 90 (78.3%) 0.959
Preferred Asset = D 55 (21.5%) 201 (78.5%)
Treatment 3
Preferred Asset = A 30 (28.8%) 74 (71.2%) 0.993
Preferred Asset = B 91 (28.9%) 224 (71.1%)
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significant (76.7% to 73.1%, p-value=0.437). In Treatment 3, proportions for
suboptimal choices are approximately 9% (90.4% to 81.8%, p-value=0.030)
lower for participants preferring Investment B. When we turn to Outcome
Bias|Suboptimal, differences between both groups of participants are small
and insignificant across all treatments. If anything, marginally more subop-
timal choices are driven by the Outcome Bias for participants preferring the
dominant asset. In conclusion, participants’ asset preferences have negligi-
ble impact on the most puzzling finding: Once information about the quality
of an investment is not provided separately from outcomes, individuals are
quick to fall prey to the Outcome Bias. This holds regardless of how simply
the investment quality can be inferred from outcomes.
2.6 Conclusion
Individuals struggle to distinguish skill from luck. In particular, good in-
vestment outcomes are erroneously associated with good investment deci-
sions. This experiment presents evidence that individuals follow this flawed
logic even when monetarily incentivized not to. A considerable fraction of
manager choices are outcome biased, although investment quality is promi-
nently displayed. A puzzling result of our study, however, is that individ-
uals’ choices are heavily outcome biased once decision quality has to be in-
ferred from decision outcomes, specifically when moderate outcomes are an
indicator of a good decision. Specifically, this observation holds regardless of
whether outcomes allow for an easy and certain identification of the invest-
ment quality (Treatment 2) or whether outcomes only allow for assessing the
probability of obtaining good investment quality (Treatment 3).
Our study may also have implications for policymakers. In a recent blog
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post,18 AQR hedge fund manager Cliff Asness points to the danger that out-
come biased decision making (calling it “after-the-fact” reasoning) poses for
policymakers. In particular, he elaborates on how well-intended fiduciary
regulations may entail unintended, negative consequences. To give a con-
crete example, the much-discussed Fiduciary Rule in the U.S. is going to
make it easier to sue financial advisors “after-the-fact”, that is after invest-
ment returns materialize. However, if investors are susceptible to the Out-
come Bias, they might decide to sue when returns were low but the finan-
cial advice itself was appropriate. In the light of our findings, leaving the
disclaimer that “[...]performance data shown represent past performance, which is
not a guarantee of future results”19 to the footnotes may not benefit the indi-
vidual investor. Instead, it should be highlighted that a good investment
decision takes into account the investor’s personal preferences and charac-
teristics, and that outcomes are only second to it. Emphasizing the impact
that unreasonable fund fees have on investment outcomes could be another
way of improving ex ante investment quality.
18 Can be found online at https://www.aqr.com/cliffs-perspective/caveat-investor.
19 As shown in the footnotes on the website of a large U.S. fund provider.
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Chapter 3
Trust and Delegated Investing: A
Money Doctors Experiment ∗
3.1 Introduction
A longstanding observation in finance is the inability of fund managers to
outperform the market after costs. Since Jensen (1968), research in finance
has produced numerous studies questioning the skill of fund managers (e.g.,
Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 2010).1 Because the average mutual fund
underperforms the market net of fees, investment managers and advisors
also advertise other qualities – one of them being trust (Mullainathan et al.,
2008).
Trust is a vital aspect of economic transactions (Arrow, 1972). General
trust has been linked to overall economic performance (La Porta et al., 1997;
∗ Authors: Maximilian Germann, Benjamin Loos, and Martin Weber. Maximilian Germann
and Martin Weber are at the University of Mannheim. Maximilian Germann: L9, 1-2, 68161
Mannheim. Email: germann@bank.bwl.uni-mannheim.de. Martin Weber: L9, 1-2, 68161
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of Technology Sydney. Email: Benjamin.Loos@uts.edu.au. We thank seminar participants
at the University of Mannheim, participants at the ESA 2017 Vienna conference , and par-
ticipants at the SEF AP 2018 Brisbane conference for helpful suggestions. Funding from the
Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim (GESS), the
Karin-Islinger-Foundation, and the Julius-Paul-Stiegler Gedächtnis Stiftung is gratefully ac-
knowledged. We would like to thank Alexander Sandukovskiy for invaluable programming
work. All remaining errors are our own.
1 We are aware that there exist theories rationalizing low after-costs alphas with decreasing
returns to scale, see e.g., Berk and Green (2004), Chen et al. (2004), and Pastor et al. (2015).
To make our point in a concise way, we resort to discussing only one strand of the literature
concerned with mutual fund returns.
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Knack and Keefer, 1997), and in particular to stock market participation
(Guiso et al., 2004, 2008). In the absence of trust, financial markets need to
be more regulated: Trust leaves agents satisfied with (inevitably) incomplete
contracts, so that when trust is lost, laws and regulation must provide
additional safety for agents (see e.g., Carlin et al., 2009; Sapienza and
Zingales, 2012). Opinions in the Financial Times (“Trustworthiness is key for
asset managers”)2 and in the blog of the CFA Institute (“How to Win Investors’
Trust”)3 also support the notion that trust is vital for the finance industry.
In a recent paper, Gennaioli et al. (2015) transfer the importance of trust to
delegated investing. They propose a model which explains management fees
as a trust premium voluntarily paid by investors. All else equal, more trust-
worthy money managers4 can set higher fees for generic services. In essence,
the value that money managers provide is to hold their clients’ hands and
make them confident to accept risks.
To our knowledge, we are the first to test this theory in an experiment.
Our experiment consists of two parts: First, participants play a trust game
in the spirit of Berg et al. (1995). This game allows to measure trusting
and trustworthy behavior (Camerer, 2003; Fehr, 2009; Johnson and Mislin,
2011). We exploit variation in the amounts participants return in this game:
Higher returned amounts are considered a signal of higher trustworthiness.
Second, participants make investment decisions in two treatments. In
both treatments, participants are matched to two other participants, who
represent money managers. Participants (i.e., investors) then have to invest
separately through both money managers. We induce different levels of
money manager trustworthiness by providing the amount each money
2 https://www.ft.com/content/fc597c2e-8711-11e2-bde6-00144feabdc0.
3 https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2014/10/21/how-to-win-investors-
trust.
4 The idea of Gennaioli et al. applies to various financial intermediaries, such as "families of
mutual funds, registered investment advisors, financial planners, brokers, funds of funds,
bank trust departments, and others who give investors confidence to take risks." (p.92).
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manager returned in the trust game. In particular, we provide the level
of money manager trustworthiness because it is the investor who needs
to place differential trust in money managers: Regardless of an investor’s
unconditional level of trusting, she will place more trust in a money manager
who appears more trustworthy. In the first treatment participants have to
specify how risky they want to invest with either money manager. These
money managers either charge high or low costs. In the second treatment
participants have to specify the costs they are willing to bear from one
money manager in order to obtain the same investment as with the other
money manager.
We find that investors take substantially more risk when investing
through a more trustworthy money manager than when investing through
a less trustworthy money manager. On average, the share invested into
a risky asset is approximately 16% larger for a more trustworthy money
manager than for a less trustworthy manager. This finding is striking, since
more trustworthy money managers are exogenously assigned twice the costs
(1.5%) of less trustworthy money managers (0.75%). Results from the second
treatment show that investors are also willing to bear substantially higher
costs for investing with more trustworthy managers. On average, investors
indicate acceptable costs of 1.95% for a more trustworthy money manager
when the less trustworthy money manager charges only 0.75%. Effect sizes
from both the first and the second treatment are increasing in the difference
in trustworthiness between money managers. Albeit weakened, our findings
do not vanish once we control for alternative explanations, such as biased
investor beliefs or rewarding (i.e., reciprocity) as motivation for investing
with more trustworthy managers. Our study can not, however, discern
the precise influence of these alternative factors on trust and delegated
investing. That is, our study only demonstrates and quantifies the impact
that trust has on delegated investing through the channel of risk aversion.
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Empirical support for the Money Doctor theory comes from Kostovetsky
(2016), Dorn and Weber (2017), and Linnainmaa et al. (2018). Kostovetsky
(2016) uses announced changes in the ownership of fund management com-
panies as exogenous shock to an existing trust relationship. The study finds
that, after controlling for fund characteristics, approximately 7% of assets are
withdrawn in the 12-month period following the announcement. Because
retail investors and investors in funds with higher expense ratios (i.e., those
funds able to extract higher trust premia) are most responsive to ownership
changes, Kostovetsky interprets his findings as evidence for the Money Doc-
tor theory. Dorn and Weber (2017) find that retail investors who had dele-
gated all their equity investments to fund managers – money doctors – before
the financial crisis, were almost twice as likely to exit the stock market during
the crisis than their peers who invested into individual stocks. This finding is
consistent with the view of Gennaioli et al. (2015) that those investors relying
on a trust relationship to invest into the stock market will be particularly af-
fected by a negative shock to this trust relationship. Linnainmaa et al. (2018)
proxy trustworthiness by the length of a client-advisor relationship. They
show that, consistent with the Money Doctor hypothesis, investors with a
longer-established client-advisor relationship are more willing to take finan-
cial risks.
Nonetheless, these empirical studies only reveal the direction in which
trust affects mutual fund flows and investor behavior, respectively. Neither
empirical setting does allow for a clean quantification of trust or a measure-
ment of the trust-cost-relationship. The assumption that investors balance
trust against management fees, however, is critical to the Money Doctors
theory. Testing the theory in a controlled experiment allows for both a quan-
tification of trust and a measurement of the trust-cost-relationship. Thus, we
contribute to the understanding of the mechanism of the Money Doctors the-
ory.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 gives a brief
overview of the Money Doctors theory. Section 3.3 outlines the experimen-
tal design, in particular the trust game and the two investment treatments,
and testable Money Doctors hypotheses are derived. General results follow
in section 3.4. In section 3.5, alternative explanations for our results are dis-
cussed. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Money Doctors Theory
In the following, we briefly sketch the model of Gennaioli et al. (2015) that
we seek to test. Gennaioli et al. think of trust as an ingredient that reduces
the perceived riskiness of an investment. In particular, investing through a
more trusted money manager is more effective in reducing perceived riski-
ness of financial investments than is investing through a less trusted money
manager. Placing this idea in an economic context, investors’ risk aversion
is lower when investing with a trusted money manager. Importantly, money
managers offer identical investment services and investors have correct be-
liefs about the investment services provided by money managers.5 Hence,
trustworthiness is not mistaken for skill. Formally, assuming a standard
quadratic utility function, this translates to
ui,j(c) = E(c)−
ai,j
2
Var(c), (3.1)
where c is the investor’s future consumption. Parameter ai,j ≥ 1 represents
investor i’s “anxiety” of investing with money manager j. To keep the model
simple, Gennaioli et al. (2015) assume that investors do not invest risky them-
selves, which implies ai,i = ∞. From the investor’s utility function it becomes
5 In the latter part of their paper, Gennaioli et al. (2015) also examine implications of their
model if investors hold biased beliefs. Our paper, however, focuses on the part of their
paper in which investors hold correct beliefs.
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evident that placing more trust into a money manager, thereby reducing ai,j,
decreases the costs of bearing investment risk. However, this also means
that more trusted money managers are able to exploit their relative advan-
tage over their less trusted counterparts. Ceteris paribus, more trustworthy
money managers can charge higher fees without losing investors to competi-
tors. From the investor’s point of view, the investment problem becomes one
of weighting the benefits of trust – less perceived risk and thus greater par-
ticipation in risky investments – against the costs of management fees. Given
a riskless asset with return R f (in which investors can invest on their own)
and a risky asset with excess return over the riskless asset of R and variance
σ2,6 investor i’s expected utility of investing with manager j is thus equal to
Ui,j(xi,j, f j) ≡ R f + xi,j(R− f j)−
ai,j
2
x2i,jσ
2, (3.2)
where the share of wealth invested into the risky asset is denoted by xi,j.
Solving for the optimal portfolio composition thus yields
xˆi,j =
(R− f j)
ai,jσ2
. (3.3)
Therefore, the investor will invest a larger proportion of his portfolio into the
risky asset when investing with a more trusted money manager. Substituting
xˆi,j back gives the utility obtained from investing optimally:
Ui,j(xˆi,j, f j) = R f +
(R− f j)2
2ai,jσ2
. (3.4)
Investors still have to choose among money managers. The simplest case
is the choice between two money managers (referred to as manager A and
manager B), as outlined in the original model. In the simplest case, the in-
vestor will prefer manager A over manager B provided that U(xˆi,A, fA) ≥
6 Gennaioli et al. (2015) denote variance as σ (p.95).
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U(xˆi,B, fB). Rearranging the relationship yields a central prediction of the
theory:
ai,B
ai,A
≥ (R− fB)
2
(R− fA)2 . (3.5)
Hence, the investor will choose manager A provided that the benefit of trust-
worthiness overcompensates for the disutility stemming from higher man-
agement fees. The investor’s choice thus depends on the difference, but not
the level, in trustworthiness of money managers.
3.3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experiment consists of two distinct parts. In the first part, we aim to col-
lect a measure of trustworthiness that is based on human interaction. This
step is necessary in order to induce different levels of trustworthiness in the
second part. For this purpose, participants first play a trust game. In the sec-
ond part, participants face two treatments in which they have to make invest-
ment decisions. In the first treatment, participants have to make two separate
investment decisions with two different money managers, who charge differ-
ent costs. In the second treatment, participants have to indicate management
fees they are willing to pay for one money manager in order to obtain the
same investment allocation as with another money manager. Building on
the first part, the treatments in the second part allow us to test predictions
of the theory. Participants do not know what the second part looks like be-
fore completing the first part. Thus, participants have no reason to bias their
behavior in the first part in order to obtain more favorable outcomes in the
second part. The experiment concludes with control questions and a sociode-
mographic survey. The sequence of the experiment is shown in Figure 3.1. In
the following, the details of the experiment are laid out.
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of Experimental Setup
3.3.1 Trust Game
Gennaioli et al. (2015) emphasize that they “do not think of trust as deriv-
ing from past performance” (p.92). Since we want to adhere to the original
paper, money managers’ trustworthiness must also not be induced by past
performance in our experiment. We opt for a trust game (Berg et al., 1995)
to induce differences in trustworthiness. In the trust game, a sender (trustor)
is endowed with an amount X. The sender can transfer any amount between
0 and X to the receiver (trustee). The amount sent to the trustee, S, is then
tripled. The trustee has the choice to reciprocate by returning any amount
between 0 and 3S. Because trustees are not obliged to return anything, self-
interested trustors should not send anything in the first place. In the trust
game, sending is therefore associated with trusting behavior, while returning
is associated with trustworthy behavior (Camerer, 2003; Fehr, 2009; Johnson
and Mislin, 2011).
We use the trust game for two reasons: First, results of the trust game
are derived from actual human interaction. Second, the trust game is a well-
studied game in the economics literature and has been found to predict trust-
ing and trustworthy behavior also outside the lab (see e.g., Baran et al., 2010;
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Aksoy et al., 2018). In finance, pro-social behavior in the trust game has re-
cently been linked to real-world propensity to hold socially responsible in-
vestments (SRI) (Riedl and Smeets, 2017).
Results from trust games show that trustors usually send part of their en-
dowment, and that trustees usually reciprocate to a certain extent. In a meta
study of more than 160 trust games, Johnson and Mislin (2011) find that par-
ticipants on average send 50% of their endowment, and return 50% of the
available amount. Several studies also show that there is variation in the
amounts sent and the amounts returned in the trust game (Berg et al., 1995;
Croson and Buchan, 1999; Buchan et al., 2002; Keser, 2002; Ashraf et al., 2003;
Cox, 2004; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Dubois et al., 2012). These empirical observa-
tions are critical for our experiment: Since the amount returned in the trust
game represents the level of trustworthiness, we can exploit variation in the
amount returned by trustees to induce differences in trustworthiness. Not
critical for our experiment is how exactly the trust game is designed. Chang-
ing parameters of the trust game (e.g., doubling or quadrupling the amount
sent) or having participants play both sender and receiver in the trust game
may affect participant behavior (see the meta study by Johnson and Mislin,
2011). These modifications to the trust game, however, affect all participants
and thus only affect the level of trust and trustworthiness. Identification in
our experiment is based on differences in participants’ behavior and is there-
fore not susceptible to changes in the design of the trust game.
In the first part of the experiment, participants are paired anonymously
and randomly. Senders are endowed with 100 ECU and can send any amount
of tens between 0 and 100 ECU. The amount sent is then tripled, and receivers
can return any amount of tens between 0 and the tripled amount sent. The
trust game is played using the strategy method: Participants indicate a) how
much they would be willing to send if they were playing as sender, and b)
how much they would be willing to return for any possible amount sent if
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they were playing as receiver.7 We incentivize choices in the trust game by
randomly picking the roles within each pair and by evaluating the trust game
according to the indicated choices. If the trust game is chosen randomly to
determine participants’ payoff from the experiment, 1 ECU is converted to
0.05e. Based on average levels of trust and trustworthiness found by John-
son and Mislin (2011), the expected payoff for senders is 7.5e and 3.75e for
receivers.8
3.3.2 Treatment: Exogenous Costs
After the trust game, every participant plays the role of an investor. Investors
have the choice to invest their endowment (100 ECU) into a riskless asset
with return r = 0 and a risky asset with normally distributed returns with
mean of 6% and volatility of 20%. Because we are interested in the impact
of trust on the investment decision, we match every investor with two other
participants and their respective decisions in the trust game. These two par-
ticipants represent money managers. Investors then have to make separate
investment decisions with both money managers.
Money managers do not effectively act. In other words, they do not in-
fluence the characteristics of the riskless and the risky investment – just as
money managers in the real world have no control over the movement of
the stock market. For both money managers, the identical expected asset
returns before costs are displayed prominently. Nonetheless, both money
managers can be associated with a different level of trustworthiness. This
level of trustworthiness stems from the money managers’ decision to return
ECU in the trust game. A money manager who was willing to return more
7 Using the strategy method for simple economic games such as the trust game has been
found to yield similar results as direct (i.e., playing only one role and only once) elicita-
tion approaches, see e.g. Brandts and Charness (2000), Brandts and Charness (2011), and
Vyrastekova and Onderstal (2010).
8 Senders send 50% (50 ECU) of their endowment (100 ECU) and receivers return 50% (75
ECU) of the available amount (150 ECU, 3 times 50 ECU).
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ECU in the trust game is therefore more trustworthy than a money manager
who was willing to return fewer ECU. As in the Money Doctors model, risky
investments can only be made via money managers. Crucially, both money
managers offer identical risky investments before costs (mean return of 6%
and volatility of 20%). However, money managers charge different costs –
specifically, the money manager who returned more in the trust game is as-
signed high costs (Ch = 1.5%), the money manager who returned less in the
trust game is assigned low costs (Cl = 0.75%). In case both money man-
agers returned the same amount in the trust game, one is randomly assigned
high costs and one is randomly assigned low costs. We deliberately rule out
trivial cases in which more trustworthy managers also charge lower costs.
Known to participants, costs are not transferred to managers. Hence, con-
cerns of higher risky investments as means of monetarily “rewarding” more
trustworthy managers are alleviated.
Investors receive the following information: 1) the mean and the volatil-
ity of the risky asset, 2) the costs each money manager charges, and 3) the
amount each money manager was willing to return in the trust game for the
amount the investor was willing to send. An exemplary screen of the treat-
ment, also showing the exact wording of the instructions, is shown in Figure
3.2.
Since only one of the two investment decisions is selected randomly for
payoff, diversification across money managers is not possible. Thus, rational
(risk-averse) investors should invest a greater share of their endowment into
the risky asset via the low-cost, low-trust manager than via the high-cost,
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Figure 3.2: Exemplary Screen of Treatment: Exogenous Costs
This figure is a screenshot of the instructions and the action screen of Treatment: Exogenous Costs. The level of
money manager trustworthiness, as proxied by the amount returned in the trust game, is displayed in the third
column as “Returned amount for amount you sent (You sent: X ECU)”. Because exemplary choices for this screen-
shot were to send 0 ECU as sender and return 0 ECU as receiver for any amount sent, the level of trustworthiness
shows as “0 ECU”.
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high-trust manager.9 Alternatively, if trustworthy money managers are ef-
fective in holding a client’s hand, investors could also invest more risky via
the high-cost, high-trust manager. In particular, the share invested risky with
the high-trust manager relative to the share invested risky with the low-trust
manager should increase the larger the difference in trustworthiness.
After one investment decision is chosen randomly, the return of the re-
spective risky investment is drawn and costs are deducted. Participants are
then informed which choice was drawn and how their investment decision
turned out. As in the trust game, 1 ECU is converted to 0.05e. The expected
payoff from this task hence varies between 5e and 5.3e, depending on how
much risk is taken. Afterwards, investors are again independently matched
with two new money managers. In total, this investment task is repeated five
times with independent matchings of new money managers. If participants’
payment for participation is randomly chosen to be determined by this treat-
ment, the outcome of one of the five rounds is chosen randomly. In summary,
we test the following hypotheses in the first treatment:
Hypothesis 1 (“Hand-holding”): Investors invest a larger proportion of
their wealth into the risky investment via a more trust-
worthy money manager (higher amount returned in
trust game) than via a less trustworthy money manager
(lower amount returned in trust game), even if the more
trustworthy money manager charges higher costs (twice
as much) than the less trustworthy money manager.
Hypothesis 2: The larger the difference in trustworthiness between
money managers, the larger the share invested risky with
9 Risk aversion is assumed in the Money Doctors model. In our experiment, risk-seeking or
risk-neutral preferences would imply that investors should invest all their wealth into the
risky asset, as it offers a positive expected return as opposed to the riskless asset. From par-
ticipants’ actual choices we can assume that participants do not have such preferences: No
participant invested all his wealth into the risky asset in all rounds and only two participants
invested all their wealth into the risky asset in four out of five rounds.
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the more trustworthy money manager relative to the share
invested risky with the less trustworthy money manager.
3.3.3 Treatment: Indifference Costs
There are two possible identification strategies in our experiment: One is
to fix costs and exploit variation in the share invested risky. The second is
to fix the share invested risky, and exploit variation in costs. The previous
treatment fixes costs and allows us to elicit investors’ risk aversion, which
is potentially lowered by trust. In this treatment, we investigate the costs
investors are willing to bear to make the same investment decision with a
more trustworthy money manager as with a less trustworthy money man-
ager. Again, every participant is matched with two other participants. First,
acting as investor, every participant has to indicate how much she would in-
vest risky with the first money manager. Parameters of both assets, riskless
and risky, are identical to the previous treatment. By construction, the first
money manager always charges fees of Cl = 0.75% and always returned less
than or equal to the second money manager in the trust game. We impose
this restrictions to increase the reliability of statistical testing, as costs logi-
cally have to be bounded by 0%. Second, investors have to indicate the costs
they are willing to accept from the second money manager in order to obtain
the same risky investment as with the first money manager.
Participants indicate their indifference costs on a slider with a lower
bound of 0% and an upper bound of 10%.10 The default input is set to 0%,
which, if anything, would imply an anchoring bias against our hypothesis.
Figure 3.3 shows the setting. As predicted by the theory, investors should
indicate higher indifference costs for more trusted money managers. Choices
in this treatment are not monetarily incentivized, as indicating indifference
10 In pretests, participants had trouble entering fees in the correct numerical units when pre-
sented with an input box. Thus we opt for the more restrictive slider input.
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Figure 3.3: Exemplary Screen of Treatment: Indifference Costs
costs of 0% would be a dominant strategy.11 Again, this task is repeated five
times with new random and independent matchings. In summary, we test
the following hypotheses in the second treatment:
Hypothesis 3: Investors are willing to accept higher costs from more
trustworthy money managers in order to obtain the same
investment allocation as with a less trustworthy money
manager.
Hypothesis 4: The larger the difference in trustworthiness, the higher the
costs investors are willing to accept from more trustwor-
thy managers in order to obtain the same investment allo-
cation as with less trustworthy money managers.
11 We refrain from using an incentive-compatible Becker-Degroot-Marschak (Becker et al.,
1964) mechanism, as we believe it would considerably complicate the second treatment for
participants.
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3.4 Results
The experiment took place at the University of Mannheim experimental
laboratory in July and September 2017. Participants were invited through
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was computerized using oTree
(Chen et al., 2016). In total, 114 individuals participated in 8 sessions.
Participants were predominantly female (58.77%). Almost all participants
were students (98.25%). Thus, the mean age was relatively low at 23.35
(SD=3.99) years. Furthermore, most participants studied business or eco-
nomics (71.05%). However, only few participants had any real investment
experiences: Only 20.18% and 11.40% of all subjects had invested in passive
or active funds, respectively. Sessions lasted approximately 30 minutes and
the average payment for participation was 6.16e, including a base payment
of 1e. The minimum payment was 2.5e, the maximum payment 16e, and
payment variance was 1.86.
Trust Game
In order to induce different levels of trustworthiness, there must be variation
in participants’ choices in the trust game. Results from our trust game are in
line with the literature. Participants usually trust their counterpart. Only 13
(11.4%) participants resorted to the equilibrium strategy of sending 0 ECU in
the trust game. On average, 43.16 ECU were sent from trustors. The distri-
bution of sent amounts is depicted in Figure 3.4.
The measure of money manager trustworthiness, however, is the amount
the money manager returns in the trust game. Hence, to establish a situation
which allows us to test predictions from the Money Doctors theory, there
must also be variation in the amounts returned in the trust game. For ev-
ery possible choice of trustors, we find substantial variation in the choices
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Sent Amount in Trust Game
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of trustees. The average standard deviation of returned amounts is approx-
imately 29.49. Figure 3.5 shows a boxplot of median returned amounts in
the trust game. As expected, the absolute median returned amount increases
with the amount sent. Nonetheless, the relative level of median reciprocity
(amount returned divided by amount sent) stays relatively constant at one.
In summary, results from the trust game offer sufficient variation for our sub-
sequent analysis.
Treatment: Exogenous Costs
In this treatment, we are interested in the share of wealth participants invest
risky with both money managers. Specifically, we want to test whether in-
vestors are willing to invest more risky with more trustworthy money man-
agers, even if that investment comes at higher costs. For this reason, sim-
ple univariate analyses are reported first. To assess differences in the shares
of wealth invested risky, we need to account for the fact that observations
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of Median Returned Amounts in Trust Game
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are not necessarily independent, since participants face multiple choices per
treatment. Thus, we regress the difference of the share invested risky with
the more trustworthy and the share invested risky with the less trustworthy
money manager on a constant only and cluster standard errors at the individ-
ual level. Hence, we effectively run a test of means, but adjust for potential
non-independence of observations. For all subsequent comparisons of means
we use this approach as well. Univariate p-values reported subsequently are
therefore adjusted for clustering at the individual level. In Table B.1 in the
appendix, we also report results of tests for each round individually.
The order in which more or less trustworthy money managers appear
in the investment decision screen is randomized. As results are similar for
cases in which the more trustworthy money manager appears on top and
for cases in which she appears at the bottom, pooled results are reported
throughout this paper. Table 3.1 compares the average amount invested
risky with both money managers. When money managers are not equally
3.4. Results 75
Table 3.1: Risky Share of Investment
This table shows the share invested into the risky asset, Risky Share, for both money managers.
High Trustworthiness, High Costs corresponds to the more trustworthy (i.e., returned more in the trust game) but
more costly money manager. Low Trustworthiness, Low Costs corresponds to the less trustworthy (i.e., returned
less in the trust game) but less costly money manager. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Risky Share in %
N µ σ 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
High Trustworthiness, High Costs 410 46.15 29.20 0 100
Low Trustworthiness, Low Costs 410 29.27 27.07 0 100
∆ t-stat = 6.58***
trustworthy, investors are willing to invest substantially more risky with the
trustworthy, but more expensive money manager. The difference of 16.88%
is highly statistically significant. Investors profit from investing through a
more trustworthy money manager in terms of expected return: The average
investment decision with the more trustworthy money manager implies a to-
tal expected return on the portfolio of 2.07% (Mean Risky ShareHT,HC times
4.75%), whereas the average investment decision with the less trustworthy
money manager translates only to a total expected return on the portfolio
of 1.54% (Mean Risky ShareLT,LC times 5.25%, p-value=0.000). More precise,
investors essentially move upwards on the Capital Market Line. While the
total investment’s Sharpe ratio is unchanged, it is more risky overall and thus
offers higher expected return.
By construction, we prohibit trivial cases in which more trustworthy
money managers charge lower costs than less trustworthy money managers.
However, there are cases in which both money managers are equally trust-
worthy. If there is no difference in trustworthiness, investors are expected
to invest more risky with the money manager who charges lower costs.
Results are provided in Table 3.2. On average, investors invest a higher
share of their wealth into the risky asset if costs are lower. This difference
of 6.98% is also significant at the 10%-level. However, 13 participants
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Table 3.2: Risky Share of Investment for Identically Trustworthy Money
Managers
This table shows the share invested into the risky asset, Risky Share, for both money managers when both money
managers are equal in trustworthiness (i.e., returned identical amounts in the trust game). The type of costs, high
or low, is indicated by High Costs and Low Costs, respectively. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
All Participants
Risky Share in %
N µ σ 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
Low Costs 160 32.71 28.11 0 100
High Costs 160 25.73 27.32 0 100
∆ t-stat = 1.77*
Only Participants Who Sent > 0 ECU
Low Costs 95 35.84 30.89 0 100
High Costs 95 23.14 25.90 0 100
∆ t-stat = 3.11***
chose the Nash equilibrium strategy in the trust game. By default, these
participants are always presented cases in which both money managers are
equally trustworthy: If senders send 0 ECU, the only choice of receivers is to
return 0 ECU. Excluding the choices (13·5=65 choices) of these non-trusting
participants results in an increased and highly significant difference of
12.71%. In the Table B.2 in the appendix, we again report results of tests for
each round individually. In summary, univariate analyses strongly support
our first hypothesis. Investors voluntarily pay a trust premium and are less
risk averse when investing with trustworthy money managers. Nonetheless,
investors benefit from this increase in risk taking even net of fees.
We use multivariate analyses to test our second hypothesis. Equation (3.5)
states that the discrepancy of trustworthiness between money managers is a
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key factor in the Money Doctors framework by Gennaioli et al. (2015). To
analyze whether the difference in trustworthiness is related to the difference
of the share invested risky, the following random effects model (REi) with
round fixed effects (Roundt) is estimated:
∆ Risky Shareit = α+ ∆ Trustworthinessitβ+ REi + Roundt + eit.
A random effects model is used because the independent variable,
∆ Trustworthinessit, is orthogonal to other regressors, as it is obtained
by randomly matching investors to money managers. For robustness, fixed
effects regressions are reported in the appendix. The dependent variable,
∆ Risky Share, is calculated as the share of wealth invested risky with the
more trustworthy money manager minus the share of wealth invested
risky with the less trustworthy manager. In case both managers are equally
trustworthy, it is calculated as the share of wealth invested risky with the
more costly manager minus the share of wealth invested risky with the less
costly manager. Therefore, the constant in the regression is expected to be
negative. Because ∆ Risky Share is technically censored at -100 and +100, we
also report random effects tobit regressions in Table B.4 in the appendix.
For the independent variable, ∆ Trustworthiness, we test three different
specifications. In a first specification, it is calculated in absolute terms as
the amount the more trustworthy manager returned in the trust game mi-
nus the amount the less trustworthy manager returned in the trust game.
This absolute difference, however, depends on the amount that was sent in
the trust game. For larger amounts sent, the absolute measure may thus be
substantially larger. To correct for this mechanical relationship, in a second
specification the relative difference in trustworthiness is calculated. It cap-
tures the percentage the less trustworthy manager sent less than the more
trustworthy manager and is calculated as (1− ( Lower Returned AmountHigher Returned Amount)) ∗ 100.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics ∆ Trustworthiness
∆ Trustworthiness Absolute is calculated as the amount the more trustworthy manager returned in the trust
game minus the amount the less trustworthy manager returned in the trust game. ∆ Trustworthiness Relative
is calculated as (1 − ( Lower Returned AmountHigher Returned Amount )) ∗ 100. ∆ Trustworthiness Relative to Sent is calculated as
( Higher Returned Amount − Lower Returned AmountAmount Sent ) ∗ 100.
N µ σ 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
∆ Trustworthiness Absolute 570 28.77 34.78 0 160
∆ Trustworthiness Relative 570 49.00% 39.86% 0% 100%
∆ Trustworthiness Relative to Sent 570 60.00% 56.58% 0% 300%
As a third and last specification, the difference in trustworthiness is calcu-
lated adjusting for the amount the investor sent in the trust game. This
approach aims at controlling for potentially different sensitivity to differ-
ences in trustworthiness depending on investors’ own level of trusting. As
shown in Table B.3, more trusting investors – not surprisingly – invest more
risky and state higher indifference costs. The third measure is calculated as
(Higher Returned Amount − Lower Returned AmountAmount Sent ) ∗ 100. In all three specifications,
however, we also implicitly control for the amount sent through random
or fixed effects. Summary statistics for all three variable specifications are
shown in Table 3.3.
Regression results are summarized in Table 3.4. All regressions account
for potential learning effects by including round fixed effects. As hypothe-
sized, coefficients for differences in trustworthiness are positive and signif-
icant across all regression specifications. That is, the larger the difference
in managers’ trustworthiness, the larger the difference of the share invested
risky. An absolute difference in trustworthiness of 1 ECU therefore relates
to an increase of the amount invested risky with the more trustworthy man-
ager over the amount invested risky with the less trustworthy manager of
0.33 ECU (see column 1). In other words, a third of the absolute difference
in trustworthiness translates directly into a difference of the share invested
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Table 3.4: Risky Share – Difference in Trustworthiness
This table reports regression results with ∆Risky Share as dependent variable. It is calculated as the share
of wealth invested risky with the more trustworthy money manager minus the share of wealth invested
risky with the less trustworthy money manager. In case both managers are equally trustworthy, it is cal-
culated as the share of wealth invested risky with the more costly manager minus the share of wealth in-
vested risky with the less costly manager. All regressions account for unobserved individual heterogeneity
through random effects. ∆ Trustworthiness Absolute is calculated as the amount the more trustworthy man-
ager returned in the trust game minus the amount the less trustworthy manager returned in the trust game.
∆ Trustworthiness Relative is calculated as (1 − ( Lower Returned AmountHigher Returned Amount )) ∗ 100. ∆ Trustworthiness Relative to Sent
is calculated as ( Higher Returned Amount − Lower Returned AmountAmount Sent ) ∗ 100.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Random Effects
∆Trustworthiness Absolute 0.330***
(0.067)
∆Trustworthiness Relative 0.248***
(0.042)
∆Trustworthiness Relative to Sent 0.176***
(0.031)
Constant -0.669 -3.801 -1.909
(3.809) (4.295) (3.954)
Observations 570 570 570
Cluster-robust S.E. YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
R2overall 0.082 0.054 0.066
risky. A similar picture remains for relative differences in trustworthiness.
Returning 1% less than a more trustworthy manager results in a difference of
attracted risky investments of 0.25 percentage points. Scaled by the amount
investors sent, a relative difference in trustworthiness of 1% still implies a
difference of the share invested risky of 0.18 percentage points. Evidence
from three regressions thus is in favor of our second hypothesis. In general,
investors are sensitive to differences in trustworthiness. These differences
also translate to the risky investment choice: The more trustworthy a money
manager is relative to a competitor, the more funds she can attract relative to
this competitor.
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Treatment: Indifference Costs
Instead of investigating the share invested risky with money managers, one
may also look at the costs investors are willing to bear to make risky invest-
ments. In this treatment, participants are asked to make an investment de-
cision with one money manager first, and indicate at which costs they are
indifferent between making the same risky choice with a second money man-
ager. By construction, the first manager always charges Cl = 0.75%. Thus,
to test the third hypothesis, we compare Cl to the average indifference costs
investors indicate in cases in which the second money manager is more trust-
worthy than the first. Results are shown in Table 3.5. On average, investors
accept costs of 1.95% when the second money manager is more trustworthy
than the first. These costs are 2.6 times the costs the less trustworthy manager
charges, or, put differently, almost a third of the return of the risky invest-
ment. The difference to the low costs the less trustworthy manager charges
is statistically significant at the 1%-level. Table 3.5 also provides the results
of a test of those cases in which the second manager and the first manager
are equally trustworthy. In this scenario, indifference costs should not be sig-
nificantly greater than 0.75%. Indeed, indifference costs are only 0.844% on
average, and the difference to 0.75% is statistically insignificant. Results are
virtually identical if we only include participants who sent a positive amount
in the trust game. Again we report results of tests for each round individually
in Table B.6 in the appendix.
As in the first treatment, we also test the impact of differences in trust-
worthiness (Hypothesis 4). For this purpose, indifference costs are used as
dependent variable in random effects regressions. Because these costs are
technically censored at 0 and +10, we report random effects tobit regressions
in Table B.7 in the appendix. The same specifications for ∆ Trustworthiness as
in the previous regressions are used. Table 3.6 shows the results. Coefficients
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Table 3.5: Indifference Costs
This table shows indifference costs of investing with the second money manager in Treatment 2. Tests are based
against the costs the first money manager charges, which are equal to 0.75%. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Trustworthiness Second Manager > First Manager
N µ σ 5th Percentile 95th Percentile
Indifference Costs 412 1.946 2.243 0 8.02
∆ t-stat = 6.42***
Trustworthiness Second Manager = First Manager
Indifference Costs 158 0.844 1.174 0 5
∆ t-stat = 0.56
Trustworthiness Second Manager = First Manager
Only Participants Who Sent > 0 ECU
Indifference Costs 93 0.845 1.021 0 2.99
∆ t-stat = 0.69
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Table 3.6: Indifference Costs – Difference in Trustworthiness
This table reports regression results with Indifference Costs as dependent variable. All regressions account for unob-
served individual heterogeneity through random effects. ∆ Trustworthiness Absolute is calculated as the amount
the second manager returned in the trust game minus the amount the first manager returned in the trust game.
∆ Trustworthiness Relative is calculated as (1− ( Lower Returned AmountHigher Returned Amount )) ∗ 100. ∆ Trustworthiness Relative to Sent is
calculated as ( Higher Returned Amount − Lower Returned AmountAmount Sent ) ∗ 100.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Random Effects
∆Trustworthiness Absolute 0.0098***
(0.0039)
∆Trustworthiness Relative 0.0063***
(0.0022)
∆Trustworthiness Relative to Sent 0.0069***
(0.0020)
Constant 1.514*** 1.500*** 1.390***
(0.181) (0.167) (0.181)
Observations 570 570 570
Cluster-robust S.E. YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
R2overall 0.036 0.031 0.059
are positive and hence point into the hypothesized direction in all specifica-
tion. All coefficients, that is for absolute and relative differences in trustwor-
thiness, are significant at the 1%-level. In economic terms, investors are will-
ing to accept 0.63 basis points more management fees from a 1% more trust-
worthy manager. Scaled by the amount investors sent, a relative difference
in trustworthiness of 1% translates to 0.69 basis points higher management
fees accepted by investors for investing with the more trustworthy money
manager. Findings from Treatment 2 therefore provide further evidence of
the Money Doctors hypothesis.
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3.5 Alternative Explanations
Is Trustworthiness Mistaken for Skill?
Trustworthiness could be mistaken for investment skill. Investors could be-
lieve that more trustworthy money managers are able to deliver better in-
vestment performance. Beliefs could be such that more trustworthy man-
agers offer an expected return that overcompensates for their higher man-
agement fees. In this case, rational investors should invest more risky with
the more trustworthy – more skilled – money manager. To control for such
biased beliefs, we ask participants whether they believed that more trustwor-
thy money managers could deliver better investment performance after the
experiment. Possible answers are “Yes”, “No”, and “I do not know”. We
deliberately refrain from asking for participants’ beliefs about asset returns
during the experiment, as this might tempt them to believe that there was a
difference in investment skill, simply because we ask for it explicitly.
The majority of participants (n=66) believes that more trustworthy man-
agers can deliver better investment performance. There may be two expla-
nations for this observation. On the one hand, participants can justify their
choices in the experiment ex post. By stating that they (incorrectly) believed
that more trustworthy money managers were able to offer better investment
performance, participants can rationalize the behavior the experimenter ob-
serves. On the other hand, believing in the ability of more trustworthy man-
agers to deliver better investment performance may reflect investors’ “wish-
ful thinking”. An analogy for this explanation can be a medical diagno-
sis: Today many diagnoses are automatized by medical hard- and software,
and are hence largely independent of the doctor supervising the diagnosis.
Nonetheless, patients’ trust in a doctor determines how this doctor’s abilities
are perceived – even if the doctor’s diagnosis is based on algorithms (see e.g.,
Promberger and Baron, 2006; Arkes et al., 2007).
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We first contrast choices of participants holding biased beliefs with the
choices of those participants holding correct beliefs (n=36, “I do not know”
answers excluded) in Treatment 1. As expected, holding biased beliefs in-
creases the difference between the share invested risky with the more trusted
money manager and the share invested risky with the less trusted money
manager (18.52 to 14.22). However, also for the subgroup of participants
holding unbiased beliefs, the difference (14.22) remains highly statistically
significant (p-value=0.003).
In Treatment 2, biased beliefs should have a positive impact on stated
indifference costs. When the second manager is more trustworthy than the
first, investors are willing to accept costs of 2.23% if they hold biased beliefs,
but only 1.53% if they do not have biased beliefs. Nonetheless, indifference
costs for both groups are significantly different from 0.75% (p-values=0.000
and 0.032, respectively). Note that we excluded – and exclude in the fol-
lowing subsection – observations in which both managers returned equal
amounts in the trust game, because the alternative explanations are void in
these cases. In summary, biased beliefs amplify the findings in Treatment 1
and Treatment 2. However, evidence in favor of our hypotheses remains if
investors hold correct beliefs.
Are More Risky Investments a Means of Rewarding?
A second reason why investors might invest more risky with more trust-
worthy money managers is that they use the risky investment as a reward.
While this reciprocity motivation is interesting in itself, it would describe a
different channel than that modeled by Gennaioli et al. (2015). To control for
such motivation, we ask participants whether they invested risky with more
trustworthy money manager because they wanted to reward them. Possi-
ble answers are “Yes”, “No”, and “I do not know”. Half of the participants
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(n=58) stated that they wanted to reward more trustworthy managers when
investing more risky. On the other hand, 36 participants (“I do not know”
answers excluded) stated that rewarding did not motivate their investment
choices. Contrasting the choices of both subgroups in Treatment 1 reveals
the expected pattern: On average, rewarding investors invest 21.45% more
risky with the more trustworthy manager, whereas non-rewarding investors
invest only 8.69% more risky with the more trustworthy manager. While
the former is significant at the 1%-level, the latter is marginally insignificant
(p-value=0.137). In Treatment 2, the reward motivation leads to higher indif-
ference costs for investments with more trustworthy money managers. Re-
warding investors indicate indifference costs of 2.22%, while non-rewarding
investors indicate indifference costs of 1.58%. Again, however, these costs
are significantly higher than the costs (0.75%) charged by less trustworthy
managers (p-value=0.000 and 0.022, respectively). Evidence from both treat-
ments points out to “rewarding for trustworthiness” as one of the drivers of
investors’ investment choices. However, even without this motivation, re-
sults are still in line with our hypotheses.
Finally, we investigate whether the difference of the share invested risky
with either money manager varies significantly between participants hold-
ing correct and biased beliefs, and between participants with and without
reward motivation. For this purpose, random effects regressions are esti-
mated.12 In these regressions, we can also check for any interaction between
biased beliefs and reward motivation. For Treatment 1, Table 3.7 shows re-
sults of a regression with ∆ Risky More − Risky Less as dependent vari-
able. This variable is calculated as the amount invested risky with the more
trustworthy money manager minus the amount invested risky with the less
trustworthy money manager. Results of random effects tobit regression can
12 Here we cannot report fixed effects estimates, as the independent variables of interest –
dummies for biased beliefs or reward motivation – are time invariant.
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be found in Table B.9 in the appendix. Independent variables are a dummy
equal to 1 if investors hold biased beliefs (Biased Beliefs), a dummy equal to
1 if investors stated that they were motivated by rewarding for trustwor-
thiness (Reward Motivation), and an interaction term of both dummies (Bi-
ased Beliefs×Reward Motivation).13 If higher trustworthiness were to lower
investors’ anxiety of investing with a money manager, the constant in this
regression should be positive and significant. This is exactly what we find.
On average, investments with more trustworthy money managers are 17.5%
more risky, despite higher associated costs. On the other hand, neither Biased
Beliefs nor Reward Motivation significantly influence differences in investment
choices. Hence, differences in subgroups’ investment choices, as observed in
univariate tests, seem to be insignificant.
For Treatment 2, Table 3.8 reports results of a regression with Indifference
Costs as dependent variable. Random effects tobit regression are shown in
Table B.10 in the appendix. Independent variables are the same as before.
Under our hypotheses, the constant in the regression should be positive and
significantly different from the low fees of 0.75%. That is, investors should be
willing to accept higher costs for a risky investment made with a more trust-
worthy money manager. Regression results are as expected: On average, in-
vestors are willing to accept costs of 1.79% (p-values of 0.001 and 0.056 when
compared to 0 and 0.75, respectively) when investing with a more trustwor-
thy money manager. Coefficients for Biased Beliefs, RewardMotivation, and the
interaction of both are not statistically significant. Thus, even after control-
ling for potentially confounding factors, evidence from Treatment 2 supports
the Money Doctors theory.
13 Observations with “I do not know” as answer to the control questions are excluded in this
analysis.
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Table 3.7: Risky Share – Robustness
This table reports regression results with ∆ Risky More − Risky Less as dependent variable. It is calculated as
the share of wealth invested risky with the more trustworthy money manager minus the share of wealth invested
risky with the less trustworthy money manager. The regression accounts for unobserved individual heterogeneity
through random effects. Biased Beliefs is an indicator variable equal to 1 if participants stated that they believed that
more trustworthy money managers could deliver better investment performance. Reward Motivation is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if participants stated that they invested more risky with more trustworthy money managers
because they wanted to reward them.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Random Effects
Biased Beliefs -12.98
(11.48)
Reward Motivation 1.289
(8.862)
Biased Beliefs×Reward Motivation 18.46
(13.27)
Constant 17.46**
(8.633)
Observations 322
Cluster-robust S.E. YES
Round FE YES
R2overall 0.057
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Table 3.8: Indifference Costs – Robustness
This table reports regression results with Indifference Costs as dependent variable, for cases in which the second
money manager is more trustworthy than the first money manager. The regression accounts for unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity through random effects. Biased Beliefs is an indicator variable equal to 1 if participants stated
that they believed that more trustworthy money managers could deliver better investment performance. Reward
Motivation is an indicator variable equal to 1 if participants stated that they invested more risky with more trust-
worthy money managers because they wanted to reward them.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Random Effects
Biased Beliefs 0.216
(0.637)
Reward Motivation 0.002
(0.688)
Biased Beliefs×Reward Motivation 0.591
(0.844)
Constant 1.787***
(0.543)
Observations 324
Cluster-robust S.E. YES
Round FE YES
R2overall 0.042
3.5. Alternative Explanations 89
Do Participants React to Arbitrary Information?
Lastly, a possible objection to our results is that participants may not inter-
pret higher amounts returned in the trust game as sign of higher trustworthi-
ness. More subtle, this objection would mean that our results could simply
be due to participants reacting to arbitrary information. In other words, re-
placing the amount returned in the trust game with irrelevant information
might produce similar results. To control for this objection, we ask whether
participants interpreted higher amounts returned in the trust game as sig-
nal of higher trustworthiness at the end of the experiment. Possible answers
are “Yes”, “No”, and “I do not know”. The manipulation check indicates
that only a fifth of participants (20.18%) do not associate higher amounts
returned in the trust game with higher trustworthiness. For the majority
of participants (64.04%), the manipulation through the trust game appears
to have been effective. Nonetheless, we check whether both subgroups be-
have differently. In general, effect sizes should be greater for the subgroup
of participants affirming the manipulation question. In both Treatment 1 and
Treatment 2, tests of the variable(s) of interest confirm this hypothesis. In
Treatment 1, participants answering “Yes” to the manipulation check on av-
erage invest 17.93% more risky with the more trusted money manager (p-
value=0.000). Participants answering “No” to the manipulation check, on
the other hand, only invest 10.94% (p-value=0.056) more risky with the more
trusted money manager. In Treatment 2, participants answering “Yes” to the
manipulation are on average willing to accept costs of 2.10%. Participants an-
swering “No” to the manipulation check, however, are only willing to accept
costs of 1.53%. For both groups, costs are significantly different from 0.75%
(p-values=0.000 and 0.054, respectively). In summary, these results do not
corroborate the objection that our general findings are driven by participants
just reacting to some arbitrary information.
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3.6 Conclusion
This experimental study provides a direct test of the Money Doctors theory.
Our findings support the notion that trust is an important component for
delegated investing. Even at higher costs, investors take more risk when in-
vesting through a money manager who can be trusted. Vice versa, investors
are willing to accept higher costs for investments made through more trust-
worthy money managers. The larger the spread between managers’ trust-
worthiness, the larger the observed effects. Collectively, our study highlights
a positive aspect of delegated investing. Although investors would be best
off with high risk taking at low costs, they are still better off with higher risk
taking at higher costs, if they trust their money manager. In short, our study
identifies trust as the “substantial intangible benefit” Bergstresser et al. (2009,
p.4129) suspect but cannot observe. Trust may thus be the “saving grace” for
a delegation and advice industry whose benefits have been severely doubted
in several studies (see e.g., Bergstresser et al., 2009; Mullainathan et al., 2012;
Hackethal et al., 2012; Hoechle et al., 2017, 2018).
Furthermore, our experiment points to a reward mechanism as another
potential channel why trustworthy money managers may be able to charge
higher fees and attract more funds. While it appears plausible that investors
want to reward trustworthiness, it is different from the trust-modified risk
aversion mechanism proposed by Gennaioli et al. (2015). Determining the
precise influence of the reward mechanism is left for future research..
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Chapter 4
Algorithm Aversion in Financial
Investing ∗
4.1 Introduction
Increasing digitalization and automation of processes in all parts of society
have sparked a debate on whether people are willing to rely on algorithms.
We use the term algorithm for any automated formula or rule that is used to
process data. In a recent experiment, Dietvorst et al. (2015) show that humans
prefer to rely on predictions made by a human rather than an algorithm,
even if the latter performs better. Additionally, participants are quicker to
lose confidence in the algorithm than the human once they observe an error.
Dietvorst et al. (2015) explain this behavior with algorithm aversion.
With the emergence and growth of robo-advisors,1 and with major fund
∗ Authors: Maximilian Germann and Christoph Merkle. Maximilian Germann is at
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Email: germann@bank.bwl.uni-mannheim.de. Christoph Merkle is at the Kühne Logis-
tics University. Christoph Merkle: Grosser Grassbrook 17, 20457 Hamburg. Email:
christoph.merkle@the-klu.org. For valuable comments, we thank Peter Bossaerts,
Noboyuki Hanaki, Martin Weber, participants of the Experimental Finance 2018, the ESA
world meeting 2018, and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim. Funding from
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is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are our own.
1 www.ft.com/content/6b2d5490-d9bb-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e (retrieved July 20, 2018).
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companies shifting towards more cost-efficient, automatized products,2 at-
titudes towards algorithms become increasingly important for the finance
industry. In the words of practitioners “over many years, the fund indus-
try has operated with a false sense of security, assuming that algorithms
and computing power would digitize and revolutionize trading, but that
the right products would ultimately be selected by humans.”3 Today, robo-
advisors like Betterment or Wealthfront already report assets under manage-
ment worth several billion U.S. dollars.4 New FinTech companies heavily
relying on technology are founded all over the world.
These developments show that the financial industry offers many appli-
cations for algorithms, be it in trading, asset management, or financial ad-
vice. This makes it vital to understand how algorithm aversion – or the lack
thereof – might affect financial decision making. It will determine whether
new competitors to traditional financial intermediaries will remain in a niche
market and cater the tech-savvy, or will gain wide acceptance in the general
population. Our study therefore aims to answer two key questions: 1. Are
human investors less likely to invest in a portfolio selected and “managed”
by an investment algorithm than in a portfolio selected and managed by a
human fund manager? 2. Are they quicker to abandon the investment algo-
rithm than the human fund manager if performance (absolute or relative) is
poor?
To answer these questions, we conduct an experimental study consisting
of two parts, an online survey and a laboratory experiment. The survey is
administered several weeks prior to the experiment and elicits beliefs about
the strengths and weaknesses of algorithms relative to human judgment. It
2 www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-28/blackrock-said-to-cut-jobs-fees-
in-revamp-of-active-equity-unit (retrieved July 20, 2018).
3 See Bain & Company (2017) report “Asset-Management: Erfolgsformel gesucht”, p.9 (translated
from German by the authors).
4 US$ 13.5bn for Betterment and US$ 10bn for Wealthfront as of March 2018. Data retrieved
from Google Finance as of May 22, 2018.
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includes explanations for algorithm aversion suggested in the literature and
is designed to contribute to our understanding of participants’ preferences
for either intermediary. We implement a distance in time between the survey
and the main experiment to avoid a direct effect of this task on experimental
decisions.
In the laboratory experiment, we ask participants to choose between a
human fund manager and an investment algorithm to invest for them. Both
financial intermediaries then repeatedly decide to invest in either a risk-free
bond or a risky stock. The stock can be in a good state or a bad state, which
is slowly revealed by its performance (the design is adapted from Kuhnen,
2015). The pre-programmed algorithm strictly applies Bayes’ Law and de-
cides accordingly, while the human fund manager has complete discretion
over the decisions to make. In the experiment, the participant with the best
financial literacy and numeracy skills takes over the role of the human fund
manager. The incentives of participants depend on the payoffs generated by
their selected intermediary.
Importantly, the selection of the financial intermediary is repeated ten
times, which allows us to study initial preferences without much informa-
tion, as well as the reaction to the outcomes the intermediaries produce. The
experimental design gives rise to frequent (ex-post) mistakes that occur even
if a rational strategy is applied. We can thus also examine the consequences
of such mistakes on the preferences of participants. To determine how strong
these preferences are, we apply several different fee schemes, which render
one intermediary more expensive than the other.
We find no evidence for algorithm aversion. In the initial choice with
equal fees 56% of participants decide to invest with the algorithm. If fees
differ between the intermediaries, participants mostly (>80%) choose the in-
termediary with the lower fee. They apparently do not believe that one will
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outperform the other by a high enough margin to justify the higher fee. In-
deed, human fund managers perform quite well and register only slight un-
derperformance relative to the Bayesian algorithm.
There is no strong trend in the proportions choosing either intermedi-
ary. Once investors learn about investment choices and outcomes of the hu-
man fund manager and the algorithm, they focus on performance. Choices
are strongly influenced by cumulative past performance whereby the highest
weight is given to the most recent performance. In their reaction to perfor-
mance, participants do not discriminate between intermediaries. In particu-
lar, they do not respond differently to (ex-post) mistakes by the intermedi-
aries, rejecting the idea of trust in an algorithm eroding more quickly. We
thus do not find support for the two major predictions of algorithm aversion
– general preference for human judgment and adverse response to errors by
an algorithm – in the domain of financial decision making.
The survey provides some insights into the reasons for this result. Partic-
ipants believe in the ability of an algorithm to generate higher returns than
a human. They also think that an algorithm is better able to learn. On the
contrary, they see advantages of the human in using qualitative data and
dealing with outliers. Regarding the relationship between the intermediaries
they view an algorithm as an aid rather than a competitor to a human fund
manager. Of these attributes only the belief about returns has explanatory
power for observed choices in the experiment. This is in line with partici-
pants paying most attention to returns, as the experimental setting provides
little opportunity to play off strengths in analyzing qualitative data or out-
liers.
We further establish that in focusing mainly on returns, participants fail
to distinguish between skill and luck. They take into account the outcome
of an investment but not whether an investment decision was reasonable
ex ante (outcome bias). They will thus be slow in recognizing true skill,
4.2. Literature and Hypotheses 95
which might explain the absence of a strong trend towards the algorithm
over time. The random component in outcomes introduces noise which pre-
vents a small performance difference to be noticeable by participants (consis-
tent with Heuer et al., 2017).
Our results have several implications for the financial industry. First, al-
gorithm aversion is absent in general which suggests that products based on
algorithmic strategies should find a large market of interested clients. Sec-
ond, however, preferences can be quite sticky as the investment proportions
in our experiment do not change much. It might need a long performance
history or large performance difference to convince people initially in favor
of a human fund manager. Third, the expressed view of algorithms serving
as an aid suggests that the most preferred intermediary could be a human
manager assisted by an algorithm. Even though people are forgiving in case
of errors, they might view human intervention in extreme scenarios favor-
ably.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides
an overview of the literature on algorithm aversion from which we derive
hypotheses for the experiment. Section 4.3 presents the experimental design
and participants. In section 4.4, we report and discuss the main results, be-
fore a final section concludes.
4.2 Literature and Hypotheses
Algorithm aversion is neither a new concept, nor limited to a particular do-
main. Researchers as early as Meehl (1954) discuss the superior performance
of algorithms in various prediction tasks. In comparing statistical and clinical
prediction, this line of research pits a statistical algorithm against a human
clinician. Dawes (1979) confirms the superiority of even improper specified
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algorithms and already reports common objections against the use of algo-
rithms. These include technical issues raised against the particular methodol-
ogy applied, psychological misperceptions of performance, and ethical prob-
lems with algorithms deciding in sensitive areas.
In meta studies, Grove and Meehl (1996) and Grove et al. (2000) corrob-
orate the hypothesis that for many forecasting tasks, algorithms are better
suited than humans. The tendency to discount algorithms has been docu-
mented in a variety of settings as well. In medicine, recommendations com-
ing from a physician are rated higher than recommendations from a com-
puter system or from a physician aided by a computed system (Promberger
and Baron, 2006; Shaffer et al., 2013). In matters of personal taste, Yeomans
et al. (2017) provide evidence that although an algorithm outperforms hu-
mans at recommending jokes that participants rate funny, they still prefer to
receive joke recommendations from other humans.
A first hypothesis emerging from this literature is that algorithm aversion
exists and that people shy away from using algorithms, most likely also in
financial decisions:
Hypothesis 1: A larger fraction of participants will initially select to in-
vest with the human fund manager than with the invest-
ment algorithm.
Hypothesis 1a: Participants’ willingness-to-pay for the human fund
manager (i.e., fees) will initially be higher than their
willingness-to-pay for the algorithm.
Hypothesis 1a is added as a measure for the strength of preference for a finan-
cial intermediary. By attaching a price to investing, we are able to determine
at what price people are indifferent between investing with the human fund
manager and the algorithm.
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Dietvorst et al. (2015) analyze algorithm aversion in a systematic way. Ex-
periment participants observe predictions of human judges and algorithms
in domains such as MBA student performance or U.S. air traffic. In several
conditions, the amount of information participants observe is varied. They
can either tie their incentives to the performance of an algorithm or to a hu-
man judge (which is in some conditions themselves and sometimes another
participant). Dietvorst et al. (2015) find that algorithm aversion is most pro-
nounced after seeing the algorithm perform, even if this performance is supe-
rior to the human judge. They conclude that people are particularly troubled
by seeing the algorithm err and abandon it in response.
We can thus specify the expected reaction to seeing the investment algo-
rithm perform and to mistakes that is makes:
Hypothesis 2: Participants will disregard higher performance of the al-
gorithm and continue to favor the human fund manager
after outcomes are observed.
Hypothesis 3: After mistakes by the algorithm, participants will be more
prone to switching from the algorithm to the human fund
manager than vice versa.
In a follow-up article, Dietvorst et al. (2018) find that allowing partici-
pants to modify the forecast of an algorithm makes them considerably more
likely to use it. At the same time the modification option increases partic-
ipants’ satisfaction with and belief in the algorithm. There exists further
evidence for situations in which humans do rely on algorithms. In a task
of evaluating statements and reducing them to a logical problem, partici-
pants rely more on algorithms than on other people (Dijkstra et al., 1998),
or even themselves (Dijkstra, 1999). As Logg (2017) elaborates, confound-
ing factors in existing studies make it difficult to establish a clear case for or
against algorithm aversion. She shows that participants prefer advice from
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algorithms over advice from other people, and that they particularly prefer
advice from algorithms for objective decisions (e.g., estimating air traffic),
whereas they prefer advice from humans for subjective decisions (e.g., rec-
ommending jokes).
Financial decision making might be perceived as a domain of objective
decision making, which would work against Hypotheses 1-3. Little attention
has yet been paid to algorithm aversion in a financial context. To our knowl-
edge, there is only a handful of studies on the role of algorithm aversion in
finance. In an experiment, Önkal et al. (2009) show that stock price forecasts
provided by a statistical forecasting method are more severely discounted
than forecasts by a human expert. Based on fund flow data, Harvey et al.
(2017) report that algorithm-based (“systematic”) hedge funds receive less in-
flows than actively managed (“discretionary”) hedge funds. However, they
do not find a performance gap justifying this aversion towards algorithm-
based hedge funds.
Most recently, Hodge et al. (2018) provide experimental evidence that in-
vestors are more likely to follow the advice of a robo-advisor in an anony-
mous setting, while they are more likely to follow the advice of a human ad-
visor when advisors are humanized (e.g., by adding a name). Unlike in our
study, however, their setting does not feature actual human advisors, nor do
the human or the algorithm advisor act in the experiments. D’Acunto et al.
(2018) study the characteristics of investors who adopt robo-advising tool
and find that they are demographically similar to non-adopters, but have
larger portfolios, trade more, and achieve higher risk-adjusted performance.
Following their interpretation, more sophisticated investors are more likely
to adopt the algorithm.
Our study contributes to this emerging literature on the presence (or ab-
sence) of algorithm aversion in financial decision making in multiple ways.
To our knowledge, we are the first to use an experimental setting in which
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both the investment algorithm and human fund manager act and are ob-
served to act. Due to the straightforward design, we are able to exclude many
of the confounding factors that make conclusions about algorithm aversion
otherwise difficult (Logg, 2017). By presenting the decisions and investment
outcomes to participants, we generate rich data on how they respond to per-
formance and to mistakes, which has been described as one of the key ele-
ments of algorithm aversion. Finally, we explore the underlying beliefs that
shape people’s preferences for a human or algorithmic intermediary.
4.3 Experimental Design and Participants
We design an experiment that consists of two parts, an online survey and
a laboratory experiment. We need to separate the parts to avoid spill-over
effects from the questionnaire to the experiment or vice versa. As for practical
reasons the payment of participants takes place at the laboratory stage, the
survey is run beforehand. A survey link is sent out to participants about four
weeks before the scheduled experiment and the survey closes three weeks
before the experiment. Participants are required to complete the survey and
receive an individual code in order to partake in the laboratory experiment.
4.3.1 Online Survey
The aim of the survey is to understand perceptions of algorithms and human
managers that may affect algorithm aversion in financial decision making.
There are several aspects of decision making and data processing for which
either an algorithm or a human might be better equipped. We draw on the
literature to identify relevant dimensions for which we measure participants’
perceptions. Based on this we formulate statements that one intermediary is
better than the other in a particular dimension (see Table 4.1 for a list of these
statements). To avoid acquiescence bias, there is an inverted version of each
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statement and one of the two is presented at random. Participants express
their agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree”
to “strongly agree.”
A straightforward question is whether participants expect an investment
fund run by an algorithm or a human fund manager to achieve higher returns
(statement one). One objection against algorithms is their supposed inability
to learn or to improve through experience (Dawes, 1979; Highhouse, 2008),
which we capture in statement two. It has been suggested that algorithms
are unable to incorporate qualitative data and to react to unexpected events
or outliers (Grove and Meehl, 1996), which we address in statements three
and six. There also might be different perception on intermediaries’ ability to
identify relevant factors and to integrate this data (statements four and five,
Dawes, 1979).
Of specific interest to the industry should be whether algorithms are ex-
pected to compete with (and probably replace) human fund managers, or
whether they are perceived as an aid to human managers (statement seven).
It is unclear whether a combination of the two intermediaries is considered
superior to a single one (Shaffer et al., 2013).
In addition, we elicit self-reported measures for trust and risk aversion
(Falk et al., 2018), and economic knowledge (van Rooij et al., 2011). Some of
these factors might interact with algorithm aversion, as for example more
sophisticated investors have been suggested to rely more on algorithm
(D’Acunto et al., 2018). The impact of trust and risk-aversion will depend on
which intermediary is considered to be more trustworthy and less risky.
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4.3.2 Laboratory Experiment
In the laboratory experiment, we simulate financial decisions in the context
of delegated investments. This provides a simple setup in which an algo-
rithm can directly compete with a human fund manager. Dietvorst et al.
(2015, p.114) define the term algorithm to “encompass any evidence-based
forecasting formula or rule. Thus, the term includes statistical methods, de-
cision rules, and all other mechanical procedures that can be used for fore-
casting.” For an investment context, we derive the following criteria for the
algorithm: 1) Once constructed, it must act independently of a human, 2) it
must be strictly rule-based, and 3) its recommended actions must be executed
automatically.
The investment decisions made by the financial intermediaries are re-
peated choices between a risk-less bond and a risky stock. Our experimental
design follows the gain condition in Kuhnen (2015). There are two securi-
ties on a market, one of which is a bond paying 3e for certain. The other is a
stock paying either 5e or 1e. The probability for the high payoff is either 70%
(good state) or 30% (bad state). Whether the stock happens to be in a good
or bad state is randomly determined with equal probability at the beginning
of a block of trials. A trial hereby represents one realization of payoffs for the
two securities. The state of the stock is fixed for a block of six trials.
An important difference to the original design is that participants do not
decide themselves in which security to invest, but instead choose the inter-
mediary they want to invest with. Intermediaries are presented as invest-
ment funds managed either by a human fund manager or by an investment
algorithm. The algorithm is programmed to maximize expected return fol-
lowing Bayes’ law. In case expected returns are equal for both securities, it
chooses randomly. The algorithms’ goal of maximizing expected return is
disclosed to participants. The exact mechanism, however, is not disclosed.
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This is consistent with the literature on algorithm aversion which usually
does not explain how algorithms work exactly. Likewise, in reality the me-
chanics of an algorithm would typically not be disclosed by fund companies.
Moreover, too much information would be counterproductive to learn about
participants’ existing dispositions towards investing with an algorithm or a
human. While a concern is that participants believe an algorithm constructed
by the experimenters must be superior, prior research finds algorithm aver-
sion despite this fact (Dietvorst et al., 2015).5
The human fund manager represents an actual human being selected
from participants. This avoids simulating human decisions, which would
make them appear similar to an algorithmic decision. Participants complete
a set of eight (advanced) financial literacy questions (van Rooij et al., 2011)
and a four-question numeracy test (Berlin Numeracy Test, see Cokely et al.,
2012). Known to participants, the participant with the highest score is anony-
mously appointed as the human fund manager. This is to ensure that the
other participants view this individual as financially competent even though
he or she is not a professional fund manager. In case of ties for highest score,
one of the tied participants is selected randomly.
After the role of the fund manager is assigned, participants decide
whether they want to tie their incentives for the first block of trials to the
human or to the algorithm. Their decision is fixed for this block and can
be revised only after the block ends. They then observe the choices and the
outcomes of the human fund manager and the algorithm. In each trial, the
human and the algorithm invest in the stock or the bond and observe the
outcomes of both securities. After a block of trial ends, a new state for the
stock is drawn and participants can change their preferred intermediary.
They are shown a summary of the aggregated payoffs of both intermediaries
5 Dietvorst et al. (2015) use light deception and tell participants that “the admissions office
had created a statistical model that was designed to forecast student performance.”
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of Experimental Design
for all previous blocks. This is repeated for a total of ten blocks. For an
overview of the experimental design see Figure 4.1.
The experimental design allows for (ex-post) mistakes by the human
manager and the algorithm, as even perfect information will result in the
selection of the asset with the inferior payoff in 30% of the cases. The
design thus enables us to study how participants react to mistakes by the
intermediaries. It further avoids several of the confounding effects identified
in the literature (Logg, 2017).
In addition to the decision for one of the intermediaries, we also mea-
sure the strength of participants’ preferences. Investing with the human fund
manager always costs a fixed fee of 2e. Investing with the algorithm costs
a fee of either 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4e. For each of the five fee-combinations we ask
which intermediary a participant would prefer (see appendix C for screen-
shots of the experiment). One fee combination is then randomly drawn and
the actual decision for this combination is used. Participants can thus express
a preference for either intermediary in the range from -2e to +2e.6
All participants are incentivized based on the outcomes of their decisions.
Participants acting as investors receive the payoff generated by their chosen
intermediary minus fees. To avoid wealth effects only one of the blocks is
randomly drawn for payment. Participants in the role of the fund manager
6 Fees are not transferred to the human fund manager (or the algorithm) to avoid issues of
reciprocity.
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receive the gross payoff they achieved in a random block. This also pro-
vides incentive to become fund manager.7 The expected payoff for a block
of trials amounts to 6·3=18e, the expected fees are 2e. The laboratory ex-
periment concludes with a short questionnaire asking participants how they
rate the human fund manager’s and the algorithm’s investing capability, and
an open-ended question regarding participants’ primary motivation when
choosing between both intermediaries.
4.3.3 Participants
The experiment was implemented using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and the
survey was run on the research platform SoSci survey. Participants were
invited to the MLab of the University of Mannheim via the recruiting soft-
ware ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). In total, 114 participants took part in the labora-
tory experiment, 107 of which could be matched to survey data. To preserve
anonymity, the matching was done via an individual code generated in the
survey, which some participants could not recall. We nevertheless allowed
these participants to enter the main experiment.
We aimed for twelve sessions of ten participants. Due to no-shows some
sessions had fewer but never less than eight participants. This means that we
ended up with 12 unique human fund managers (one per session) each with
seven to nine investors. The small sessions were intended to generate more
variation in the human fund manager which implies more independent clus-
ters (i.e., session fixed effects) and reduced risk that results might be driven
by extreme strategies of one particular fund manager.
7 There might be concerns that participants do not want to stand out from their peers and be-
come fund manager. We make it clear in the instructions that the fund manager is appointed
anonymously and not revealed to anyone. From the results in the literacy and numeracy
tests, we conclude that participants do compete for the role.
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Participants were 22.8 years old on average, were predominantly female
(58%), and a quarter had already invested in stocks (24.3%). The average pay-
off from the experiment was 16.79e for participants in the role of investors
and 18.83e for participants in the role of fund managers. The payoff range
was between 4e and 30e. Considering an average experiment duration of
approximately 40 minutes (and an additional 5-10 minutes for the survey),
the payoff for participation was substantially higher than the laboratory av-
erage and German minimum wage.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Survey Results
We begin with the analysis of the survey responses on how algorithms are
perceived in the financial context. As two reversed versions of each state-
ment are randomly presented, we rescale all answers so that a value of 5
expresses the algorithm is strongly favored, and a value of 1 that the human
is strongly favored. Consequently, a value of 3 indicates a neutral perception.
We do find a sometimes significant effect of the version of the question shown
to participants (acquiescence bias), which we eliminate by counterbalancing
versions. As intended, the questions capture different dimensions: Overall,
answers have low and mostly insignificant correlations (see appendix Table
C.1).
Table 4.2 summarizes participants’ perceptions along the dimensions we
explained before. On average, investment algorithms are expected to deliver
better investment performance than human fund managers. In addition, in-
vestment algorithms are viewed to be slightly better at adapting their invest-
ment approach. Not surprisingly, however, human fund managers are per-
ceived to make better use of qualitative data. No difference is found for both
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Table 4.2: Perceptions of Algorithms in Finance
This table shows how participants perceive algorithms in finance. To avoid acquiescence bias, for each dimension
there were two versions of the statement one of which was randomly presented. The exact wording of these
questions is shown in Table 4.1. Answers are given on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 was labeled
“strongly disagree” and 5 was labeled “strongly agree.” Values shown here are combined values for both versions,
with the value of 5 indicating a perception in favor of the algorithm. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. All tests are two-sided t-tests against a neutral response of 3.
N µ σ Min Max
1 Returns 106 3.26∗∗∗ 0.82 1 5
2 Learning 107 3.19∗ 1.00 1 5
3 Qualitative data 107 2.69∗∗∗ 1.00 1 5
4 Data aggregation 107 3.08 1.05 1 5
5 Data weighting 107 3.06 0.90 1 5
6 Dealing with outliers 107 2.70∗∗∗ 1.08 1 5
7 Aid rather than competitor 107 3.56∗∗∗ 0.81 2 5
data aggregation and data weighting. When it comes do dealing with out-
liers, such as financial crises, human fund managers are again viewed more
capable.
Overall, participants’ perceptions of algorithms in finance appear quite
reasonable. Some correspond to the views expressed in the literature such
as dealing with qualitative data and with outliers. In the domains proba-
bly most relevant for the laboratory experiment, the expected return and the
ability to learn, participants view algorithms as better than humans. This
means their perceptions do not unambiguously support all of the proposed
reasons for algorithm aversion. Particularly important for practitioners, we
find that participants view algorithms as an aid to instead of a competitor of
fund managers.
Lastly, participants are somewhat inclined to take financial risks (5.4 out
of 10, SD=2.0) and report to have an average level of general trust (4.7 out of
10, SD=2.3). As many of the recruited participants are students of business
or economics, they rate their economic knowledge above average (4.5 out
of 7, SD=1.1). As investors in stocks and mutual funds typically represent
an economically rather sophisticated group as well, the participant group
should be a relevant one even though it lacks investment experience.
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4.4.2 Investment Decisions by Financial Intermediaries
While the selection of an intermediary is in the center of this study, we first
report on the investment behavior of the intermediaries. The algorithm max-
imizes returns following Bayes’ law, which is relatively simple in the em-
ployed experimental setting. In the first trial without any information, it
selects either the stock or the bond at random. In any later trial, it selects the
stock if the good outcome of the stock (payoff of five) was observed more
often than the bad outcome (payoff of one), and the bond if the bad outcome
was observed more often than the good outcome. In case of equal occurrence
of both outcomes, the algorithm again selects at random.
Six trials are usually enough to identify the true state of the stock. In the
final investment decision, the choice of the algorithm is in line with the true
state in 86.9% of the cases. We refer to such a decision as an ex-ante cor-
rect decision, because the intermediary selects the asset that is expected to
perform better according to the underlying probabilities. Figure 4.2 shows
how the fraction of ex-ante correct decisions by the algorithm rises over the
course of the trials. However, the fraction of ex-post correct decisions, mean-
ing that the selected asset outperforms the other asset in the following period,
is lower, as it is subject to chance. The upper limit for ex-post correct deci-
sions is 70% even for a perfectly informed investor. As the figure shows, the
algorithm remains below this limit even the final trials.
The expected investment outcome of a perfectly informed investor would
be 22.80e in the good state (always selecting the stock) and 18e in the bad
state (always selecting the bond). The algorithm on average reaches 21.66e
(good state) and 16.62e (bad state). These values are the benchmark for the
human fund manager. As the algorithm uses the best available strategy, the
human fund manager will likely underperform. This is consistent with the
literature on algorithm aversion in which the algorithm usually outperforms
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Figure 4.2: Correct Decisions by Intermediary
This figure shows the fractions of ex-ante and ex-post optimal decisions by the algorithm and the human. Fractions
averaged over all blocks are shown by trial.
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the human expert.
By appointing the most financially literate and most numerate partici-
pant, the human fund manager should at least be well-equipped to make
good investment decisions and might actually come close to the optimal
strategy of the algorithm. Participants perform well in the financial literacy
quiz. On average, 6.2 out of 8 questions are answered correctly. The numer-
acy test is harder with on average 1.8 out of 4 correct responses. Adding both
scores, participants answer 7.9 questions correctly. As intended, human fund
managers perform substantially better with an almost perfect score of 11.7.
Human fund managers’ knowledge and abilities also translate into in-
vestment decisions. The dashed lines in Figure 4.2 show the fractions of their
ex-ante and ex-post correct decisions. From trial two onwards, they are be-
low those of the algorithm but only by on average 11 (ex-ante) and 6 (ex-post)
percentage points. Over all 120 blocks (12 human fund managers · 10 blocks),
the algorithm outperforms human fund managers by on average 0.58e per
block. As depicted in Figure 4.3, payoff differences between algorithm and
human fund manager are skewed to the right. By construction, it is difficult
to outperform the algorithm by more than 2e. However, algorithms some-
times significantly outperform the human fund manager.
Human fund managers can only deviate substantially from the algorithm
if they do not follow Bayesian logic. A majority of outcomes differing by
no more than 2e suggests that, by and large, human fund managers adopt
a Bayesian approach. On average, they make Bayesian investment choices
in 4.95 trials per block.8 As shown in Figure 4.4, in more than 50% of all
blocks, human fund managers make Bayesian decisions in every trial. This
investment behavior is stable over blocks and does not require initial learning
(see Figure C.1 in the appendix).
8 We generously count any decision as Bayesian in cases where the Bayesian decision is
ambiguous (i.e., the algorithm randomizes). If we exclude such decisions, the fraction of
Bayesian decisions by human fund managers is reduced to 76%.
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Figure 4.3: Relative Performance Investment Algorithm and Human Fund
Manager
This figure shows the distribution of cumulated payoff differences (in e) between the algorithm and the human.
Payoff differences are cumulated over all trials of one block.
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Figure 4.4: Human Fund Manager Choices
This figure shows the distribution of the number of trials in a particular block for which the human invested
Bayesian and invested exactly as the algorithm, respectively.
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This naturally results in a high number of identical choices between the
two intermediaries, which is also documented in Figure 4.4. In most blocks
between four and six decisions are the same between the intermediaries. This
allows us to investigate participants’ choices after blocks in which there was
virtually no difference between human fund manager and investment algo-
rithm. Interestingly, we find no evidence for risk aversion on the side of the
human managers. If information is ambiguous, they invest into the stock
52.6% of the time. Because both intermediaries invest risk neutrally, risk
preferences of participants cannot bias our results (e.g., favoring the more
risk-averse intermediary).
4.4.3 Investors’ Initial Choice of Intermediary
When analyzing the choices of investors, we distinguish between the first
decision at the start of the experiment and all subsequent decisions. Entering
the first block of investments, participants have to rely on their predisposi-
tions towards the investment algorithm and the human fund manager. There
is no information yet available on their performance in the task at hand, and
the decision might differ from those after seeing the algorithm perform (Di-
etvorst et al., 2015). To test hypotheses 1 and 1a, we thus examine investors’
initial choice of an intermediary before the first block of investments.
The aim of the algorithm to maximize expected return is part of the exper-
imental instructions. Similar to what is observed in reality, the exact mecha-
nism of the investment algorithm is not disclosed. We avoid any particular
reference to its quality.9 It is common knowledge to participants that hu-
man fund managers are selected based on financial sophistication and that
they are incentivized based on investment performance. It is thus reasonable
for participants to assume that they aim at maximizing performance as well.
9 This is unlike Dietvorst et al. (2015), who explain to participants “that the model was so-
phisticated, put together by thoughtful analysts (p.117).” If anything, we should observe
stronger algorithm aversion in presence of quality uncertainty.
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Although human managers as reported act rather risk neutrally, investors
might initially believe that they invest more closely to human investors’ (po-
tentially risk-averse) preferences.
When participants first select an intermediary, there is no evidence for
algorithm aversion. Our baseline is the choice situation with equal fees, in
which 56% of investors choose the algorithm. While this is a slight major-
ity, the proportion is not significantly different from 50% (p-value=0.24). To
show the absence of algorithm aversion, however, a general preference for
the algorithm is not necessary. Our data are unlikely to occur in presence of
true algorithm aversion of, e.g., 60% (p-value<0.01). We interpret the result
as evidence against Hypothesis 1.
Under Hypothesis 1a, we should further find a higher willingness-to-pay
for the human fund manager when fees are not equal. This means, we should
observe relatively more choices in favor of the human fund manager than the
algorithm if their respective fees are higher. However, the observed distribu-
tion of choices is almost symmetric. If the human fund manager costs 1e
(2e) more than the investment algorithm, 13% (6%) of investors still prefer
the human manager in the initial choice. If the investment algorithm costs 1e
(2e) more than the human fund manager, 15% (5%) of investors prefer the
algorithm. These revealed preferences imply an on average 7.5 cents higher
willingness-to-pay for the algorithm.10 We therefore cannot confirm Hypoth-
esis 1a.
The low fraction of participants selecting the more expensive intermedi-
ary in the unequal fee combinations suggests that they do not believe any
intermediary will outperform the other by a Euro or more. This is interest-
ing, as just one more (ex-post) mistake per block loses 2e relative to the other
intermediary. Open-ended feedback at the end of the experiment supports
10 This is a coarse calculation as exact switching points (maximum willingness-to-pay) cannot
be identified. We instead use the mid-point of the fee interval, at which participants switch.
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the importance of fees: Out of 95 participants who state their motivation for
choosing between intermediaries, 75 (79%) mention costs as a decisive factor.
As a consequence, these choices tend to be very stable over the course of the
experiment (see Figure C.3 in the appendix). For the following analyses, we
thus focus mainly on investors’ choices when fees are equal, as they are more
sensitive to developments in the experiment.
For participants in the role of investors with a matching survey (n=95),
we regress their initial choice for an intermediary on their perceptions of al-
gorithms, demographics and controls. Table 4.3 shows marginal effects of
probit regressions. In a first step, we aggregate the perceptions towards the
algorithm by taking the mean of questions 1 to 6 as reported in Table 4.1.11
We find that the general perception of the algorithm is positively correlated
with choosing the algorithm in the equal fee condition (column 1). One step
on the five-point scale makes it 26.5% more likely to select the algorithm.
Effects for the individual perceptions (columns 2 and 3) are all positive,
but only the belief that the algorithm is able to generate higher returns attains
significance. This is consistent with participants viewing this ability as the
most important attribute in the experimental task. Of the control variables,
being male and having invested in stocks have a negative effect. This might
be surprising as men are sometimes seen as more affine to technology. On the
other hand, male and active investors are prone to overconfidence, and they
may believe that the human fund manager can beat the algorithm. Risk tol-
erance has a positive effect, suggesting that the algorithm is perceived as the
riskier alternative. Turning to the choices when fees are unequal (columns 4
and 5), we find only little effects of the independent variables on the choice of
intermediary. As assumed before, decisions in these cases seem to be mostly
driven by cost considerations.
11 The simple mean is highly correlated with the first component of a principal component
analysis. We exclude the question on perceiving the algorithm as a competitor or an aid, as
the direction of this item is unclear.
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Table 4.3: Initital Choice of Intermediary
The table reports probit regression results with the initial choice of intermediary as dependent variable. The binary
variable takes a value of 1 if an investor chooses to invest with the investment algorithm. Columns (1) to (3) report
results for the choice under equal fees, column (4) shows results for the choice when the algorithm demands a
1e higher fee, and column (5) shows results for the choice when the human manager demands a 1e higher fee.
Independent variables include responses to questions 1 to 6 as reported in Table 4.1, and an aggregated perception
of the algorithm which is the mean across question. Gender is an indicator variable (male=1), Invested in stocks is
an indicator whether a participant has invested in stocks (=1). Risk tolerance and Trust are as defined in Falk et al.
(2018) and range from 0 to 10. Self-reported knowledge is participants self-reported economic knowledge ranging
from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest). Knowledge score is the total score obtained from the financial literacy and numeracy
task. Reported are marginal effect with robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Equal fees Fee algo +1 Fee human +1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Perception of Algorithm (aggr.) 0.265
(0.123)∗∗
Returns 0.109 0.126 0.057 –0.027
(0.060)∗ (0.063)∗∗ (0.040) (0.041)
Learning 0.022 –0.004 0.013 0.056
(0.052) (0.050) (0.036) (0.030)∗
Qualitative Data 0.032 0.037 0.042 0.002
(0.051) (0.049) (0.036) (0.025)
Data Aggregation 0.041 0.036 0.009 –0.015
(0.048) (0.048) (0.035) (0.023)
Data Weighting 0.022 0.029 0.055 0.071
(0.059) (0.055) (0.039) (0.029)∗∗
Outliers 0.030 0.049 –0.050 0.023
(0.049) (0.045) (0.034) (0.026)
Gender (1=male) –0.278 –0.002 0.048
(0.105)∗∗∗ (0.077) (0.061)
Age in years –0.027 –0.004 –0.002
(0.016)∗ (0.011) (0.007)
Invested in stocks –0.234 –0.086 0.033
(0.118)∗∗ (0.090) (0.063)
Risk tolerance 0.048 0.028 0.005
(0.024)∗∗ (0.017) (0.015)
Trust 0.002 –0.011 –0.015
(0.024) (0.016) (0.012)
Self-assessed knowledge 0.060 –0.036 0.006
(0.046) (0.029) (0.018)
Knowledge score 0.019 0.014 –0.024
(0.019) (0.015) (0.011)∗∗
Pseudo-R2 0.031 0.040 0.149 0.136 0.250
Observations 95 94 94 94 94
4.4. Results 117
4.4.4 Investors’ Choices After Seeing Intermediaries Perform
We first consider descriptive evidence to answer the question whether algo-
rithm aversion arises in response to seeing the algorithm perform. Figure 4.5
shows the fraction of participants choosing to invest with the algorithm over
the course of the experiment (at equal fees). Indeed, this fraction drops from
the initial 56% to a low of 44% in investment blocks 4 and 5. Possibly, partic-
ipants are disappointed that the algorithm is not perfect and makes (ex-post)
mistakes. However, afterwards we observe a strong recovery to above 60% in
the final blocks. With accumulating evidence apparently the outperformance
of the algorithm becomes harder to ignore.12 The average after investment
block 1 is 51% in favor of the algorithm, which speaks against a general pres-
ence of algorithm aversion.
To examine Hypothesis 2 more closely, we treat repeated choices by par-
ticipants as panel data with investment blocks as time dimension. Rational
investors should learn from observing the decisions of intermediaries and
their performance. At the end of each block, accumulated payoffs of both in-
termediaries are prominently displayed (including all previous blocks). We
investigate how investors respond to cumulative performance of both inter-
mediaries as well as their performance in individual blocks (e.g., the most
recent performance). As before, the dependent variable is whether a partici-
pant chooses to invest with the algorithm for the current block. We estimate
panel logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by session, as all
participants within one session observe the same outcomes.
As displayed in Panel A of Table 4.4, investors react to cumulative per-
formance of both intermediaries in the expected direction. The higher the
12 In addition, outperformance of the algorithm is not evenly distributed in the experiment but
is much stronger in later blocks. This is mainly by chance, as decision quality of the human
fund managers remains stable (see also Figures C.1 and C.2 in the appendix).
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Figure 4.5: Choice of Investment Algorithm Over Time
This figure shows the percentage of investors choosing to invest with the algorithm in blocks one to ten.
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past payoff of the algorithm, the more likely are investors to choose the al-
gorithm in the current block. On the contrary, the higher the payoff of the
human fund manager, the less likely are they to choose the algorithm. A one
Euro increase in performance of the algorithm implies an about 3.3% increase
in the probability of choosing the algorithm. The magnitude of coefficients is
very similar for both intermediaries. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that
coefficients are of equal size in any of our regression specifications. Hence,
we do not find that investors show different sensitivity to the performance of
the algorithm.
In further specifications, we add block fixed effects and investor fixed
effects (columns 2 and 3). Using investor fixed effects reduces the number
of observations, as participants who never change their chosen intermedi-
ary (n=30) drop out of the model. Unsurprisingly, the size of the coefficients
increases, as we hereby exclude the participants who are most insensitive to
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Table 4.4: Choice of Intermediary Depending on Performance
Panel A of this table shows average marginal effects of panel logistic regressions with participants choice of inter-
mediary (algorithm=1) in block t as dependent variable (at equal fees). The cumulative payoff is intermediaries’
past payoff, accumulated over all blocks up to t-1. Algorithm (t-1) is a dummy variable indicating a participants
choice for the previous block. This variable is interacted with the cumulative payoff variables. Regressions include
block fixed effects and investor fixed effects as indicated. Panel B shows results for the same dependent variable
regressed on up to five lags of payoffs of both intermediaries. Coefficients are average marginal effects of a panel
logistic regression estimated with random effects. Clustered standard errors by session are shown in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Choice of Algorithm in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cumulative payoff algorithm 0.033 0.036 0.055 0.052 0.047
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
Cumulative payoff human –0.033 –0.031 –0.048 –0.046 –0.042
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
Algorithm (t-1) 0.105 –0.008
(0.046)∗∗ (0.068)
Algorithm (t-1) × cum. payoff algorithm 0.008
(0.008)
Algorithm (t-1) × cum. payoff human –0.007
(0.008)
Observations 1020 1020 720 720 720
Block FE NO YES YES YES YES
Investor FE NO NO YES YES YES
Wald test for equal size of coefficients (p-value) 0.71 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.30
Panel B Choice of Algorithm in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Payoff algorithm (t-1) 0.028 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.034
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
Payoff human (t-1) –0.028 –0.026 –0.032 –0.033 –0.033
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
Payoff algorithm (t-2) 0.021 0.027 0.029 0.028
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
Payoff human (t-2) –0.017 –0.016 –0.023 –0.022
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
Payoff algorithm (t-3) 0.025 0.030 0.033
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
Payoff human (t-3) –0.022 –0.021 –0.027
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
Payoff algorithm (t-4) 0.009 0.010
(0.006) (0.006)∗
Payoff human (t-4) –0.007 –0.009
(0.006) (0.007)
Payoff algorithm (t-5) 0.012
(0.005)∗∗
Payoff human (t-5) –0.011
(0.005)∗∗
Observations 1020 918 816 714 612
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performance. We also find an effect of the choice in the previous block, which
suggests that having chosen the algorithm in t-1 makes it about 10% more
likely to choose the algorithm again (column 4). We interact this variable
with past performance to determine whether investors pay different atten-
tion to outcomes depending on the intermediary they invested with (column
5). Indeed, those who invested with the algorithm are more sensitive to its
performance and less sensitive to the human fund managers’ performance
(not significant).13
Panel B of Table 4.4 reports results for individual lagged payoffs of both
intermediaries. Their economic and statistical significance is slightly weaker
than that of the cumulative payoffs, as they reflect only part of the observed
performance history. There is evidence that more recent payoffs matter more,
with the strongest effect of blocks t-1 to t-3. We find mixed evidence on co-
efficient size, with mostly a larger effect of the algorithm’s performance (not
significant). In sum, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 2 that participants dis-
regard the performance of the algorithm. Figure 4.6 illustrates the almost
monotonous effect of payoff difference in the previous block on the propen-
sity to invest with the algorithm.
It is possible, however, that participants punish the algorithm more
severely for bad performance. As the presented results do not condition on
good or bad outcomes, the prediction of Hypothesis 3 might still be valid.
Table 4.5 shows results of several regression specifications testing for this
possibility. With the choice of the algorithm again as dependent variable, we
now split past payoff differences into cases when the algorithm outperforms
the human fund manager and those when the human outperforms the
algorithm (for cumulative payoffs in columns 1 and 2, and for last block
payoffs in columns 3 and 4). Coefficients are larger when the algorithm
13 As interactions in logistic regressions can be misleading, we estimate a linear model for
robustness. Magnitude and sign of the coefficients are comparable.
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Figure 4.6: Choice of Investment Algorithm by Difference in Last Payoffs
This figure shows the percentage of investors choosing to invest with the algorithm in the current block, depending
on the cumulated payoff difference (in e) between the algorithm and the human in the previous block.
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Table 4.5: Choice of Intermediary After Negative Performance
This table shows average marginal effects of panel logistic regressions with participants choice of intermediary
(algorithm=1) in block t as dependent variable (at equal fees). The Cumulative payoff difference is payoff of the
algorithm minus the payoff of the human fund manager, accumulated over all blocks up to t-1. The variable Last
payoff difference is this difference for (t-1) only. Number of errors is the number of ex-post errors (=choosing the
intermediary with the lower outcome) for block t-1. Regressions include block fixed effects and investor fixed
effects as indicated. Coefficients are average marginal effects of a panel logistic regression estimated with random
effects. Clustered standard errors by session are shown in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Choice of Algorithm in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cum. payoff difference (Algorithm>Human) 0.027 0.039
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Cum. payoff difference (Human>Algorithm) 0.037 0.063
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
Last payoff difference (Algorithm>Human) 0.024 0.041
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Last payoff difference (Human>Algorithm) 0.034 0.049
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗
Number of errors by algorithm –0.057 –0.098
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗
Number of errors by human 0.052 0.079
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
Observations 918 585 918 585 918 585
Block FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Investor FE NO YES NO YES NO YES
Wald test for equal size of coefficients (p-value) 0.47 0.26 0.57 0.76 0.74 0.54
underperforms, suggesting a stronger sensitivity to bad outcomes by the
algorithm. The effect size is between 20% and 60% larger than after good
outcomes, but does never attain statistical significance.
We earlier defined an ex-post error as choosing the asset with the lower
payoff in a given trial. Another way to test whether investors are quicker to
abandon the investment algorithm is counting the number of errors per block
for both intermediaries. Participants’ sensitivity to errors by the algorithm is
somewhat higher than to errors by the human manager (see columns 5 and
6; not statistically significant). However, one has to consider that humans
make more errors, which renders it quite natural that a single error bears less
significance for judging them. A similar argument holds for payoff differ-
ences in favor of the human, which are less frequent and on average smaller
justifying a stronger reaction on a per Euro basis. These statistics also explain
4.4. Results 123
why the found asymmetry does not produce algorithm aversion in the long-
run. As the algorithm is the better intermediary, frequency and magnitude
of outperformance more than compensates for the slightly lower sensitivity.
Evidence for Hypothesis 3 is thus relatively weak.
So far, we treated repeated decisions for an intermediary the same way
as a switch between intermediaries. Arguably, a switch has special signifi-
cance in determining what considerations govern participants’ choices. We
observe 105 switches to the algorithm and 98 switches to the human fund
managers (at equal fees). On average, investors switch intermediaries in 2
out of 9 blocks after their first decision. 30 participants never revise their
initial choice, 19 switch once, 15 twice, and 38 switch three or more times.
An optimal switching point for a Bayesian would be once the non-chosen
intermediary overtakes the chosen one in terms of accumulated payoffs.14
We identify 109 such situations, which means that participants switch about
twice as often as a Bayesian would. However, they seize 57% of the optimal
switching opportunities.
In a logistic panel regression with observed switches as dependent
variable, we confirm that optimal switching points have strong explanatory
power (see Panel A of Table 4.6, column 1). When switching is optimal, we
are 29% more likely to observe an actual switch. It could be that participants
rather look at the performance of the intermediary they currently invest
with (own) or the one they might switch to (target). We find no conclusive
evidence in that regard, whether we look at cumulative payoffs, last block
payoffs, or number of errors (columns 2-4). Higher own performance always
reduces the propensity to switch, while higher target performance increases
it, both with very similar effect size. We find that last block results play
a relatively large role for switching, consistent with the idea that older
14 This rule can be refined by considering the decisions and not just the outcomes. For the
current purpose optimality based on outcomes is sufficient (see also section 4.4.5).
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information could have triggered a switch already before.
More important for algorithm aversion is switching behavior by type of
intermediary, which is displayed in Panel B of Table 4.6. When participants
switch to the algorithm, they consider the performance of their target as well
as the performance of the human fund manager about equally. Likewise,
switching to the human fund manager is informed almost symmetrically by
the performance of the algorithm and human. Interestingly, coefficients are
smaller and significance is weaker for switches to the human, suggesting that
participants pay less attention to performance but might have other reasons.
We do not find any evidence for more pronounced switching behavior af-
ter errors by the algorithm. In fact, errors by the algorithm matter less for
switching. We thus do not find support for Hypothesis 3 from switching
behavior.
4.4.5 Skill vs. Luck
We present evidence that participants strongly consider performance when
selecting a financial intermediary. However, in the used experimental setting
as well as in reality, performance is only a noisy signal of true skill (Heuer
et al., 2017). We thus break down total performance of both intermediaries
into a component of skill and a component of luck. For each trial, we cal-
culate the expected outcome of the intermediary’s chosen asset using the in-
formation available at that point in time. The expected outcome is the skill
component, which we then subtract from the realized payoff of the chosen
asset. This difference is the luck component. For bond investments, luck
is therefore always zero. For stock investments, luck can either be positive
(outcome > expected outcome) or negative (outcome < expected outcome).
Table 4.7 summarizes luck and skill for both intermediaries aggregated
by investment block. Average luck is not significantly different from zero
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Table 4.6: Analysis of Switching Behavior
Panel A of this table reports results of logistic panel regressions with switch of intermediary as dependent variable.
It is a binary variable equal to 1 if an investors switches intermediary from the last block to the current block,
and 0 otherwise. Switch optimal is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, based on total aggregated performance of both
intermediaries, a switch was optimal in a given block, and 0 otherwise. Payoff variables are as defined before, with
target indicating that the payoff refers to the (potential) target of a switch, and own indicating that the payoff refers
to the intermediary invested with in t-1. Panel B shows the same regression results separately for switches to the
algorithm and switches to the human fund manager. Coefficients are average marginal effects of a panel logistic
regression estimated with random effects. Clustered standard errors by session are shown in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A Switch of intermediary in t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switch optimal 0.286
(0.033)∗∗∗
Cum. payoff target 0.018
(0.003)∗∗∗
Cum. payoff own –0.019
(0.003)∗∗∗
Payoff target (t-1) 0.035
(0.005)∗∗∗
Payoff own (t-1) –0.038
(0.005)∗∗∗
Number of errors target –0.077
(0.019)∗∗∗
Number of errors own 0.074
(0.010)∗∗∗
Observations 918 918 918 918
Panel B Switch to algorithm Switch to human
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cum. payoff target 0.014 0.004
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)
Cum. payoff own –0.014 –0.005
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)
Payoff target (t-1) 0.023 0.011
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗
Payoff own (t-1) –0.026 –0.010
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗
Number of errors target –0.048 –0.027
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗
Number of errors own 0.052 0.017
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010)
Observations 918 918 918 918 918 918
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Table 4.7: Luck and Skill of Financial Intermediaries
This table shows total payoffs, luck and skill of both financial intermediaries (in e). All outcomes are aggregated
by investment block. Skill is calculated as the expected payoff based on the intermediary’s asset choices. Luck is
calculated as the difference between realized outcomes and expected payoff.
N µ σ Min Max
Investment algorithm Total payoff 120 18.75 3.96 12.00 30.00
Skill 120 19.02 1.16 18.00 21.08
Luck 120 -0.27 3.12 -6.64 8.92
Human fund manager Total payoff 120 18.17 4.55 6.00 30.00
Skill 120 18.49 1.50 14.92 21.08
Luck 120 -0.33 3.44 -8.92 8.92
for both intermediaries. This finding is not surprising, as consistent luck
would defy the random nature of outcomes. However, luck or bad luck in
individual blocks can be large. When either intermediary outperforms the
other within a block, luck drives this outperformance in 65% of the cases
(due to the larger standard deviation of luck compared to skill). The earlier
mentioned payoff difference of 58 cents in favor of the algorithm is almost
entirely due to skill.
To disentangle whether skill or luck is appreciated by investors, we in-
clude both as variables in a regression of investor choice (Table 4.8). As we
have already established, participants respond to overall performance in the
previous investment block (column 1). However, the effect of the payoff com-
ponent produced by skill remains insignificant (column 2). The larger effect
size arises from the fact that skill differences are often small. In contrast, par-
ticipants strongly react to luck, which also is the only relevant payoff com-
ponent when we include both components simultaneously (columns 3 and
4). Although the assets in the experiment have simple payoff structures and
investors possess the same information as intermediaries, they are unable to
draw additional inferences from choices. They concentrate on outcomes in
line with an outcome bias (Baron and Hershey, 1988).
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A way to corroborate this finding is to look at ex-post errors and ex-ante
errors as defined in section 4.4.2. Clearly, few ex-ante errors are a better signal
of skill as they show how often an intermediary did not identify the superior
asset correctly for a given state of the stock (good or bad). Meanwhile, ex-
post errors include a major luck component as they depend on the outcome
of the payoff draw. Indeed, participants react in expected manner to both
types of errors, with a stronger effect of ex-post errors (columns 5 and 6).
However, this result may be due to the fact that ex-ante and ex-post errors
often coincide. Including both types of errors simultaneously reveals that ex-
post errors crowd out the effect of ex-ante errors (column 7). We conclude
that participants are unable to distinguish skill and luck in the experimental
setting. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, they do not respond more strongly to
errors by the algorithm using different types of error definitions.
4.5 Conclusion
While the term “algorithm aversion” has been introduced only recently (Di-
etvorst et al., 2015), there already exist numerous studies on human prefer-
ences for or against using algorithms. However, the literature is still indeci-
sive on the general prevalence of algorithm aversion. Part of this is due to the
different contexts in which algorithm aversion is tested, while another part is
due to the methodology algorithm aversion is tested. As Logg (2017) points
out, it is difficult to assess when and how algorithm aversion matters.
The aim of this study is to provide insights for financial decisions, as fi-
nance is a field in which the use of algorithm is not only theoretically promis-
ing, but also practically important. We test algorithm aversion in an exper-
imental setting that is (necessarily) simplified, but that contains many fea-
tures of real-world financial decision making. In particular, a real human
fund manager selected by financial knowledge competes with a rule-based
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investment algorithm. They act as financial intermediaries for investors just
as mutual funds would. They operate in a financial market that reveals useful
information, but at the same time is driven by chance. This means that they
have opportunities to show their skill, but also inevitably will make errors.
Investors observe the performance of the intermediaries and their choices
and can react by changing their choice of intermediary.
Under these premises, we find no sign of algorithm aversion. Investors
initially have a slight preference for the algorithm. After observing out-
comes they strongly favor the intermediary who outperforms, but they do
so equally for both intermediaries. We do not find support for the assump-
tion that investors abandon algorithms after seeing them err. Instead, better
performance by the algorithm over time convinces them to switch to the al-
gorithm. However, investors do not discern luck and skill and mostly rely
on investment outcomes without considering the skill revealed by choices.
There are certain ways in which financial decisions differ from decisions
typically studied in the algorithm aversion literature. Two prominent exam-
ples are university admissions and medical decisions, which are likely per-
ceived as contexts in which human intuition or even human empathy should
play a greater role. In these contexts, prospects of academic success and
health of humans are judged, while in finance the prospects of (inanimate)
financial assets are judged. The contexts might further differ in the weight
people place on “soft factors” such as interviews and other direct communi-
cation, as opposed to quantitative strategies based on data. Finally, there is a
moral dimension which deters people from allowing algorithms to make im-
portant life decisions on career or health that is presumably less pronounced
for asset allocation. These considerations are in line with lower or absent
algorithm aversion as we observe in the experiment.
Lastly, there are also practical implications that follow from our experi-
ment. By collecting a sample of university students, often with background
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in economics or finance, our sample is likely similar in financial and tech-
nological sophistication to the customer base of well-known robo-advisors.
In the online survey, sample participants state they believe human fund
managers to be better able to deal with outlier events (e.g., financial crisis
of 2008). They also state to rather view algorithms as aid to human fund
managers. These statements entail that robo-advisors or algorithmic trading
funds could highlight that human experts and algorithms form a symbiotic
relationship. In other words, human experts could be proclaimed to monitor
the complex algorithms, and have the power to ultimately step in in case of
extreme events. To a certain extent, this is already done in practice: Both
Betterment and Wealthfront frame their services as being delivered by a
group of humans (“we”).15 Moreover, both companies also give detailed
information about their investment experts and investment committee
members.
In addition, as we find that performance but not skill is rewarded, robo-
advisors and algorithmic trading funds need to point out to factors that guar-
antee better performance over their human counterpart ex ante and ex post.
One such factor are management fees, which are certain to lower client’s
returns. In the end, however, businesses based on algorithms will have to
prove their success over a long period of time in order to attract convince the
skeptics.
15 See their web presences. For Betterment: “We’ll learn a bit about you.”, “We’ll build you a
portfolio.”, or “We’re on a mission to help you make the most of your money.”. For Wealth-
front: “Live the life you want. We’ve got your back.”, “Financial planning and investing
with Wealthfront couldn’t be easier. We do it for you.”. As of 8 August 2018.
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Table A.1: Sample Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for all participants. CRT is the number of correct answers on a 7 question
cognitive reflection test taken from Toplak et al. (2014). Age is the participant’s age in years. Understanding
Distributions measures how difficult participants found interpreting the distributions of assets in the experiment.
It is calculated from a 5-point Likert scale where 1 refers to “Very easy” and 5 refers to “Very difficult”.
N = 100 µ σ Min Max
CRT 3.90 2.30 0 7
Age 32.08 8.62 18 70
Understanding Distributions 2.58 0.99 1 5
Frequency
Understanding Question 1
Correct 86
Wrong 14
Understanding Question 2
Correct 87
Wrong 13
Both correct 78
Gender
male 70
female 30
Education
Bachelor 46
Master (or equivalent) 7
Middle School 5
PhD (or equivalent) 1
University entrance qualification 33
other 7
Occupation
High school student 1
employee 62
retired 1
self-employed 19
student 9
other 8
Invested in corp. bonds
No 80
Yes 20
Invested in gov. bonds
No 72
Yes 28
Invested in passive funds
No 64
Yes 36
Invested in active funds
No 75
Yes 25
Invested in derivatives
No 88
Yes 12
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Figure A.1: Examplary Screen for Treatment 1
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Results of Experiment Without Restrictions
A secondary study without any restrictions to manager choices was run on
Amazon Mechanical Turk in March 2018. Qualification criteria of AMT work-
ers were unchanged. In total, 151 participants were recruited. In the follow-
ing, we show basic results of the secondary study. For a discussion of the dis-
advantages of running the study without any restrictions to manager choices
see section 2.2 of the paper.
To test for Suboptimal Choice, we drop 1) all manager choices for which ei-
ther every investment manager invests into the preferred asset, as any choice
would then be optimal by default, and we drop 2) all manager choices for
which no investment manager invests into the preferred asset, as any choice
would then be suboptimal by default. To test for Outcome Bias and Outcome
Bias|Suboptimal, we further drop all manager choices for which the invest-
ment manager with the highest historical payoff is also an investment man-
ager who could be chosen by a rational individual. In these cases, we could
not distinguish whether the manager choice is driven by the Outcome Bias
or by rational decision making.
In Treatment 1, the number of observations decreases from 755 to 716 for
tests of Suboptimal Choice, and to 373 for tests of Outcome Bias. In Treatment 2,
the number of observations decreases from 755 to 699 for tests of Suboptimal
Choice , and to 358 for tests of Outcome Bias. In Treatment 3, the number of
observations remains at 755 for tests of Suboptimal Choice, and decreases to
470 for tests of Outcome Bias. Since in Treatment 3 a good investment choice
needs to be inferred from payoff probabilities, fewer observations need to be
dropped than in the other two treatments.
Results from the secondary study are well in line with Hypothesis 1: The
more difficult the separation of skill and luck, the more investors are prone to
the Outcome Bias (Figure A.2). Similarly, the more difficult the separation of
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skill and luck, the more investors tend to make suboptimal manager choices,
resulting in not obtaining their preferred investment (Figure A.3). Again,
the Outcome Bias seems to be the main driver of suboptimal choices (Figure
A.4). Although proportions of Outcome Bias, Suboptimal Choice, and Outcome
Bias|Suboptimal are slightly lower throughout all treatments than in the main
study, a sizable fraction of manager choices is outcome biased or suboptimal
nonetheless.
Results from the secondary study can also not be reconciled with
randomly simulated data. Proportions of Outcome Bias and Outcome
Bias|Suboptimal are consistently above proportions expected from random
choices. However, compared to randomly simulated data, participants make
fewer suboptimal manager choices in all treatments. Nonetheless, as the
difficulty of separating skill from luck increases, so does the proportion of
suboptimal choices in any treatment. In summary, comparing observed to
simulated data in the secondary study presents a similar picture as in the
main study (see Table 2.4).
136 Appendix A. Outcome Bias
Figure A.2: Distribution of Outcome Bias – No Restrictions
Differences of proportions of Outcome Bias between treatments are all significant at the 1%-level. P-values were
obtained using the regression-based approach as outlined in the main analysis.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of Suboptimal Choices – No Restrictions
Differences of proportions of Suboptimal Choice between treatments are all significant at the 1%-level. P-values were
obtained using the regression-based approach as outlined in the main analysis.
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Figure A.4: Distribution of Outcome Bias|Suboptimal – No Restrictions
Differences of proportions of Outcome Bias|Suboptimal between treatments are all insignificant. P-values were ob-
tained using the regression-based approach as outlined in the main analysis.
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Table A.2: Observed vs. Simulated Data – No Restrictions
Simulated data was obtained by simulating the experiment 1000 times with random choices. P-values were ob-
tained using the regression-based approach as outlined in the main analysis.
Outcome Bias
∆
Outcome Bias = 0 Outcome Bias = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Observed 245 (65.7%) 128 (34.3%) 0.001***
Simulated 2072 (77.9%) 588 (22.1%)
Treatment 2
Observed 189 (52.8%) 169 (47.2%) 0.000***
Simulated 1843 (76.3%) 573 (23.7%)
Treatment 3
Observed 205 (43.6%) 265 (56.4%) 0.000***
Simulated 2690 (75.2%) 888 (24.8%)
Suboptimal Choice
∆
Suboptimal Choice = 0 Suboptimal Choice = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Observed 492 (68.5%) 226 (31.5%) 0.000***
Simulated 2365 (50.5%) 2315 (49.5%)
Treatment 2
Observed 375 (53.6%) 324 (46.4%) 0.049**
Simulated 2345 (49.7%) 2371 (50.3%)
Treatment 3
Observed 270 (35.8%) 485 (64.2%) 0.000***
Simulated 1383 (27.4%) 3671 (72.6%)
Outcome Bias|Suboptimal
∆
Outcome Bias|Suboptimal = 0 Outcome Bias|Suboptimal = 1 p-value
Treatment 1
Observed 55 (28.2%) 140 (71.8%) 0.000***
Simulated 992 (61.0%) 634 (39.0%)
Treatment 2
Observed 80 (29.3%) 193 (70.7%) 0.000***
Simulated 915 (60.4%) 600 (39.6%)
Treatment 3
Observed 118 (30.8%) 265 (69.2%) 0.000***
Simulated 1719 (65.9%) 888 (34.1%)
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Experimental Instructions
The following images show instructions and experimental screens as pre-
sented to participants. All realized values shown in the experimental screen
are for illustration purposes only.
Screen 1:
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Screen 2:
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Screen 3 (based on Treatment 3):
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Screen 4 (based on Treatment 3): If answer “yes”
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Screen 4 (based on Treatment 3): If answer “no”
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Screen 5 (based on Treatment 3): If answer “yes”
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Screen 5 (based on Treatment 3): If answer “no”
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Screen 6 (based on Treatment 3):
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Screen 7 (based on Treatment 3):
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Screen 8 (based on Treatment 3):
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Screen 9 (based on Treatment 3): Repeated
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Screen 10 (based on Treatment 3): Repeated
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Screen 11 (based on Treatment 1):
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Screen 12 (based on Treatment 1):
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Screen 13 (based on Treatment 1):
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Screen 14 (based on Treatment 1):
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Screen 15 (based on Treatment 1): Repeated
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Screen 16 (based on Treatment 1): Repeated
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Screen 17 (based on Treatment 2):
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Screen 18 (based on Treatment 2):
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Screen 19 (based on Treatment 2):
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Screen 20 (based on Treatment 2):
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Screen 21 (based on Treatment 2): Repeated
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Screen 22 (based on Treatment 2): Repeated
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Screen 23:
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Screen 24:
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Screen 25:
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Screen 26:
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Table B.1: Risky Share of Investment (By Round)
This table shows the share of wealth invested into the risky asset, Risky Share, for both money managers. HT, HC
corresponds to the more trustworthy (i.e., returned more in the trust game) but more expensive money manager.
LT, LC corresponds to the less trustworthy (i.e., returned less in the trust game) but less expensive money manager.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
N Mean Risky ShareHT,HC Mean Risky ShareLT,LC Paired t-test Wilcoxon signed-rank
Round 1 86 42.97 26.05 0.000*** 0.000***
Round 2 81 46.48 28.64 0.000*** 0.000***
Round 3 85 48.06 28.94 0.000*** 0.000***
Round 4 77 42.66 31.95 0.003*** 0.001***
Round 5 81 50.49 31.11 0.000*** 0.000***
Table B.2: Risky Share of Investment for Identically Trustworthy Money
Managers (By Round)
This table shows the share of wealth invested into the risky asset, Risky Share, for both money managers when both
money managers are equal in trustworthiness (i.e., returned the same amounts in the trust game). The type of costs,
high or low, is indicated by subscripts HC and LC , respectively. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
All Participants
N Mean Risky ShareLC Mean Risky ShareHC Paired t-test Wilcoxon signed-rank
Round 1 28 31.96 18.21 0.033** 0.013**
Round 2 33 33.33 24.94 0.152 0.013**
Round 3 29 30.17 27.76 0.736 0.111
Round 4 37 36.27 28.05 0.181 0.045**
Round 5 33 30.94 28.52 0.696 0.108
Only Participants Who Sent > 0 ECU
Round 1 15 31.67 15.67 0.050* 0.033**
Round 2 20 37.25 22.65 0.100* 0.012**
Round 3 16 31.88 20.94 0.291 0.090*
Round 4 24 42.71 25.83 0.024** 0.025**
Round 5 20 32.50 27.75 0.538 0.279
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Table B.3: Amount Sent – Risky Share and Indifference Costs
This table reports regression results with the amount participants sent in the trust game, Amount Sent, as indepen-
dent variable. For this regression all observations of one treatment were pooled. The value of Amount Sent is fixed
for an individual for all five rounds of a treatment. In column (1) the dependent variable is the share investors
invested risky with the first money manager in Treatment 1. In column (2) the dependent variable is the share
investors invested risky with the second money manager in Treatment 1. In column (3) the dependent variable is
the indifference costs investors specified.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Random Effects Random Effects Random Effects
Risky Share (in %) Risky Share (in %) Indifference Costs
1st Money Manager 2nd Money Manager
Amount Sent 0.237*** 0.216*** 0.0087**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.0044)
Constant 27.13*** 17.69*** 1.413***
(3.721) (3.447) (0.272)
Observations 570 570 570
Cluster-robust S.E. YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
R2overall 0.073 0.080 0.024
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Table B.4: Risky Share – Difference in Trustworthiness (Tobit)
This table reports random effects tobit regression results with ∆Risky Share as dependent variable. It is cal-
culated as the share of wealth invested risky with the more trustworthy money manager minus the share of
wealth invested risky with the less trustworthy money manager. In case both managers are equally trustwor-
thy, it is calculated as the share of wealth invested risky with the more costly manager minus the share of
wealth invested risky with the less costly manager. All regressions account for unobserved individual hetero-
geneity through random effects. ∆ Trustworthiness Absolute is calculated as the amount the more trustworthy
manager returned in the trust game minus the amount the less trustworthy manager returned in the trust game.
∆ Trustworthiness Relative is calculated as (1− ( Lower Returned AmountHigher Returned Amount )) ∗ 100. ∆ Trustworthiness Relative to Sent is
calculated as ( Higher Returned Amount − Lower Returned AmountAmount Sent ) ∗ 100.
∆Risky Share is censored at -100 and +100.
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 repetitions) are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Random Effects Tobit
∆Trustworthiness Absolute 0.341***
(0.069)
∆Trustworthiness Relative 0.252***
(0.041)
∆Trustworthiness Relative to Sent 0.179***
(0.032)
Constant -0.357 -3.423 -1.531
(4.108) (4.630) (4.559)
Observations 570 570 570
Bootstrapped S.E. YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -2735 -2739 -2737
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Table B.5: Risky Share – Difference in Trustworthiness (FE)
This table reports regression results with ∆Risky Share as dependent variable. It is calculated as the share
of wealth invested risky with the more trustworthy money manager minus the share of wealth invested
risky with the less trustworthy money manager. In case both managers are equally trustworthy, it is cal-
culated as the share of wealth invested risky with the more costly manager minus the share of wealth in-
vested risky with the less costly manager. All regressions account for unobserved individual heterogeneity
through fixed effects. ∆ Trustworthiness Absolute is calculated as the amount the more trustworthy man-
ager returned in the trust game minus the amount the less trustworthy manager returned in the trust game.
∆ Trustworthiness Relative is calculated as (1 − ( Lower Returned AmountHigher Returned Amount )) ∗ 100. ∆ Trustworthiness Relative to Sent
is calculated as ( Higher Returned Amount − Lower Returned AmountAmount Sent ) ∗ 100.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed Effects
∆Trustworthiness Absolute 0.384***
(0.081)
∆Trustworthiness Relative 0.290***
(0.047)
∆Trustworthiness Relative to Sent 0.190***
(0.033)
Constant -2.307 -6.044 -2.815
(3.651) (3.813) (3.370)
Observations 570 570 570
Cluster-robust S.E. YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
R2adjusted 0.090 0.095 0.092
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Table B.6: Indifference Costs (By Round)
This table shows indifference costs of investing with the second money manager in Treatment 2. Tests are based
against the costs the first money manager charges, which are equal to 0.75%. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Trustworthiness Second Manager > First Manager
N Mean Indifference Costs Exogenous Costs Paired t-test Wilcoxon signed-rank
Round 1 80 2.24 0.75 0.000*** 0.000***
Round 2 86 1.98 0.75 0.000*** 0.000***
Round 3 79 1.71 0.75 0.000*** 0.000***
Round 4 81 2.02 0.75 0.000*** 0.000***
Round 5 86 1.78 0.75 0.000*** 0.000***
Trustworthiness Second Manager = First Manager
Round 1 34 0.71 0.75 0.835 0.037**
Round 2 28 0.91 0.75 0.545 0.087*
Round 3 35 0.81 0.75 0.715 0.375
Round 4 33 0.92 0.75 0.444 0.180
Round 5 28 0.89 0.75 0.598 0.194
Trustworthiness Second Manager = First Manager
Only Participants Who Sent > 0 ECU
Round 1 21 0.61 0.75 0.141 0.091*
Round 2 15 1.13 0.75 0.307 0.477
Round 3 22 0.73 0.75 0.834 0.625
Round 4 20 1.00 0.75 0.373 0.478
Round 5 15 0.86 0.75 0.765 0.393
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Table B.7: Indifference Costs – Difference in Trustworthiness (Tobit)
This table reports random effects tobit regression results with Indifference Costs as dependent variable. All re-
gressions account for unobserved individual heterogeneity through random effects. ∆ Trustworthiness Absolute
is calculated as the amount the second manager returned in the trust game minus the amount the first man-
ager returned in the trust game. ∆ Trustworthiness Relative is calculated as (1 − ( Lower Returned AmountHigher Returned Amount )) ∗ 100.
∆ Trustworthiness Relative to Sent is calculated as ( Higher Returned Amount − Lower Returned AmountAmount Sent ) ∗ 100.
Indifference Costs is censored at 0 and +10.
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 repetitions) are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Random Effects Tobit
∆Trustworthiness Absolute 0.0102**
(0.0045)
∆Trustworthiness Relative 0.0073***
(0.0025)
∆Trustworthiness Relative to Sent 0.0075***
(0.0022)
Constant 1.358*** 1.309*** 1.208***
(0.196) (0.184) (0.188)
Observations 570 570 570
Bootstrapped S.E. YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -1074 -1075 -1067
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Table B.8: Indifference Costs – Difference in Trustworthiness (FE)
This table reports regression results with Indifference Costs as dependent variable. All regressions account for un-
observed individual heterogeneity through fixed effects. ∆ Trustworthiness Absolute is calculated as the amount
the second manager returned in the trust game minus the amount the first manager returned in the trust game.
∆ Trustworthiness Relative is calculated as (1− ( Lower Returned AmountHigher Returned Amount )) ∗ 100. ∆ Trustworthiness Relative to Sent is
calculated as ( Higher Returned Amount − Lower Returned AmountAmount Sent ) ∗ 100.
Standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed Effects
∆Trustworthiness Absolute 0.0094**
(0.0039)
∆Trustworthiness Relative 0.0056***
(0.0022)
∆Trustworthiness Relative to Sent 0.0064***
(0.0019)
Constant 1.527*** 1.531*** 1.417***
(0.125) (0.115) (0.135)
Observations 570 570 570
Cluster-robust S.E. YES YES YES
Round FE YES YES YES
R2adjusted 0.031 0.020 0.053
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Table B.9: Risky Share – Robustness (Tobit)
This table reports random effects tobit regression results with ∆ Risky More − Risky Less as dependent variable.
It is calculated as the share of wealth invested risky with the more trustworthy money manager minus the share of
wealth invested risky with the less trustworthy money manager. The regression accounts for unobserved individual
heterogeneity through random effects. Biased Beliefs is an indicator variable equal to 1 if participants stated that they
believed that more trustworthy money managers could deliver better investment performance. Reward Motivation
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if participants stated that they invested more risky with more trustworthy money
managers because they wanted to reward them.
∆ Risky More − Risky Less is censored at -100 and +100.
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 repetitions) are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Random Effects Tobit
Biased Beliefs -12.67
(14.47)
Reward Motivation 1.170
(9.357)
Biased Beliefs×Reward Motivation 18.21
(16.84)
Constant 18.39**
(8.825)
Observations 322
Bootstrapped S.E. YES
Round FE YES
Log-likelihood -1525
178 Appendix B. Trust and Delegated Investing
Table B.10: Indifference Costs – Robustness (Tobit)
This table reports regression results with Indifference Costs as dependent variable, for cases in which the second
money manager is more trustworthy than the first money manager. The regression accounts for unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity through random effects. Biased Beliefs is an indicator variable equal to 1 if participants stated
that they believed that more trustworthy money managers could deliver better investment performance. Reward
Motivation is an indicator variable equal to 1 if participants stated that they invested more risky with more trust-
worthy money managers because they wanted to reward them.
Indifference Costs is censored at 0 and +10.
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 repetitions) are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Random Effects Tobit
Biased Beliefs 0.214
(0.652)
Reward Motivation 0.010
(0.656)
Biased Beliefs×Reward Motivation 0.644
(0.857)
Constant 1.751***
(0.527)
Observations 324
Bootstrapped S.E. YES
Round FE YES
Log-likelihood -659
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Experimental Instructions
The following images show instructions and experimental screens as pre-
sented to participants. All realized values shown in the experimental screens
are for illustration purposes only.
Screen 1:
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Screen 6: Repeated
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Screen 7: Repeated
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Screen 8: Repeated
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Experimental Instructions
This appendix contains the experimental instructions as they were used in
the experiment. Instructions were in English and were handed out on paper.
Written Instructions MLab. Page 1:
Instructions 
Overview 
This laboratory experiment consists of two parts. The first part will determine which 
participants will be selected for the role of a “human fund manager”. There is one fund 
manager for each randomly assigned group of ten participants. In the second part, the human 
fund manager will have to make active choices between investing into either a stock or a bond. 
All participants not selected as human fund manager are investors and have to make an 
investment choice between investing either with the human fund manager or an investment 
algorithm. The goal of the investment algorithm is to maximize expected terminal wealth. The 
human fund manager will obtain his/her terminal wealth according to his/her investment 
decisions. Investors will obtain the terminal wealth of their selected investment intermediary 
(human or algorithm) minus a fee. As participant, please make your decisions carefully as 
these decisions determine your payoff for participation.  
 
Part 1 
You will be asked to answer 8 questions on financial matters. Time is limited to 1 minute per 
financial question. You will then be asked to answer 4 numeracy questions. Time is limited to 
2 minutes per numeracy question. The participant with the highest number of correctly 
answered questions will be anonymously appointed as “human fund manager”, his/her 
identity will not be revealed to the other participants. In case there are ties for the highest 
number of correctly answered questions, a random number draw will resolve the tie. 
As an incentive to assume the role of the fund manager, this participant can collect his/her 
investment outcomes without deduction of any fees. 
 
Part 2 
General structure: 
There are two securities on a market, one of which is a bond paying 3€ for certain. The other 
is a stock paying either 5€ or 1€. The probability for the high payoff is either 70% (good state) 
or 30% (bad state). Whether the good or bad state applies is randomly determined (50%/50%) 
at the beginning of a block of trials. A trial represents one draw of returns for the stock and 
the bond. Each block contains 6 trials for which the state of the stock is fixed. There is a total 
of 10 blocks. 
As Human Fund Manager: 
In each trial, the participant appointed as human fund manager is asked to choose to invest 
into either the stock or the bond. A history of the returns of the stock and the bond, and a 
history of the investment choices and returns of the investment algorithm is shown in each 
block. 
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Written Instructions MLab. Page 2:
 
As Investor: 
At the start of each block you have to choose whether to invest with the human fund manager 
or the investment algorithm. Investing with the human fund manager always costs a fee of 
2€ per block. Investing with the investment algorithm costs a fee of either 0€, 1€, 2€, 3€ or 4€. 
The respective fee is subtracted from the final investment outcome of each block (but not 
given to the fund manager or algorithm). For each of the 5 possible cost-combinations you will 
be asked to choose with which intermediary you would like to invest in this block (see Figure 
1 below). 
Figure 1: Example of Cost-Combination Choice 
 
 
A random draw then determines which cost-combination applies, and your indicated choice 
for this combination will be implemented. You then observe the choices of the human fund 
manager and the algorithm for the six trials within the block. You cannot change your chosen 
intermediary within a block. For the next block, however, you make a new decision on with 
whom to invest. 
 Figure 2 shows the structure of the experiment. 
Figure 2: Sequence of Experiment 
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Written Instructions MLab. Page 3:
Test block: 
There will be a test block to familiarize participants with the screens and steps of the 
experiment. In this test block all choices are randomly determined: They do not stem from the 
human fund manager or the investment algorithm. The test block is purely for illustration 
purposes. The test block also does not count towards your payoff for participation. 
 
Payoffs: 
As Human Fund Manager:  
You will receive the outcome for one block of your investment choices. At the end of the 
experiment, 1 out of the 10 blocks will be chosen randomly. The accumulated terminal wealth 
for this block will be paid out to you.  
As Investor: 
You will receive the outcome for one block of your investment choices, minus costs. At the 
end of the experiment, 1 out of the 10 blocks will be chosen randomly. The accumulated 
terminal wealth of the chosen investment intermediary for this block minus the respective 
costs will be paid out to you.  
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Experimental Screens
This appendix shows screenshots from the experiment as seen by par-
ticipants. All realized values shown in the experimental screens are for
illustration purposes only.
Experimental Screens. Financial Literacy and Numeracy
Test, Page 1/3:
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Experimental Screens. Financial Literacy and Numeracy
Test, Page 2/3:
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Experimental Screens. Financial Literacy and Numeracy
Test, Page 3/3:
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Experimental Screens. Investor Choice of Financial Inter-
mediary:
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Experimental Screens. Outcome of Random Draw of Fee
Combination:
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Experimental Screens. Fund Manager Choice of Asset:
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Experimental Screens. Outcome Screen Within Block of
Investments:
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Experimental Screens. Outcome Screen After Finished
Block of Investments:
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Additional Results
This appendix contains additional results from the experiment.
Figure C.1: Human Equal Bayesian in Block, Over Blocks
This figure shows the average number of Bayesian investment choices by the human in a block.
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Figure C.2: Performance Human and Algorithm, by Block
This figure shows the average cumulated performance (in e) of the algorithm and the human in a block.
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Figure C.3: Choices by Block and Costs
This figure shows the percentage of investors choosing to invest with the human in a block if fees for both
intermediaries are not equal. “H: 2e, A: 0e” refers to fees of 2e for the human and fees of 0e for the algorithm.
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Table C.2: Choice Intermediary – Lags of Performance Difference
This table reports panel regressions with Choice Humant as dependent variable. It is a dummy equal to 1 if in-
vestors choose to invest with the human fund manager if costs are equal at 2e per intermediary, and 0 otherwise.
Performance Differencet−x measures the performance difference of the human fund manager minus the investment
algorithm, accumulated over all trials of block t-x.
Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed Effects
Performance Differencet−1 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.025***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Performance Differencet−2 0.014** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Performance Differencet−3 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Performance Differencet−4 0.007 0.008
(0.006) (0.008)
Performance Differencet−5 0.007
(0.007)
Constant 0.522*** 0.521*** 0.532*** 0.562*** 0.508***
(0.026) (0.061) (0.043) (0.035) (0.034)
Observations 918 816 714 612 510
Investor FE YES YES YES YES YES
Block FE YES YES YES YES YES
R2adjusted 0.063 0.082 0.114 0.116 0.088
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Table C.3: Choice Intermediary – Total Performance, Split by Gain and Loss
This table reports panel regressions with Choice Humant as dependent variable. It is a dummy equal to 1 if investors
choose to invest with the human fund manager if costs are equal at 2e per intermediary, and 0 otherwise. Perfor-
mance Differencet=0 to t−1 measures the performance difference of the human fund manager minus the investment
algorithm, accumulated over all blocks to t-1. Positive Performance Differencet=0 to t−1 is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 if the total aggregated performance of the human fund manager up to block t-1 is greater than the total
aggregated performance of the investment algorithm, and 0 otherwise. Observations for which total aggregated
performance of both intermediaries up to block t-1 is equal are dropped.
Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Fixed Effects
Performance Differencet=0 to t−1 0.020**
(0.009)
Positive Performance Differencet=0 to t−1 0.104
(0.076)
Performance Differencet=0 to t−1×Positive Performance Differencet=0 to t−1 0.004
(0.019)
Constant 0.477***
(0.059)
Observations 734
Investor FE YES
Block FE YES
R2adjusted 0.085
Table C.4: Choice Intermediary – Identical Investments in Previous Block
This table reports panel regressions with Choice Humant as dependent variable. It is a dummy equal to 1 if investors
choose to invest with the human fund manager if costs are equal at 2e per intermediary, and 0 otherwise. Human
Equal Algorithmt−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if human fund manager and investment algorithm had all identical
investment outcomes in block t-1.
Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Fixed Effects
Human Equal Algorithmt−1 -0.004
(0.050)
Constant 0.521***
(0.042)
Observations 918
Investor FE YES
Block FE YES
R2adjusted 0.026
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